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A PEACE PROPOSAL FOR THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
WARS: RESTORING THE HOUSEHOLD TO ITS
PROPER PLACE
MARIE A. FAILINGER*
Western legal cultures are enmeshed in fierce social debates
about how both marriage and the family should be defined. What
was once academic speculation about new forms of marriage has
now moved into popular discussion worldwide. Most recently, this
debate has been galvanized by judicial decisions in Canada and
Western Europe, the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas
that same-sex sodomy cannot be criminally punished without
violating the due process clause,' and the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court's decision that denial of legal marriage to same-sex
partners violates equal protection provisions of the state constitution.2
These cases have brought same-sex marriage to the forefront of
popular debate, particularly among political conservatives. On July
30, 2003, President Bush took sides with marriage traditionalists,
yet apparently not the states' rights advocates among them,
announcing in a press conference, "I believe marriage is between a
man and a woman, and I believe we ought to codify that one way or3
the other and we have lawyers looking at the best way to do that."
On February 24, 2004, the President unambiguously issued a call
for a constitutional amendment to "prevent the meaning of marriage
from being changed forever, by defining and protecting marriage as
a union of a man and woman as husband and wife," while "leaving
...

state legislatures free to make their own choices in defining

legal arrangements other than marriage."4

* Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law.

Thanks to my research

assistant, Paula Semrow, for her thorough work on this project.

1. See notes 31-44 infra and accompanying text for further discussion.
2. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Public Health, 440 Mass. 308, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003). For
a discussion of Goodridge,see notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
3. Neil A. Lewis, From the Rose Garden:Same Sex Marriage;Bush Backs Bid to Block
Gays From Marrying,N.Y. TIMS, July 31, 2003, at Al.
4. Transcript of Bush Statement, at http://cnn.alpolitics.printthis.clickability.com/
pt?action&title=CNN.com (last visited Feb. 24, 2004). Bush argued that this move would
"respect every person and protect the institution of marriage. There is no contradiction
between these responsibilities. . . 'Id. By contrast, immediately after the Goodridgedecision
was handed down, Bush was more ambiguous, suggesting on prime time television that he
would support a constitutional amendment to codify man-woman marriage "if neccessary,"
but in a bow to both conservative and liberal interests, stated, "the position of this
administration is that whatever legal arrangements people want to make, they're allowed to
make, so long as it's embraced by the state or start at the state level." Carolyn Lochhead,
Bush plays both sides in debate over gay marriage/Hesays he'll back constitutionalban, S.F.
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America's religious communities have also taken sides in the
debate. On July 31, 2003, because of a concern about the growing
legalization of same-sex relationships, the Vatican "urged Roman
Catholic lawmakers and others to fight back, calling support for
such legislation 'gravely immoral.'"5 During the same week, the
Episcopal Church USA, meeting in Minneapolis, seated its first gay
bishop living openly in a committed same-sex relationship, and
compromised on same-sex blessings.6
The long-advocated cause of legal same-sex marriage has only
recently claimed its first stable successes in court and legislative
arenas, but these successes are significant. Particularly in the past
five years, this movement has scored solid victories for gay and
lesbian couples in much of Western Europe, including nations with
significant Roman Catholic populations, such as France, Belgium,
and Germany.' In the United States, following unstable victories in
Hawaii8 and Alaska9 , and a compromise decision in Vermont,10
CHRON., Dec. 18, 2003, at Al. Bush seemingly tried to recover by declaring that "the issue of
same-sex marriage should be left to the states except and unless judicial rulings undermine
the sanctity of marriage. In which case, we may need a constitutional amendment." Id.
Congress has already responded by introducing legislation to constitutionalize marriage. 149
Cong. Rec. H9689-05, H9690 2003 WL 22386811 (Oct. 20, 2003) (remarks of Rep.
Blumenauer). Bush has previously attempted to appease both states' rights advocates and
anti-gay marriage supporters. See Bush backs amendment to stop gay marriages, DESERET
NEws, Dec. 12, 2003,at A12.
5. Frank Bruni, Vatican ExhortsLegislatorsto Reject Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
1, 2003, at Al.
6. Monica Davey, Gay Bishop Wins in Episcopal Vote; Split Threatened, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug.
6, 2003, at Al; Martha Allen Sawyer, Gay bishop approved;Episcopaliansurvives allegations,
fears of church split, STAR-TRIBUNE (Minn.-St. Paul), Aug. 6, 2003, at A3, A10; Rachel Zoll,
Episcopal Leaders OK Same-Sex Blessings, Newsday.com, at www.newsday.com/news/
nationworld/wire/snsap-episcopalians-gay-bishop (last visited Jan. 12, 2004).
7. See Bruni, supra note 5 (noting that France became the first predominantly Roman
Catholic nation to allow same-sex marriages, while "Germany, which also has a large Catholic
population, grants gay couples protections, benefits, and responsibilities traditionally reserved
for married men and women.").
8. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (ruling state statute preventing same sex
marriage establishes a sex-based classification subject to strict scrutiny, but also ruled that state
constitution does not provide a fundamental right of persons of the same sex to marry).
9. See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. 1998) (finding
that same-sex marriage is a fundamental right; state must have compelling interest that
supports its decision to refuse to recognize same sex-marriages). But see Brause v. Dep't of
Health and Human Services, 21 P.3d 357 (Alaska 2001) (dismissing declaratory judgment
action challenging the validity of state statute precluding same-sex marriage as not ripe for
adjudication).
10. See Bakerv. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (determining that exclusion ofsame-sex
couples from benefits related to marriage violates common benefits clause of state
constitution).
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Goodridge v. Department of Massachusettspromises to be the most
significant public victory for advocates of gay marriage in the
United States, though the Massachusetts court and legislature
engaged in a struggle over marriage versus civil unions for gay and
lesbian couples." Yet, in practical terms, the case that will create
the broadest impact in the Western Hemisphere was the decision of
the Canadian government to extend marriage to same-sex couples
after three provincial court victories. 2
These are not the only winds blowing change into the law of
marriage. Another movement, the covenant marriage movement,
which aims to make marriage and divorce a more serious
undertaking for the matrimonial couple through heightened
restrictions on both, continues to capture the imagination of persons
with traditional understandings of marriage and those troubled by
the state of modern marriage. 3 In addition to legislative successes
in Arkansas, Arizona, and Louisiana, 4 covenant marriage bills have
successfully passed at least one house in Oregon, Georgia, Texas
and Oklahoma and have been introduced in at least eighteen other
states and Australia as well. 5 Simultaneously, a religious movement
11. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 343, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (2003).
For a discussion of these developments, see notes 73-74 infra and accompanying text.
12. See Clifford Kraus, Canadian Leaders Agree to Propose Gay Marriage Law, N.Y.
TMES, June 17, 2003, at Al (noting that the Canadian cabinet approved a same-sex marriage
policy and ordered draft legislation to implement the policy). However, the debate over
extension of marriage to same-sex partners is far from over in Canada. On September 16,
2003, the Canadian House of Commons barely defeated a nonbonding resolution to oppose the
government's plan to legalize gay marriage, see Tom Cohen, Resolution Opposing Same-Sex
Unions Fails, S. FLA SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 17, 2003, at 21A. The case which spurred the
government's decision was Halpern v. Toronto (city), 2003 CarswellOnt 2159, 36 R.F.L.(5th)
127, 172 O.A.C. 276, reversing, in part, Halpern v. Toronto (Attorney General), 2002
CarswellOnt 3209, 28 R.F.L. (5th) 41, 215 D.L.R. (4th) 223 (holding Canadian marriage law
that defined marriage in opposite sex-terms only as a violation of section 15(1) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms). Halpern cites Hendricks v. Quebec (Procureure
General) 2002 CarswellQue 1890 (2002) R.J.Q. 2506, (2002) R.D.F. 1022 and EGALE Canada
Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 CarswellBC 3178,2002 BCCA 710, 178 B.C.AC. 309
(both holding that the prohibition against same-sex marriages was unconstitutional, but
suspending the court declarations for periods of up to two years); Clifford Kraus, World
Briefing: Americas: Canada:CourtAllows Same-Sex Marriages,N.Y. TIMEs, June 11, 2003,
at A8.
13. See, e.g., Alan J. Hawkins et al., Attitudes about Covenant Marriage and Divorce:
Policy Implications from a Three-State Comparison, 51 FAM. REL. 166, 2002 WL 11465233
(2002) (analyzing and comparing data obtained from Louisiana, Arizona, and Minnesota
pertaining to viewpoints on heightening guidelines for marriage and divorce).
14. Id. at 167.
15. For links to actual statutes and bills, see Covenant MarriageLinks, at http'J/www.
divorcereform.org.cov.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
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to encourage and register private covenant marriages has been
endorsed and underwritten by many of the most significant
conservative marriage and family organizations in the country,
including the Moody Bible Institute, the Promise-Keepers, and
Focus on the Family.'" Although both the gay marriage movement
and the covenant marriage movement represent positive
alternatives in the debate around legal marriage and family, one
can argue that both ultimately mimic rather than resolve the
problems with using the 'choice'-based nuclear family as the favored
legal model for ordering intimate relationships. As a short-term
strategy, however, the covenant marriage and gay marriage
movements both promise to bring stability to intimate relationships
that are increasingly seen by people from various ideological
positions as fragile. Moreover, both movements offer the possibility
of bringing new social respect to relationships traditionally viewed
with disdain over the last few decades: by conservatives- the gay or
lesbian committed intimate relationship; and by liberals- the
religiously informed traditional marriage.
Unless a solution beyond these two alternatives is found, both
movements, in particular the same-sex marriage movement, could
ignite a destructive cultural conflagration. Just as significantly, by
supporting the modern trend of singling out marriage and the
parent-child relationship as the legal sine qua non of private
relationships, these movements may ultimately defeat their
purpose: in fact, they may only exacerbate the modern tendency to,
if you will, 'put all the eggs' of private life into the 'basket' of the
nuclear family. That is, these movements may ultimately help,
albeit modestly, to load the institution of marriage with
expectations that it cannot realistically hope to achieve. These
movements seem only to shore up the modern wall between public
life and the private world of the
family rather than freeing men and
7
women to live fulfilling lives.'
16. See About Us, What is the Covenant MarriageMovement?, at httpJ/www.familyfi.org/
CMM-LIST.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2004) [hereinafter What is the Covenant Marriage
Movement?].
17. For a discussion on how the distinction between public and private life affects and
creates the manner which an individual functions in society, see generally Elizabeth Mensch
& Alan Freeman, The Public-PrivateDistinctionin American Law and Life, 36 BuFF. L. REV.
237,239,241-42 (1987). See also MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEtrrERED MOTHER, THE
SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIErH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 156-57 (1995) (noting the
blurring of lines between the public and private in areas such as domestic violence); Lynda
Nead,Women and Urban Life, at http:/Avww.bbc.co.uk/history/lj/victorian.britainljwomen
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In addition, one can argue that these movements portend the
further stigmatization of the sexually promiscuous and other social
outliers who refuse to conform to societal mores regarding sexual
behavior and sexual responsibility. These are stigmas that may be
deserved in many cases of irresponsible promiscuity, though many
in the gay community fear oppressive 'normalization' of sexuality.'
Yet, if successful, the same-sex marriage and covenant marriage
movements promise to further marginalize those who, through no
real choice of their own, do not live in relationships resembling the
marital ideal.
As emerging forms of family life continue to multiply, another,
more inclusive and indeed more traditional form might fruitfully
replace marriage and the nuclear family as the key legal category
for ordering private intimate relationships; one that does not depend
on, but is still large enough to embrace, mutually committed sexual
relationships as a typical expression. This form, the household, which
consists of all those who live under the same roof whether they are
related or not, 9 is a commonly recognized social and legal form used

_urban3.shtml?site=history.victorianljurban (last visited Jan. 21,2004) (noting that women
were identified with the private sphere and moral and sexual purity).
18. See, e.g., Michael Warner, Beyond Gay Marriage, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFr CRITIQUE
276-278 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) (arguing that same-sex marriage will
extend efforts to 'normalize' gay life and stigmatize other gay sex).
19. See U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey (CPS) - Definitions and
Explanation,at httpJ/www.census.gov/population/www/cpscpsdef.html (last visited Jan. 12,
2004) [hereinafter CurrentPopulationSurvey]. The United States Census Bureau's definition
of household states that:
A household consists of all the people who occupy a housing unit. A house, an
apartment or other group of rooms, or a single room, is regarded as a housing
unit when it is occupied or intended for occupancy as separate living quarters;
that is, when the occupants do not live and eat with any other persons in the
structure and there is direct access from the outside or through a common hall.
A household includes the related family members and all the unrelated people,
if any, such as lodgers, foster children, wards, or employees who share the
housing unit. A person living alone in a housing unit, or a group of unrelated
people sharing a housing unit such as partners or roomers, is also counted as a
household. The count of households excludes group quarters.,
Id.
See also Roger Thomas, 'HouseholdDefinition' 1998, QuestionBank Topic Commentary on
Health, at httpJ/qb.soc.surrey.ac.uk/housedefinition/housedef.htm (visited Jan. 17, 2004) ("A
household comprises either one person living alone or a group of people, who may or may not
be related, living (or staying temporarily) at the same address, with common housekeeping,
who either share at least one meal a day or share common living accommodation (ie a living
room or sitting roomY').

200

WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW

[Vol. 10:195

today in such governmental programs as the United States Census
and the Food Stamp program.2"
This is not the first attempt to suggest that the nuclear family
concept be replaced by a different legal concept such as contract,
trust or kinship as the chief way lawyers think about intimate
relationships, a literature survey discloses several such proposals,
including some that note the historical significance of the concept of
the household.2 Indeed, part of my point is that the household form
has been with us all along, if we only care to relearn and embrace
our tradition on this form. However, I hope that this more extended
treatment of the household as a legal model will both remind us of
the actual complexity of our social traditions related to the family,
and shed some new light on the critical problems of the existing
model. While a refocusing on the household as the chief unit of
20. See notes 233-235 infra and accompanying text.
21. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "It All Depends on What you Mean by Home":
Toward a Communitarian Theory of the 'Nontraditional"Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 569
(1996) (urging that an expanded definition of kinship be used to identify legal rights and
responsibilities). For other proposals, see, for example, FINEMAN, supranote 17, at 27 (arguing
that the law should recognize the mother-child dyad as the legal family and permit sexual
partners to order their affairs through private contract); Judith Butler, Is Kinship Always
Already Heterosexual?, in 13.1 DIFFERENCES: A JOURNAL OF FEMINIST CULTURAL STUDIES 14
(2002) (arguing for refocused social attention on broader forms of kinship than marriage and
children, including "self-consciously assembled" kinship until the couple involved have
children); Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law
Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709 (1996) (arguing that common law marriage should be retained
or reinstituted because of the greater level of protection it provides to women); Harry D.
Krause & David D. Meyer, American Law in a Time of Global Interdependence:U.S. National
Reports to the XVIth InternationalCongressof ComparativeLaw: Section II-What Familyfor
the 21st Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 101 (2002) (arguing that married and unmarried couples
in the same positions should be treated alike by the law); David D. Meyer, Self-Definition in
the Constitution of Faith and Family, 86 MINN. L. REv. 791 (2002) (arguing that families
should be given greater deference in defining themselves); Summer L. Nastich, Questioning
the MarriageAssumptions: The Justificationsfor 'Opposite Sex Only" Marriageas Support
for the Abolition of Marriage,21 LAW & INEQU. 114 (2003) (arguing that marital privileges are
unjustified and public policy that is ostensibly furthered by marriage should rather be
effectuated through contracts, statutes and common law doctrines); Laura Weinrib,
ReconstructingFamily: ConstructiveTrust atRelationalDissolution, 37 HARV. C.R.C.L.L. REV.
207 (2002) (arguing that courts should use constructive trust doctrine, "an equitable remedy
imposed on a party who has wrongfully obtained the property of another," to protect persons
in intimate relationships); Lenore J. Weitzman, Legal Tradition of Marriage:Traditionand
Change, a Proposalfor Individual Contracts and Contracts in Lieu of Marriage,62 CALIF. L.
REV. 1169 (1974) (arguing that as one solution to the difficulties with the marriage contract
and an alternative way to regulate the relationship, individuals should have the opportunity
to establish private contracts among themselves instead and even independent of
marriage);Lisa Milot, Note, Restitching the American Marital Quilt: Untangling Marriage
from the Nuclear Family, 87 VA. L. REV. 701 (2001) (arguing that individuals should be able
to order their lives without state intervention).
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private life from which legal rights and responsibilities flow is not
without its problems, the gains offered by this shift are more than
worth the cost. Some of these gains are symbolic. For example, the
legal concept of the household is less exclusive.2 2 I argue, therefore,
that the concept is less subject to the human temptation to elevate
one form of private relationship such as marriage or the parentchild bond above others as a morally preferable social unit, and
label other groups of individuals who function in similar ways as
socially less worthy forms of 'family.'
Arguably, the social conflicts that have been generated at the
confluence of debates over feminism, individualism, and religious
traditionalism make it possible to bring some rough, tangible
equality to a wide variety of family forms. A refocusing on the
household as a legal institution will make it less likely that the
current fights between liberals and conservatives over marriage will
overshadow pressing social problems, such as the welfare of children
and economic disparities. If the household becomes the legal form
to which the largest number of legal rights and duties are attached,
it may also be possible for the debate about marriage, including
same-sex marriage, to become more civil. This debate is then less
weighted down with the widespread and serious legal consequences
for households that attend its outcome. The legal consequences of
the definition of marriage are indeed serious: the same-sex marriage
debate has identified more than a thousand legal rights and
obligations in the United States directly affected by marital status.2 3
Still other consequences of refocusing the weight of right and
responsibility upon the legal household are practical. For example,
already existing socially fragile private communities will increasingly
be able to receive the social supports they need and deserve. Some
brief examples:
Single heterosexual mothers with children could be empowered
to form households with similar other mothers, taking advantage of
the availability of multiple adults to care for children, perform
household tasks, and seek emotional support and advice from others,
22. See CurrentPopulationSurvey, supranote 19 (providing legal definition of household).
23. See, e.g., Demian, Quick Facts on Legal Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, at
httpJ/www.buddybuddy.con/marquik.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2004) (noting 1,040 federal
laws triggered by marriage and 160-250 state laws in each jurisdiction). See also, Dernian,
U.S. Federal Regulations Triggered by Legal Marriage, at http//www.buddybuddy.com/
marfedd.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2004) (listing federal laws for which spousal status also
is used to provide benefits or regulate individuals); see also Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864,88384 (Vt. 1999) (listing types ofVermont government benefits depending on spousal relationship).
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without being penalized by social programs or subjected to the
stigmas that gay and lesbian partners currently face.
Gay and lesbian families could coexist with other families
without being forced into revealing their living arrangements as
sexual or intimate relationships, something that could subject them
to harassment, threats to custody arrangements, and other forms of
social attack.
Older persons could form households with unrelated peers
or younger people to meet their needs for companionship and
household help, without social assumptions about their sexuality
or vulnerability to exploitation.
Social kinship structures could be strengthened, as intergenerational families, such as grandparents or aunts and uncles
who parent or coparent grandchildren, nieces and nephews can
receive public benefits that currently exclude them, unless they
virtually replace the child's parents for legal purposes.
Group homes composed of adult singles, such as the mentally
disabled or chemically dependent, could be treated as legitimate
'families' without social expectation that they are either transitional
or aberrant.
The aim of this article is to investigate both the reality of family
life and the normative arguments surrounding marriage and the
nuclear family in order to make a preliminary case for a move to the
household as the key organizing concept in American law. First, it
is important to briefly look at the reality of family forms in
American society and the burden placed on the nuclear family to
represent this diversity of family forms, as well as to understand
what the gay and covenant marriage movements are about and
where they currently stand.
Second, through the lens of family history and sociology, I want
to consider whether the so-called 'nuclear family' is indeed the key
model or social building block that family duties have been
structured around, which might argue for its continued place as a
legal construct.
Third, I will argue that both the gay marriage and covenant
marriage movements have, in fact, promoted a 'choice' model for
the creation of the legal family that is both historically excluding
and morally problematical. Finally, I will argue that the household
is a viable legal concept for dealing with many of the five vital
functions that households and families have traditionally served:
sexual expression, reproduction, childhood socialization, economic
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interdependence, and social support. I will also address the
objections to a wide-scale adoption of the household in place of the
nuclear family as a legal model.
THE MARRIAGE DEBATE AND THE VANISHING NUCLEAR FAMILY

In most human societies, some practical construct of the family
or household has played a key role in organizing human identity,
relationships, historical continuity, and even community economic
and social life.24 Most modem societies continue to imagine the
family as the most vital location where the realities of human
interdependence - desire, conflict, vulnerability, power, security,
love, nurture - play themselves out in individual lives. 5
Given that in so-called developed countries, marriage and the
nuclear family do not serve as the exclusive groundwork upon which
society constructs the multiple roles that an individual will occupy
over his/her lifetime the nuclear family indeed does seem to be
vanishing. Many people are as 'wedded' to their workplace colleagues
as to their spouses. Moreover, so-called 'traditional' nuclear families
consisting of a married couple and their children have indeed
recently shrunk as a proportion of the American population.2 6 Of the
104.7 million households counted by the U.S. census in 2000, only
55.3 million were married couple households, and only twenty-four
percent of the total were 'married-couple households' with their own
minor children (down from forty percent in 1970).27
Dire predictions of the demise of marriage as the legal
placeholder for the nuclear family are not without evidence: more
than three million couples, both straight and gay, were bold enough
to identify themselves as cohabiting couples in the last census, in
addition to those who "may be reluctant to classify themselves as
such in a personal interview situation and may describe themselves
24. See, e.g., Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, Why MarriageMatters,at httpi/
www.glad.org/piblications/CivilRightProjectOPlwhymarriagematters.shtml (lastvisited Jan.
12, 2004) (providing examples of different marital constructs).
25. See, e.g., Rev. Mark Connolly, Family Life, SPITUALITY FOR TODAY
at httpJAvw.spirituality.org/lssueO2/pageO2.html (last visited Jan. 15,2004) (proposing family
care as a basis for learning chastity and compassion to others).
26. See Jason Fields & Lynne M. Casper, U. S. Census Bureau, America's Families and
Living Arrangements: March 2000, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, P20-537, 1, 1-3 (2001) at
http'/www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p20-537.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2004). [hereinafter
POPULATION REPORTS 20011.
27. Id.
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as roommates, housemates, or friends not related to each other."2 s
Other studies suggest that predictions of doom for marriage and the
traditional family generally are vastly overstated.2 s Statisticians
note that well over ninety-five percent of all women in the United
States will be married by the age of sixty-five, though the typical
age of marriage has clearly shifted from early twenties to the
twenty-five to thirty-five age range for both men and women.3" A
more significant worry expressed by nearly everyone who considers
himself in the mainstream is the high rate of divorce."' Statistics
suggest that between thirty-three to fifty percent of all first
marriages will end in divorce, most typically in the first few years
after marriage among couples in their early to mid-twenties,3 2 and
that subsequent marriages have even a worse chance of success.3
To recite the spectrum of proposed causes of the fragility of
American and other Western marriages would be tedious, for they
are well-rehearsed in public culture. I have suggested one somewhat
under-represented argument that marriages, and the nuclear
families they found, are in distress not because society focuses on
them too little, but because society places too much responsibility on
them to resolve social problems. History speaks its ironies: in the
Western world, where the concept of the 'family' has been shrunken
into a 'nucleus' of husband, wife, and children floating in an apparent
plasma of less important relationships, a wide variety of thinkers
have held up the family almost devotionally as an object for
veneration.3 4 Though these arguments cannot fully be explored here,
at least one Catholic writing on marriage argued that if we "put the
family back together again, the rest of the world would take care of
itself."3 5 Secular arguments are similar: GLAD, the society of Gay
and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, notes "[mlarriage is a major
building block for strong families and communities .... [It] is also
28. Id. at 12.
29. Id. at 9-10.
30. Id.
31. See Arthur J. Norton & Louisa F. Miller, U.S. Census Bureau, Marriage,Divorce,and
Remarriagein the 1990's, CURRENTPOPULATION REPORTS, P23-180 1,1-6(1992) at http/www
.censua.gov/population/socdemo/marr-div/p23-180/p23-180.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2004)
[hereinafter POPULATION REPORTS 1992].
32. Id. at 4-5.
33. Id. at 6.
34. See, eg., JOHN WITE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT. MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND
LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADMON 3-12 (1997); Connolly, supra note 25.
35. Connolly, supra note 25 (quoting a story where a little boy puts a puzzle of the world
together by putting the family on the other side of the puzzle back together.)
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a social institution of the highest importance; the ultimate
expression of love and commitment.""
Virtually any modern discussion of marriage will invest it with
a wide array of benefits and responsibilities. Many of these benefits
and responsibilities, for example the responsibilities of committed
sexual expression and reproduction, have traditionally been thought
to accompany marriage almost exclusively.3" Yet many other
responsibilities, once they are more widely distributed among larger
kinship groupings, are new burdens or even benefits thrust upon
the nuclear family within the last few decades. For instance,
although spouses, particularly husbands, have been held responsible
for supporting their spouses throughout time, other vehicles for
support of persons, such as extended family support and even legal
kinship responsibilities such as adult children's duty to support
aging parents, have been significantly eroded in mainstream
American society.38
The benign impetus for many of the legal changes, to ensure
vulnerable individuals whose families have defaulted on them can
receive support coupled with a modicum of autonomy and dignity,
and to lessen the strain on adult children for their extended
families, has its downside. Effectively, some of these programs have
virtually eliminated the legal responsibility of some extended family
members for others. Unreflective government program rules have
been perverse in their contribution to this breakdown. Only recently
have foster parents from a child's family received the same level of
payments as stranger foster parents, 39 and studies have shown that
they are offered substantially fewer services than nonkin foster
parents though they often face greater obstacles. 4 Federal and state
36. See Gay and Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, supra note 24.
37. See, e.g., FINNEMAN, supra note 17, at 146-47 (discussing how traditional laws
supported marriage and heterosexual expression as the only sexual relationship).
38. See, e.g., Holly Shaver Bryant, Note, FundingKinship Care:A Policy-BasedArgument
for Keeping the Elderly in the Family, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 459, 469-70 (2002)
(recognizing a lack of a legal duty to care for parents).
39. Id. (noting that relatives were originally ineligible for foster payments, and now are
eligible only if they are licensed). See also Rob Green, The Urban Institute, Foster Children
Placed With Relatives Often Receive Less Government Help, NEW FEDERALISM, ISSUES AND
OPTIONS FOR STATES, Series A, No. A-59, App. 2, at http://www.urban.org/JploadedPDF/
310774A-59.pdf (last visited Mar. 8,2004) (noting that most states do not provide foster care
payments if kin are licensed through a special process or have licensing standards waived).
40. See Green, supra note 39, at 2-3, App. 1 (noting that kin foster parents more often
have economic, child care, counseling, and educational support needs than nonkin foster
parents, but are offered and request fewer services).

206

WILLIAM &MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW

[Vol. 10:195

data practices and privacy policies in programs aiding teenage
mothers may exclude adult grandparents from important
information about the teenage mother/grandchild family unit that
is necessary to help them make responsible choices."'
This pattern of putting increasing weight on the marital or
single parent unit, whereas extended family/friend support is not
expected and sometimes discouraged, is not repeated in all American
subcultures. Studies of newly arrived Hispanic families note the
tradition of helping others in the extended family that persists into
the new setting."2 Studies of African American and American Indian
communities have documented the persistence of extended family
care for dependent children.4" Even studies of lesbian parents have
noted how frequently they receive 'family' support of all kinds from
others in their lesbian community.4
Despite this evidence of plural family/household structures,
marriage and the nuclear family remain the chief focus of social and
cultural debates in the United States. One highly visible marriage
movement has waged a steady, recently quite successful, campaign
to expand the legal definition of marriage to include committed
same-sex couples and their children.4 5 The most significant stable
41. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.46(2) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003) (preventing reporting
of Minnesota Families Investment Programs ("MFIP"), Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families ("TANF"), general assistance, or other data to nonrecipient family members whereas
permitting it to be shared widely along government agencies).
42. See, e.g., Shirley L. Patterson & Flavio Francisco Marsiglia, "Mi Casa Es Su Casa :
Beginning Exploration of Mexican Americans' Natural Helping, 81 FAMILIES IN SOc*Y.: THE
J. OF CoNTEMP. HuM. SERV. 22 (2000) (discussing how providing help within the Mexican
community to the extended family often includes providing help to strangers of the same
cultural background who are not related by blood).
43. See Sandra L. Barnes, Stressors and Strengths: A Theoretical and Practical
Examination of Nuclear, Single-Parent, and Augmented African American Families, 82
FAMILIES IN Soc'Y: THE J. OF CONTEMP. HUM. SERVICE 449, 450-51 (2001) (noting that
augmented or extended families including relative and nonrelative members are often used
to raise children as well as care for the elderly).
44. See Pauline I. Erera & Karen Fredriksen, Lesbian Stepfamilies: A Unique Family
Structure, 80 FAM. IN SOC*Y: THE J. OF CONTEMP. HUM. SERVICE 263, 265 (1999) (noting that
lesbian community members play familial roles toward children of a lesbian couple).
45. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL
LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 44-48 (1996) (hereinafter ESKRIDGE, CASE] (discussing the
history impacting the rise and strength of the same-sex marriage movement); WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, Jr., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS 15-32

(2002) (hereinafter ESKRIDGE,CIVIL UNIONS). Though Eskridge is most identified with this
movement, there have been numerous other arguments in favor of same-sex marriage. See,
e.g., Craig W. Christensen, Legal Orderingof Family Values: The Case of Gay and Lesbian
Families, 18 CARDOzO L. REV. 1299 (1997) (discussing various family values for which gays
want legal recognition and protection); Richard D. Mohr, The Case for Gay Marriage,9 NOTRE
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advances for this movement have occurred outside of the United
States. The European Union has been much more supportive than
American states toward extension of positive rights to gay and
lesbian persons, including same-sex marriage. On March 16, 2000,
its parliament passed a nonbonding resolution urging its fifteen
member nations to grant same-sex couples equal rights, "particularly
as regards tax law, pecuniary rights and social rights."' The human
rights report that incorporated this resolution "noted that 'European
citizens continue to suffer discrimination and disadvantages in their
personal and professional life as a result of their sexual orientation,'"
despite specific references in the EU's basic treaty against such
discrimination.47 These developments seem especially pertinent to
the debate in the United States in light of the Supreme Court's
references to the experience and views of European states on
homosexual sodomy in Lawrence v. Texas."
A number of European nations have given practical form to
these aspirational statements from Lawrence.49 Belgium (2003)50
DAME J. L. ETHIcs & PUB. POLV 215 (1995) (arguing for the legalization of gay marriage
through an analysis of the meaning of marriage); Michael S. Wald, Same-Sex Couple
Marriage:AFamilyPolicy Perspective, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y& L. 291(2001) (arguing that family
policy objectives demonstrate a strong interest in supporting marriage by opposite-sex as well
as same-sex couples). There are also numerous websites dedicated to advocacy and
information about same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Partners Task Force for Gay and Lesbian
Couples at www.buddybuddy.com; National Lesbian & Gay Journalists Association at
httpjwww.nlgja.org. This movement has a substantial opposition among some Christian and
other conservatives. ESKRIDGE, CASE at 46-50. See, e.g., David Orgon Coolidge, Playing the
Loving Card:Same-Sex Marriageand the PoliticsofAnalogy, 12 BYU. J. PUB. L. 201,234-35
(1998) (posing the question of how to coexist in a society that draws different analogies to
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) to support or challenge how marriage is defined);
Richard F. Duncan, From Loving to Romer: Homosexual Marriageand Moral Discernment,
12 BYU J. PUB. L. 1239, 1249-51 (1998) (arguing that defining marriage as a union between
man and woman does not discriminate individuals but rather preserves the true nature of
marriage and celebrates how men and women complement each other).
46. See Demian, Partner's Task Force for Gay & Lesbian Couples, Legal MarriageReport:
Global Status of Legal Marriage,at http/www.buddybuddy.comltoc.html (last visited Mar.
8, 2004) [hereinafter Legal MarriageReport]
47. Id.
48. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). Other nations, too, have taken action consistent with an
affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual
conduct. See Brief for Mary Robinson et al. as Amici Curiae, at 11-12 (noting "the right the
petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many
other countries. There has been no showing that in this country the governmental interest in
circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent") Id. at 2483.
49. Id. with accompanying text.
50. See Legal MarriageReport, supra note 46 at 2; Demian, Partner's Task Force for Gay
& Lesbian Couples, Belgium Offers Legal Marriage,at http'//www.buddybuddy.com/toc.html
(last visited Jan. 17, 2004). In addition, Belgium's report notes that reciprocating same-sex
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and the Netherlands (2001)51 have moved to extending almost all of
the rights of marriage to gay and lesbian persons, though they
require legal residency as a condition of same-sex marriage.52
Denmark, Iceland, Greenland, Norway and Sweden also offer a
form of legal status to gay and lesbian couples through domestic
partnership statutes, with Denmark leading the way in 1989."3
Similarly, Germany passed a life partnership law in 2001, which
has been challenged in court, though unsuccessfully.54 Numerous
other countries as diverse as Australia, Finland, Namibia, and
Hungary have extended some legal benefits and protections
to same-sex couples through a diversity of means, including
nondiscrimination law language changes, domestic partner laws,
and the extension of common law marriage to same-sex couples.55
Several other countries, such as the Czech Republic, Liechtenstein,
Mexico, and Spain, are considering such laws.5 6
France's 'civil solidarity pact' (PaCS) is of special interest for
this article, for it permits any two unmarried adults to enter into a
legal relationship regardless of gender or perhaps even without a
sexual relationship, excluding certain close relationships such as
parents and grandparents, children and grandchildren, and so
forth. 7 Among other benefits, PaCS offers a substantial number of

marriage countries' residents who are marrying a Belgian citizen may legally marry in
Belgium. Id.
51. See Legal MarriageReport, supra note 46, at 2; Demian, Partner's Task Force for Gay
& Lesbian Couples, Netherlands Offers Legal Marriage,at http://www.buddybuddy.comltoc.html
(last visited Jan. 17, 2004). See also ESKRIDGE, CIVIL UNIONS, supra note 45, at 94-97.
52. Legal MarriageReport, supra note 46, at 2.
53. See ESKRIDGE, CIVIL UNIONS, supra note 45, at 90-94 (describing the history of
these developments). Eskridge notes that the numbers registered have ranged from 57 in
Iceland to 10,804 in the Netherlands under its pre-same-sex marriage registered partnership
bill. Id. at 95.
54. Id. at 103, Legal MarriageReport, supra note 46, at 28.
55. See Legal MarriageReport, supra note 46, at 5, 27, 31 33.
56. Id. at 27, 32, 33, 40. Spain has 30 cities who register civil unions and the areas of
Catalonia and Navarra have domestic registries. Id. at 40-41. For a country-by-country
breakdown, see id.
57. See ESKRIDGE, CIVILUNIONS, supra note 45, at 101. The law generally prohibits PaCS
among relatives with whom marriage would be legal incest, such as siblings, aunts and
uncles, nephews and nieces, but not cousins. Id. Eskridge notes, however, that when the law
was upheld by France's Conseil Constitutionnele against constitutional attack, the Conseil
"impute[dl a romantic and/or sexual component" to the relationship, which arguably could
apply to couples, gay or straight. Id.

20041

A PEACE PROPOSAL FOR THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE WARS

209

rights that married couples enjoy, including bereavement leave,58
the right to purchase joint auto insurance, social security coverage,
joint tax returns, and estate preferences with favorable tax terms.59
In a case certainly likely to have even more impact on American
legislation and court decisions than the European events, the
Canadian parliament agreed to move on legislation to authorize
same-sex marriages after the Court of Appeal for Ontario was the
third provincial appellate court to hold, in Halpern v. Attorney
General of Canada,that the denial of marriage to same-sex couples
constituted a violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms s.15(1).1 The Court of Appeal found that this provision
of the charter, which provides the right to "equal protection and
equal benefit of the law without discrimination,"6 ' was violated
because the different-sex marriage law withheld a benefit from a
historically disadvantaged class in a way that demeaned their
dignity by excluding them from a fundamental social institution.8 2
Especially due to its proximity to the United States, it appears that
Canada will become a promising destination for gay and lesbian
Americans who are ready to marry now, because it will not require
lengthy residency as a requirement of taking advantage of its civil
union law.'
Yet, the push toward same-sex marriage has taken on significant
momentum in the United States in the past couple of years. In the
past decade, American courts have supported equality in marriagetype rights for gay and lesbian couples at least four times. Of course,
58. Id. at 102.
59. See id. at 101-02. See also, Partner's Task Force for Gay & Lesbian Couples, Civil
Solidarity Pact, The French Approach, at http//www.buddbuddy.com/d-p-fran.html (last
visited Jan. 27, 2004).
60. See Halpern v. Canada (Attorney General), 2003 CarswellOnt 2159, 36 R.F.L.(5th)
127, affirming, in part, Halpern v. Toronto (City), 2002 CarswellOnt 2309, 28 R.F.L. (5th) 41
(Ont. Div. Ct.). Halpern cites Hendricks v. Quebec (Procureure general) 2002 CarswellQue
1890 [2002) R.J.Q. 2506, 120021 R.D.F. 122 (Que. S.C.) and EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada
(Attorney General) (2003), 2002 CarswellBC 3178, 33 R.F.L. (5th) 318 (B.C.C.A. [In
Chambers])B.C.J. No. 994 (May 1, 2003) (also holding that the prohibition against same-sex
marriages was unconstitutional, but suspending the court declarations for periods up to two
years.) After the Halperndecision, the British Columbia Court of Appeal lifted its earlier stay,
permitting same-sex couples to marry in that province. See New Around the World, REC.
N.N.J. at All, July 9, 2003.
61. CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 638 (Eugene Meehan et al. eds., 2000).
62. Halpern, 2003 CarswellOnt, at 2166, 36 R.F.L.at 154.
63. See Joint Advisory from GLAD et al., Thinking of GettingMarried in Canada?,at
http'/nclrights.org/publicationspubstmarriageCA.pdf (noting that Canada has no
residency requirement for marriage) (last visited Mar. 8, 2004).
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these cases are not new: challenges to different-gender marriage
laws have been filed since at least the 1970's,' and several new
cases were filed in the 1990's.' However, none of these challenges
were successful until the Hawaii Supreme Court, in a surprise move,
declared different-sex statutes to constitute a possible violation of
the state's equal protection clause in Baehr v. Lewin.' That success
was followed by a similar decision in the state of Alaska, Brause v.
Bureau of Vital Statistics." These victories, however, appeared to be
short-lived until Goodridge was decided. The Baehr case was

64. See, e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 458 U.S.
1111 (1982) (denying challenge to INS law that excluded homosexual marriage partner from
entry into U.S.); Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1971) rev. denied, 84
Wash.2d 1008, 1974 WL 45234 (1974) (upholding Washington's statute against state Equal
Rights Act, and Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims); DeSanto v. Barnsley, 35
Pa. D. & C.3d 7 (1982), affd, 328 Pa. Super. 181, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super 1984) (denying
divorce action between two men); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky., 1973) (dismissing
freedom of association, free exercise of religion, and cruel and unusual punishment claims
against the marriage statute); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (denying equal protection and due process challenges to the
marriage law). See also Koppelman v. O'Keeffe, 140 Misc. 2d 828,535 N.Y.S.2d 871 (N.Y. App.
Term 1988) (protection for gay partner in rent-controlled apartment); Ross v. Denver Dep't
of Health and Hosp., 883 P.2d 516 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (denying same-sex partner's right to
"sick leave" classification). For further information about these and other suits, see Legal
MarriageReport, supra note 46.
65. See, e.g., Storrs v. Holcomb, 168 Msc.2d 898, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286 (N.Y. Super. 1996)
(holding that New York's gender classification does not violate due process on equal protection
grounds); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. App. 1995) (turning back a D.C.
statutory claim, District of Columbia Human Rights Act claim, and Due Process Clause
challenge to refusal to issue marriage license to same-sex couples). For information about
additional suits, see LegalMarriageReport, supra note 46. On related issues, see Rosengarten
v. Downes, 71 Conn. App. 372, 802 A.2d 170 (2002) (denying recognition of foreign same-sex
civil union for purposes of marriage dissolution statute). See also In Re Estate of Gardiner,
29 Kan. App. 2d 92,22 P.3d 1086 (2001), affd inpart,rev'd inpart,273 Kan. 191,42 P.3d 120
(2002) (denying comity for marriage license issued to transsexual in Wisconsin because such
marriage was against state public policy and therefore void); Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 1994
WL 315620 (D. Minn. 1994) (granting taxpayer's suit to invalidate Minneapolis City Council
resolution to provide benefits for same-sex partners on the basis that same sex marriage is
illegal in Minnesota).
66. 74 Haw. 530,580,852 P.2d 44,67 (1993) recons. grantedinpart,74 Haw. 650,875 P.2d
225 (1993), on remand Baehr v. Miike, 80 Haw. 341,910 P.2d 112 (1996) (holding that the state
had not met its burden of proving a compelling state interest for the gender discrimination in
the marriage statute.) See also ESKRIDGE, CIVIL UNIONS, supra note 45, at 18-25.
67. 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Ct. 1998) (holding that the decision to choose one's life
partner is a fundamental right to which strict scrutiny must apply but dismissing plaintiff's
claim as not ripe for adjudication).

2004]

A PEACE PROPOSAL FOR THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE WARS

211

essentially overturned by a state constitutional amendment
declaring marriage to be available to one man
and one woman in
69
Hawaii, 68 as was the Brause case in Alaska.
Subsequently, in Vermont, where the state Supreme Court held
that denying some form of similar legal protection to same-sex
couples (albeit not necessarily marriage) was unconstitutional,7 ° the
state legislature acquiesced rather than fighting back, passing the
first civil union law in the United States which legally recognizes
marriage ceremonies for gay and lesbian couples.7 ' Other
unsuccessful suits since 2000 have been filed in Indiana,72 New
Jersey, and Arizona.7 3 However, Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health appears to be the political watershed case. Noting that "the
Massachusetts Constitution affirms the dignity and equality of all
citizens" and "forbids the creation of second-class citizens," the
68. Hawaiians chose to amend their constitution to specify that marriage was a manwoman relationship, Kerstin Marx, Rights-U.S.:Gay Activists Battle Homophobia, INTER
PRESS SEv., Jun. 23, 1999, at 1999 WL 5949332. Eskridge details the complex negotiation
of the amendment in the Hawaii legislature, which ended up producing a companion
Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act, which provided about fifty of the more than 200 legal rights and
benefits enjoyed by married couples under Hawaii law to same sex couples and some blood
relatives. ESKRIDGE, CIVIL UNIONS, supra note 45 at 22-25.
69. See Brause v. State Dep't of Health & Soc. Serv., 21 P.3d 357 2001) (holding that
plaintiffs' state and federal constitutional challenge to denial of marriage licenses had been
mooted by Alaska's constitutional provision, art. I, sec. 25, adopted January 3, 1999; and that
plaintiffs' federal equal protection challenge to Alaska's "little-DOMA" law was not ripe
because plaintiffs had not alleged actual harm from denial of one of the 115 benefits they
claimed married couples could take advantage of that were denied to them.)
See also
ESKRIDGE, CIVIL UNIONS, supra note 45, at 39-40.
70. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194,744 A.2d 864 (1999). For the history of the Baker
case see ESKRIDGE, CIVIL UNIONS, supra note 45, at 43-56. For the aftermath in Vermont, see
id. at 56-82.
71. ESKiUDGE, CIVIL UNIONS, supra note 45, at 79-80.
72. For a discussion on the merits of the Indiana lawsuit, Morrison v. O'Bannon, see Indiana
Civil Liberties Union, Affirming Stable Families, The Indiana Suit for Legal Marriage, at
http'/lwww.buddybuddy.comiclu-l.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2004).
73. For a discussion on the merits of the New Jersey lawsuit, Lewis v. Harris, see Legal
MarriageReport, supra note 46, at 55. For an update on the New Jersey suit, see Lambda
Legal, Cases: Lewis, et al. v. Harris et al., http'J/www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-binAowa/cases/
record?record=179 (last visited Jan. 5,2004) (noting that a New Jersey state court judge held
against same-sex couples challenging the state's marriage law). For the Arizona decision, see
Standhard v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 77 P.3d 451 (2003) in which the Arizona
court held that the plaintiffs had no fundamental right to same-sex marriage under the
federal or Arizona constitutions, and contra to Goodridge,holding that the state's marriage
statute was rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in encouraging procreation and
child-rearing within marriage. Id. at 459-64. The Arizona court also rejected the plaintiffs
claim that the statute was enacted because of animus toward homosexual residents, a
challenge under the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitution and Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). Id. at 464-65.

212

WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW

[Vol. 10:195

Supreme Judicial Court held that the state had no rational basis for
refusing marriage to same-sex couples.7 4 This ruling, and the court's
subsequent holding that only marriage will comply with the state
constitution, stand as a ringing endorsement not only of the right of
same-sex couples to dignity in their intimate associations, but also
of the sanctity of marriage. The Massachusetts court writes:
Without question, civil marriage enhances the "welfare of
the community." It is a "social institution of the highest
importance." Civil marriage anchors an ordered society by
encouraging stable relationships over transient ones. It is
central to the way the Commonwealth identifies individuals,
provides for the orderly distribution of property, ensures that
children and adults are cared for and supported whenever
possible from private rather than public funds .... Civil marriage
is at once a deeply personal commitment to another human

being and a highly public celebration of the ideals of mutuality,
companionship, intimacy, fidelity and family.... Because it
fulfils [sic] yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection
that express our common humanity, civil marriage is an
esteemed institution, and the decision whether and whom to
marry is among life's momentous acts of self-definition. 7"
Beyond these developments, both private and public employers
have been extending benefits to same-sex and other domestic
partners. The states of California, Massachusetts and Vermont
continue to offer domestic partner registries, which permit couples
to register their relationship, as do several municipalities.76 Yet, the
primary usefulness of such registration to date is to allow gay and
lesbian partners to become eligible for health care and other
benefits offered by local government employers and to provide them
74. Goodridge v. Dep't of Health, 440 Mass 309,311,337,798 N.E.2d 941,947,966 (2003).
For more on the controversy surrounding this case, see Editorial:Civil Marriageis a Civil
Right, NEW BEDFORD STANDARD TIMEs, June 22, 2003, at http./www.southcoasttoday.con/
daily/06-03/06-22-03/b02op056.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2003) (describing Goodridge);
Editorial,METROWEST DAILY NEWS, June 3, 2003, at httpJ/www.metrowestdailynews.com/
news/opinionedit06032003.htm (noting Catholic bishops' instruction to urge parishioners to
support a constitutional amendment to prevent gay marriages).
75. 440 Mass. at 32, 798 N.E.2d at 954-55.
76. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, CIVIL UNIONS, supra note 45, at 14. Eskridge notes that California
was the only state to provide a statewide domestic partnership law in 1999. Id. at 115. See
also Demian, Partners Task Force for Gay and Lesbian Couples, Domestic Partnership
Benefits: Philosophy andProviderList, at http:J/www.buddybuddy.com/d-l-l.html (last visited
Jan. 27, 2004).
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with visitation access in hospitals." On the other hand, now hundreds
of local government entities and private employers offer, or have
taken steps to offer, specific benefits such as health care insurance
to domestic partners.7"
At the federal constitutional level, gay and lesbian advocates
have also been more encouraged by the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Lawrence v. Texas.79 The case held that states could not
constitutionally criminalize acts of sodomy between consenting gay
persons. 0 Although the Court made clear it was not deciding
whether states are required to acknowledge same-sex relationships, l
the language of the opinion arguably was sweeping in its protection
for intimate relations between same-sex couples.
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government
intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our
tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home. And there
are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home,
where the State should not be a dominant presence. Freedom
extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy
of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and
certain intimate conduct.8 2 It suffices for us to acknowledge that
adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines
of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their
dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression
in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but
one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.
The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual
persons the right to make this choice. Persons in a homosexual
77. ESKRIDGE, CIVIL UNIONS, supra note 45, at 14; Domestic PartnershipBenefits, supra

note 76.
78. See, e.g., Lambda Legal, PartialSummary of Domestic PartnerBenefits Listings, at
www.lamdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=21 (last visited Jan. 11, 2004)
(listing more than sixty local governments and seven states-California, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and Washington-that offer domestic partnership
benefits, along with the U.S. Bureau of National Affairs, Civil Service, Department of Housing
and Urban Development, House of Representatives, Office of Personnel Management, as well
as school districts, transit units, libraries, and national laboratories, among others). Lambda
also lists the major employers among the over 2000 companies now offering domestic partner
benefits, from American Airlines and Apple Computer to Wells Fargo and Xerox Corporation.
Id. at 4-6.
79. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
80. Id. at 2484.
81. The opinion also noted that the case did "not involve whether the government must
give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter." Id.
82. Id. at 2475.
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relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as
heterosexual persons do. The decision in Bowers would deny
s
them this right."
However, as of the date this article was written, Vermont
remains the only state where a stable, relatively equal form of legal
recognition is available to gay and lesbian couples, as it remains
unclear what the Massachusetts legislature's response will be to the
Goodridge decision. Moreover, providing equal recognition to such
couples has been made more difficult for any state that follows
either Massachusetts or Vermont because of federal legislation
passed in the wake of the Baehr case, the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA.)" DOMA not only permits states with heterosexual
marriage laws to refuse legal recognition to marriages performed in
other states that might recognize same-sex marriages in the future,
but also denies federal benefits to same-sex couples legally married
in such states.' The federal DOMA subsequently has been followed
by at least thirty-four 'junior DOMAs,' state laws that provide that
their state courts should not recognize same-sex marriages legally
performed in other states.'
Thus, with few exceptions, same-sex couples who wish to obtain
the full panoply of legal rights and protections accorded married
couples must obtain them through contracts, joint property
purchases, adoptions, and other legal means designed for different
kinds of relationships."s Some of the benefits of marriage available
to heterosexual couples, such as tax breaks, public benefits, insurance
offered to married couples, and even critical decisions involving
medical emergencies are not available at all to same-sex couples. 8
Some gay and lesbian couples simply have foregone these legal
83. Id. at 2478, 2482.
84. 1 U.S.C. s 7 (1996) provides, in pertinent part, "[T]he word 'marriage' means only a
legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse'
refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." Id.; see also ESKRIDGE,
CIVIL UNIONS, supra note 45, at 32-39 for a legal history of the Act.
85. See, e.g., Charles Butler, The Defense ofMarriageAct: Congress's Use of Narrativein
the Debate over Same-Sex Marriage,73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 841, 841-43 (1998).
86. See EsIcaDGE, CIVIL UNIONS, supra note 45, at 136.
87. See, e.g., Developmentsin the Law, Sexual Orientationand the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1508, 1623-1628 (1989); Ruthann Robson & S.E. Valentine, Lov(h)ers: Lesbians as Intimate
Partnersand Lesbian Legal Theory, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 511, 520-23, 532-534); Christine Jax,
Same-Sex Marriage- Why Not?, 4 WIDENERJ. PUB. L. 461,490-91 (1995) (discussing domestic
partnership laws).
88. See, e.g. Developments in the Law, supra note 87, at 1612-27; Jax, supra note 8, at 49091 (discussing domestic partnership laws).
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protections, pronouncing heterosexual legal marriage to be a
problem and not a solution, for intimate relationships. 9 Still others
argue that legal marriage should be extended to same-sex couples
on the same terms as heterosexual couples, based on equal
protection and fundamental rights principles. 9
At the same time, another marriage movement, shaped by the
Christian tradition that marriage is part of the goodness of God's
creation,9 1 has been pushing for modification of divorce laws to make
it more difficult for men and women to leave their marriage or
children.92 Among the first visible legal successes of this effort was
Louisiana's covenant marriage law.93 Similar laws were passed by
two other states, Arizona (1998) and Arkansas (2001), and
considered in several more.94
Covenant marriage is a form of marriage that any couple, in the
states providing it, may elect. The basic tenet of the covenant
marriage is its requirement that couples promise a lifelong
commitment to each other.9" As a practical means to achieve
'enforcement' of that promise, the covenant marriage law requires
electing couples to receive counseling about the seriousness of the
obligations they are undertaking, counseling that must be resumed
if the marriage runs into difficulty. 9 The law also demands that
couples disclose any potential impediments to a successful marriage

89. See Robson & Valentine, supra note 87, at 511-13, 535-40 (citing to the work of
numerous lesbian theorists).
90. See Jax, supra note 87, at 466-83; see also Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There's No
Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 27 (1996) (imagining the possibility of privatizing all sexual
relationships).
91. See Lynn Marie Kohm, Marriageand the Intact Family: The Significanceof Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 22 WnrIER L. REV. 327, 343-454 (2000). But see Comment, Nostalgic
Attempts to Recapture What Never Was: Louisiana'sCovenant MarriageAct, 77 NEB. L. REV.
567,578-80 (1998) (noting opposition to the covenant marriage law by Roman Catholic, Jewish
and Episcopalian clergy, largely on the basis that the distinction suggests that other
marriages are not as inviolable) [hereinafter Nostalgic Attempts].
92. See What is the Covenant MarriageMovement?, supra note 16; Covenant Marriage
Links, supra note 15.
93. See LA REV. STAT. § 9:272 (West Supp. 1998). See also Melissa Lawton, Note, The
Constitutionalityof Covenant MarriageLaws, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2471, 2472 (1998).
94. See Hawkins et al., supra note 13, at 7 (noting that about twenty additional states
were formally considering legislation similar to these states' covenant marriage). See also
Lawton, supra note 93, at 2471 n.5 (1998) (listing bills introduced at that time)
95. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:272, § 9:273A(1)-(3) (West Supp. 1998); Nostalgic Attempts,
supra note 91, at 569.
96. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §9:272A; (nonbreaching party must show a complete and total
breach of the commitment); §9.307 (stating grounds for dissolution of marriage).

216

WILLIAM &MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW

[Vol. 10:195

to each other.97 Perhaps most significantly, it narrows the grounds
for divorce to a small number, including infidelity, imprisonment for
a felony, abandonment for a year, or physical/sexual abuse.9" It is,
however, not an onerous bar to divorce, since one of the grounds for
divorce is two years of unreconciled separation by the spouses;' and
spouses whose reasons for divorce include 'habitual intemperance
of the other spouse, or excesses, cruel treatment or outrages" may
obtain an order of legal separation and then a divorce twelve to
eighteen months later."o
As a legal movement, the covenant marriage movement seems
to have lost public visibility, and perhaps some steam, in the last
couple of years, although legislatures continue to consider covenant
' In part, that may reflect the
marriage bills in many jurisdictions. 01
fact that many religious denominations and other conservatives
oppose covenant marriage because they fear it will stigmatize regular
marriage and weaken it, or open the door to same-sex marriage.0 2
The view I wish to explore in more depth in this article is that
the covenant marriage and gay marriage movements share more
assumptions than disagreements about the nature of marriage.
Their common view - that social and legal bonds such as marriage
are valuable for human intimacy and human community - gives
American society the opportunity to rethink how it should support
marriage without falling back on hackneyed 'conservative/liberal'
battle lines. Both movements effectively argue for moving away
from a purely contractual, autonomous model of marriage toward a
more publicly responsible form of commitment.
Unfortunately, these movements do not go far enough in
presenting an alternative vision to either the autonomous or socalled 'traditional' models, and simply substitute another form of
contractualism that may continue to ennervate the role of marriage
and the family in modern society. First, it is useful to ask whether
the picture of reality that the 'nuclear family' model purports to
paint is an accurate one over time.
97. See NostalgicAttempts, supra note 91, at 569 n.15.
98. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:307A (West Supp. 1998); See Lawton, supra note 93, at
2475-76 (comparing covenant marriage grounds with no-fault grounds). Lawton notes that it
is unclear whether the moving party must be innocent in cases of divorce obtained after a
legal separation is effected. Id. at 2477.
99. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:307B(5) (West Supp. 1998).
100. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:307B(6) (West Supp. 1998).
101. See Hawkins, et al., supra note 13, at 7.
102. Id.

20041

A PEACE PROPOSAL FOR THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE WARS

217

RECOVERING THE HISTORICAL HOUSEHOLD: TESTING THE TRUTH OF
THE NUCLEAR FAMILY

The valorization of the nuclear family is based on the
assumption that it is the latest and best permutation in a process of
an evolving form of family. This set of assumptions, which I will call
the 'evolving/nuclear household,' holds dear to the liberal view that
history progresses, and that the family similarly is an institution
that progresses over time, from a 'primitive' form to a more
enlightened one. Yet, in order to consider whether supporting the
nuclear family as the key legal form of intimate relationship in
postmodern society is a good idea, we should ask whether the
history of the family is indeed a history of progressive evolution
from primitive and complex tribal structures to a more sophisticated
and humane nuclear family. If the nuclear family model is the
natural evolution of the family, it is still unclear what form will
follow in the next century. Will the nuclear family evolve into
something even more 'nuclear,'for example, a household largely
composed of one individual with perhaps minor children? In more
abstract terms, will the household reflect the triumph of freedom
over community and responsibility? Or can we expect a return to a
more traditional or at least social conception of the family?
Reliable reflection on the realities of actual households through
the centuries does not obviate the need for a normative discussion,
but Robert Cover's oft-quoted insight that the law serves always as
a "bridge, linking a concept of a reality to an imagined alternative
.. 13 seems particularly important in this case; only to remind us
that 'what is' is important as we consider how laws should be
framed. Given how significant the assumptions about the modern
family loom in both the gay marriage and covenant marriage
movements, it is necessary to reinvestigate the claim that the
nuclear family formation is the 'traditional' form of family life, that
family formation which has proven the best way of ensuring human
well-being over time. Those who advocate covenant marriage
advocate a particular method of preserving that nuclear family. Gay
marriage advocates are also effectively advocating for extension of
the nuclear family form to persons who have been traditionally
103. Robert Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term, Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARv. L. REv. 4, 9 (1983).
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excluded from it, in the same way that advocates have argued for
the extension of the vote to women and then young adults. If socalled traditionalists are correct and the husband-wife-child triad
does indeed constitute the 'nucleus' of the household historically,
their arguments to preserve it in its current form should not be
rejected as morally reactionary or irrelevant in the modem age,
even if it is unclear what form the family should take in the future.
Such an exploration, or perhaps more correctly, a 'remembering'
of what has been learned by others, is particularly import-ant in the
American legal debate. American social debate, often mimicked by
legal debate, is unusual in its historical myopia: where other
countries describe 'traditions' dating back hundreds and thousands
of years, it is not uncommon for an American cultural form to earn
'traditional' status if it can trace its provenance back only half a
century or even less. Anything predating such a 'tradition' is
considered too antique and therefore irrelevant to a modem
discussion. Given that 'the family' is a key social institution, it is
unlikely that a tradition that spans two generations, at most, would
be a reliable indicator of what constitutes a successful form of
social organization
Before we explore whether the evolving/nuclear family is a
predominant historical expression of the family, it is useful to
consider the origins of the term, 'nuclear family.' Anthropologist
George Peter Murdock, one of the first to define and study the
family, receives credit for using the concept of the 'nuclear family' in
1 9 4 9 .'04 Murdock defined the family as "a social group characterized
by common residence, economic cooperation, and reproduction. It
includes adults of both sexes, at least two of whom maintain a
socially approved sexual relationship, and one or more children, own
or adopted, of the sexually cohabiting adults."' ° Murdock concluded
that a nuclear family was "the most basic societal structure, 'a
married man and woman with their offspring." °6 However,
according to Prof. Ingoldsby, the purpose of Murdock's investigation
was not to suggest that the nuclear family was the actual
104. Bron B. Ingoldsby, Family Origin and Universalityin FAMILIES IN MULTICULTURAL
PERSPECTIVE 83, 84 (Bron B. Ingoldsby & Suzanna Smith eds., 1995).
105. Id. at 83 (quoting G.P. MURDOCK, SOCIAL STRUCTURE 1 (1949)). See also CHERYL ANN
Cox, HOUSEHOLD INTERESTS, PROPERTY, MARRIAGE STRATEGIES AND FAMILY DYNAMICS IN

ANCIENT ATHENS 131 (1998) (noting Xenophon's understanding that an oikos, or household,
was a "unit of production, a unit of consumption, and... a unit of reproduction... based on
landed wealth," of which "an integral part is the nuclear family.").
106. See Ingoldsby, supra note 104, at 84 (quoting MURDOCK, supra note 105, at 1).
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structure of most historical families or even most modern
families, but to expose the variety of family patterns in which the
husband-wife-child triad was at the center of household formation
throughout history."°7
It is instructive that Murdock did not claim that the husbandwife-child triad was the 'cell' of private life - for example, a fully
whole body that, replicated many times over, constituted the living
organism that we know as social life, except for perhaps some
'cancerous' families or groupings that should be excised from the
body."~ Rather, Murdock's only claim was that the nuclear family
"stands on its own or serves as the basis for the more complex
forms""° of the family, it may be the nucleus, the 'central mass'
around which the family is structured, but it is not the model
against which all forms of family should be studied. Indeed,
Murdock's study of 250 ethnographic reports of cultures found that
the nuclear family was the norm in only about twenty-five percent
of the societies he studied; that the polygamous family was the norm
in another twenty-five percent; and the remaining fifty percent of
the societies primarily utilized the extended family--a married adult
residing with spouse, children and some members of his/her parents'
nuclear family (siblings, parents, etc.)." It is perhaps a fortuitous
irony that the representation of nuclear-only families in Murdock's
study lines up so closely with the 2000 census of U.S. families." 1
Thus, Murdock's 'nuclear family' seems to work more as an
imperfect starting point than as a fixed assumption providing a
concrete understanding of household formations over the course of
history. To be sure, it is difficult to deny the historical reality that
the family is a enduring social construction across cultures.
Ingoldsby, for example, attempted to find societies where either
there was no family structure, a form lacking a married man and
woman and their dependent children, or societies where the family
does not perform Murdock's four basic societal functions, i.e., sexual
intercourse, reproduction, socialization of children, and economic
organization. 2 Ingoldsby was forced to conclude that such societies
were possible, but that perhaps only three societies he could identify
107. See Ingoldsby, supra note 104, at 84.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See POPULATION REPORTS 2001, supra note 26, at 3 (noting that twenty-four percent
of all families included married couples with their own children in 2000).
112. See Ingoldsby, supra note 104, at 90.
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Jamaica, the Israeli kibbutz, and the Nayar of India - actually

family, though they
lacked either the structure or function of the
113
either.
cases
bright-line
completely
not
were
There is no significant sociological evidence that, until quite
recently, the nuclear family was the overwhelming form of the
Western household, or any other historical household:
Sociologists and historians of the family have demonstrated that
the history of the family is a story of diversity and complexity.

. . . Individual and family lives were far less predictable and
structured [citation omitted] than many commentators offamily
decline assume today.... The "conventional family pattern" of
the nuclear, two-parent, never-divorced family was actually a
demographic anomaly... Little empirical evidence exists to
support the nostalgic belief that family life in past times was

characterized
harmony."4

by

structural

homogeneity

and

relational

Any brief review of the work of family historians and
anthropologists demonstrates that there is little support for the
view that the family has steadily progressed toward a modern,
nuclear form" 5 What we do know about 'the family' as a unit
of social organization is that across historical periods, it is multiform, varying in type, size and complexity." 6 While some historians

have tried to prove that the form of the family has progressed, it
is difficult to perfectly correlate the progression of the household
and other social and economic institutions - for example, to prove
that all societies that become technologically modern and
economically capitalist will adopt the nuclear family as their
113. See Id. at 90-92. The Jamaican poor of the 1960's were considered outliers because
couples did not marry and many did not even cohabit until they were past childbearing age,
for economic reasons, and about two-thirds of all children were illegitimate. Id. Kibbutzim of
the 1950's and before were outliers because their children resided, were socialized, and
educated in common, and economic life was communal rather than couple-oriented. Id. at 91.
The Nayar, a warrior Hindu caste of India, were a matrilineal culture in which a woman could
marry as many husbands for as long as she liked, and men did not live with the women or
their children, nor did they have socialization or economic responsibilities for them. Id. at 92.
114. Katherine R. Allen et al., Older Adults and Their Children: Family Patterns of
StructuralDiversity, 48 FAM. REL. 151 (1999) (citations omitted). See generally Glen H. Elder,
Jr., History and the Family:A Discovery of Complexity, 43 J. OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAM. 489
(1981) (examining the interplay of historical research and theory building in the discovery of
complexity in historical times).
115. See Elder, supra note 114, at 491-93.
116. Id. at 491-97.
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primary family form.' Indeed, the historical evidence suggests
that families can take very different forms even within close
geographical areas, shaped by a confluence of individuals' own life
courses and choices 1 8 with other elements such as occupations or
trades, natural resources, religion and customs, and property
understandings." 9
To illustrate that family formation is more plural than unified
and more dynamic than static throughout history, and that it defies
such stereotyping as 'traditional' v. 'modern' or 'Western' v. 'nonWestern' family forms, we might look at a few family studies from
several dramatically different cultures. A few preliminary notes
about the studies themselves are instructive for lawmakers
attempting to borrow from other disciplines in their work in
remodeling the law of the family.
For example, studies of the Japanese family in the seventeenth
to nineteenth centuries and of nineteenth and twentieth century
Nordic families illustrate that even the process of studying and
theorizing about the family has undergone change, which makes a
significant difference for what is perceived as 'true' about the
family. 0 Human development theorist, Suzanna Smith, concludes,
"there is no single, correct definition of family. Rather, there are
multiple definitions formulated from a particular theoretical
perspective. In other words, theory shapes our definitions and

117. See Vern L. Bengston, Beyond the Nuclear Family: The Increasing Importance of
MultigenerationalBonds, 63 J.OF MARRIAGE AND FAM. 1-4 (2001) (noting the hypotheses that
the modern nuclear family emerged following the Industrial Revolution, that it declined as
a social institution, and that there is an increasing heterogeneity of forms). Elder, supra note
114, at 2 (noting that standard accounts "from tradition to modernity... have given way to
perceptions of multiple pathways and alternative routes..
118. See Elder, supra note 114, at 510.
119. See id. at 494-513.

120. See L. L. Cornell, Hajnal and the Household in Asia: A Comparative History of the
Family in PreindustrialJapan, 1600-1870, in FAMILY HISTORY AT THE CROSSROADS: A
JOURNAL OF FAMILY HISTORY READER 144 (Tamara Haraven & Andrejs Plakans eds., 1987)

(focusing on the traditional Japanese family and what has been learned about it in the most
recent years); David Gaunt, Rural Household Organizationand Inheritance in Northern
Europe, in FAMILY HISTORY AT THE CROSSROADS: A JOURNAL OF FAMILY HISTORY READER 121

(TamaraHaraven & Andrejs Plakans eds., 1987) (discussing evidence from the Scandinavian
Peninsula relating to the growth of privacy in generational relations, the primacy of the
father-son dyad as the preferred method of land transfer and other issues).
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expectations of family life."' I Professor Cornell has shown that
influence even how the facts of household life
investigatory models
122
are described.
The Japanese family has been quite differently described by
turn-of-the century statesmen and legal scholars, folklorists eager
to identify the Japanese family with household and lineage
institutions, American structural-functionalist anthropologists, and
American-influenced Japanese sociologists who focus on the
differences between the modern nuclear family and the traditional
household." Professor Cornell notes that no one has produced a
synthesis that would describe 'the' Japanese family. 124 Similarly,
Nordic families were studied by scholars with quite different
agendas: late 19th century German legal historians searching for a
'clan-like kinship' structure they believed to have been the original
organization of the Teutonic tribes;' researchers seeking"a common
Indo-European primary group connected with agrarian communal
living;"' cultural historians seeking primitive-to-classic evolutionary
patterns in medieval Nordic societies;2 7 anthropological scholars
influenced by Margaret Mead and other Americans;128 and finally,
Scandinavian historians using the family or household to study
other social, economic and demographic changes. 9
Moreover, the studies Cornell cites shows that there was a
significant difference between what he calls "the ideational order,"
that is, cultural norms and values about who should be included in
the household, and the "phenomenal order," or the actual pattern of
household formation.130 For example, in nineteenth century Japan,
the ideational order proposed that the constituent unit for Japanese
households was the dozoku, a patrilineal descent group, but this
3
pattern did not actually arise in some parts of the country.'1
121. See Suzanna Smith, Family Theory and MulticulturalFamily Studies, in FAMILIES IN
MULTICULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 7 (Bron B. Ingoldsby & Suzanna Smith eds., 1995) (internal

citations omitted).
122. See Cornell, supranote 120.
123. See id. at 144-45.
124. Id. at 145-46.

125. See Gaunt, supra note 120, at 122-23.
126. Id. at 122.
127. See John Rogers, Nordic Family History: Themes and Issues, Old and New, 18 J. OF
FAM. HIST. 291, 291-92 (1993).
128. See Gaunt supra note 120, at 122-123.
129. See Rogers, supra note 127, at 291-92.
130. See Cornell, supra note 120, at 148 (citing Brown's research on the dozoku).
131. Id.
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Similarly, Cox shows how scholars have assumed that the nuclear
family founded in landed wealth described in Xenophon's
Oeconomicus as the typical Greek oikos, when this discussion
actually described only an idealized and stylized
oikos; historical
13
Greek households were complex and extended. 1
These historical discoveries should cause lawmakers to inquire
more carefully before borrowing even from other serious disciplines,
and they should certainly investigate into what assumptions
motivate researchers whose paradigms and data they rely on to
make laws. For example, before a legislator accepts a study that the
family is in decline, or that single parent families exhibit more
pathologies than two-parent families, or that gay and lesbian
couples are less stable than heterosexual couples, he should find out
what normative standards the researcher uses to define pathology
or stability, and what resulting factors the researcher may have
excluded in measuring his subjects. Moreover, such studies should
give rise to the expectation that lawmakers will see some significant
deviation between ideal-types for 'family' in our society and the
reality of how households cope with their circumstances. Whether
they should err on the side of 'encouraging' all families to organize
like some idealized grouping or focus on responding to economic and
social support problems of real household formations without trying
to reshape them according to a normative agenda, similarly
deserves careful consideration.
A third preliminary point: in considering where legal change
will be most successful, it is important for lawmakers to consider
what social forces are causes or driving forces and what social forces
are results. Historian John Hajnal has argued that in many
cultures, the formation of households is a primary social activity
that dictates marriage and childbearing activity, rather than the
other way around, as the American legal debate over marriage often
supposes.' For example, if the custom in a society is for an adult
child to leave when he forms a family, then individuals in that
society may marry at very different ages, depending on when they
can afford to maintain an independent household."" Such decisions
132. See Cox, supra note 105, at 132-135 ("Although scholars have always been aware that
oikos was a complex term, meaning more than Tamily,' historical interpretations have,
nevertheless, in practice reduced the oikos to the nuclear family.*).
133. See Cornell, supra note 120, at 146-47. Indeed, Cornell notes that whether the
household is the primary way of understanding intimate life varies from culture to culture. In
West African societies, for example, the household is not a chief organizing feature. Id. at 147.
134. Id. at 146.
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have consequences for all kinds of 'family' issues, including how
frequently adolescents will be employed in servant classes, whether
women will be financially independent, and whether the public will
need to provide for indigents.'35
If Hajnal is correct, lawmakers should not be so quick to load
social and economic expectations upon marriage by making the
nuclear family the test for social and economic burdens and benefits:
it seems more likely that conferring certain legal benefits and
burdens will influence people's marriage choices, rather than vice
versa. As just one example, some lawmakers infer that making
marriage the legal tool for the conferral of economic rights within
the father-mother-child triad will encourage women to marry and
form nuclear families with their children's father.'3 6 However, in a
subgroup, such as African American women in poverty, who may be
deterred from marrying an unemployed African American man who
is the father of their children because he represents another mouth
to feed, 137 programs that focus on paying incentives for marriage
without attending to joblessness are bound to fail.
As to our central question, whether the evolution of the family
from tribal to nuclear form can be demonstrated, the evidence
suggests a much more complicated story than the nuclear/evolving
family paradigm suggests. First, we note a seemingly obvious fact
about family life cycles that is strangely overlooked in typical
description of the legal family in the United States: anyone
who cares to look can see that even the traditional 'nuclear family'
evolves in a person's lifetime from two individual households to
a combined couple, to a family with small or adolescent children,
to an 'empty nest' dyad to a one-person household composed usually
of a widow. Yet, traditional family law is largely built around the
middle 'family with children,' as evidenced by the slow response
of the legal culture to catastrophes faced by young singles
and elderly widows who may need help with financial support, care,
and companionship. 38
135. Id.
136. See Get Me to the Churchon Time, THE ECONOMIST, July 12,2003 (Bush Administration
using "welfare policy to encourage poor to get married"); Karen S. Peterson, The President's
Family Man, USA TODAY, July 30, 2002, at 1D ("[B]edrock of a child's life is a mom and dad
who stay together in a healthy marriage.").
137. See FINEMAN, supra note 17, at 109 (quoting William Junius Wilson).
138. See, e.g., ELIZABETH T. BARTLETr & ANGELA P. HARRis, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY,
DOCTRINE COMMENTARY 425-26 (1998). For example, until fairly recently, most single persons
between eighteen and sixty-five had virtually no guaranteed system of legal support from their
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Studies of the family across cultures note quite different life
cycle changes in household composition across cultures, including
how households treat aging parents has varied from culture to
3 9 While many extended
culture and historical period to period."
households from ancient to modem times have included aging
parents, the fate of the elders depended very much on economic
circumstances and family customs. In nineteenth century England,
the elderly often wound up in the poor house, while in France,
elderly peasants often remained in charge of the family group or the
community would support the elderly poor as beggars." 4 In
European cultures, struggles occurred when a married child would
decide it was time for his father to retire and turn the family farm
over to him.'" Often, this struggle would result in a contract in
which the adult child would formally agree to provide aging parents
with housing, food, furniture, clothing and wood for the rest of their
lives in exchange for surrender of the power in the household.'4 2
These differences in household lifecycle changes have profound
effects on the composition of a family household in different cultures
and different historical periods. For example, Hajnal proposed two
"fundamental sets of rules" for forming households in preindustrial
societies; in one system (the joint household), a new couple joined an
existing household; in the other system (the simple household), a
new couple would leave the household." Even such a simple
difference would have a profound impact on an individual's life
experience and whom he considers 'family:'in a joint household

families of origin or the government, if they became unemployed or suffered a serious physical
or mental illness. Moreover, after equitable division of property became the reigning regime,
younger wives who divorced might not walk awaywith anything but the property they brought
into the marriage, and it would be difficult to recoup any investment they made toward spousal
educations that ensured their divorcing husbands a healthy income for life. Middle-aged single
divorcees similarly struggled to establish a continuing need for support because of educational,
physical or emotional limitations, as it was assumed that they should pick up with their lives
as they, left them when they married. See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 21, at 217-19. See also
Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage:Single Women and the Legal Conructionof the
Family andthe State, 112 YALE L. J. 1641, 1660-89 (2003) (discussing how widows continue to
be regulated by the state from within the "shadow" of their former marriages).
139. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
140. See Martine Segalen, Life-Course Patternsand PeasantCulture in France:A Critical
Assessment, in FAMILY HISTORYAT THE CROSSROADS: A JOURNAL OF FAMILY HISTORY READER
218 (Tamara Haraven & Andrejs Plakans eds., 1987).
141. Id.
142. See id.; Gaunt, supra note 120, at 136-38 (describing a son's complicated negotiations
with his parents, the army, and the fee estate holder to take over his parents' farm).
143. Cornell, supra note 120, at 146.
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system, an individual "will share the household with cousins, aunts,
and uncles; in adulthood with brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces;
and in old age with members of younger generations. In a simple
household one has only parents, servants or children."'"
Cornell points out the even greater variations in household
composition that arise from variations on the theme of 'all children
stay,' for example, cultures in which often only male children and
their wives stayed within the household, or more rarely, only female
children and their husbands stayed, " or only the eldest son or a
chosen child stayed.'" As a result of these variations, as well as
other needs occasioned by death and disasters, the composition of
households could vary dramatically in the same locality. For
example, in seventeenth century coastal Finland, while the most
common combination of complex households included parents and
a married son or daughter, families might also include parents and
two married children, married brothers and sisters and their
children sharing a home, widowed mothers/sisters/brothers sharing
with married couples, uncles and aunts or widowed sisters-in-law
joining the family, and so forth." '
The nature of family formation strongly influences not only
when people will marry, but even how strongly society expects
people to marry and how it treats the unmarried, a particular
concern for paradigm-makers in a post-millennial culture in which
the fastest growing household form is singles.'" For example, in the
European feudal model after primogeniture was established, the
younger son's 'family' fate would depend upon external factors: if
land or jobs were plentiful, these younger sons might someday be
economically able to begin a new nuclear household and marry." 9
Otherwise, they might remain single, enter the priesthood, become
144. Id. at 151.
145. See id. at 150.
146. In the later feudal period in Europe, only the eldest son and his family would stay and
inherit the land, while daughters would join their husbands' households and younger sons.
Id. at 153-54. The 1999 Japanese civil code anticipates that the family would choose a child,
often the youngest, to stay, forming a stem family (i.e. a household that can contain any
number of married couples, but only one in each generation). Id at 152.
147. See Beatrice Moring, Household and Family in FinnishCoastalSocieties 1635-1895,
18 J. FAM. HIST. 395, 404 (1993). Similarly, eighteenth century Italian sharecropping
households were quite often composed of two or more married brothers and their wives. David
I. Kertzer & Caroline Brettell, Advances In Italianand Iberian Family History, in FAMILY
HISTORY AT THE CROSSROADS: A JOURNAL OF FAMILY HISTORY READER 93 (Tamara Haraven
& Andrejs Plakans eds., 1987).
148. See POPULATION REPORTS 2001, supra note 26, at 3.
149. See Cornell, supra note 120, at 153-54.
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lifelong servants in another household, or die an early death in
medieval cities where mortality was high, a very different existence
than the model of medieval or even modem life imagined for them.'
Even in some post-medieval societies, such as nineteenth
century Scandinavia, there have been significant proportions of
never-married persons, though they were more often than not
included as part of someone's household.' Similarly, celibacy
was quite common in nineteenth century France in areas where
real property was bequeathed to one heir; single brothers and
sisters would often remain in the heir's household, "to be treated
more or less as servants" by their brother, the household head." 2
Other studies have shown that about 50% of the men and 75% of
the women in seventeenth century Milanese patrician families
never married, while 27-32% of Portuguese women over 50 "died as
spinsters" between the late 1800s and early 1900s.

5

1

Yet, the

American law of the family, and the legal benefits and burdens that
flow from marital status or parental status, very barely recognizes
the existence of unmarried adults, especially those who reside with
family members.
Similarly, family organizations considered in population
discussions to be an illegitimate aberration of modern 'post-60s'
culture in fact show surprising resiliency throughout time. For
example, the high incidence of modem single-parent or cohabiting
Scandinavian families with illegitimate children is often noted in
popular debates about the importance ofmarriage.' 5 Yet, illegitimate
150. See id.at 153-54, 154-56 (describing the common practice of adolescent service prior
to marriage between 17th and 19th centuries).
151. See Rogers, supra note 127, at 294-95. Such single status was due to any number of
factors including restricted availability of land for setting up new agricultural households. Id.
152. See Segalen, supra note 140, at 217. These children often received a monetary award
for their share of the family wealth because land often could not be economically parceled out
due to an obligation felt by the child to keep it in the family. Id.
153. See Kertzer and Brettell, supra note 147, at 103. The authors note that these facts
confound the so-called "Mediterranean" pattern of early marriage of young women to older
men. Id. By contrast, among 19th century rural Bulgarians, virtually no women or men
remained unmarried, though the age of marriage varied dramatically by religion and
occupation. See Ulf Brunnbauer, Families and Mountains in the Balkans, Christian and
Muslim HouseholdStructures in the Rhodopes, 19th-20th Centuries,7 HIST. OFTHE FAM. 327,
338 (2001). Christians usually married by 30 for women or 35 for men, while Muslims usually
married by 25 and 30, respectively. Id at 338.
154. See Franz Rothenbacher, Social Change inEuropeand its ImpactonFamilyStructures,
in THE CHANGING FAMILY: FAMILY FORMS & FAMILY LAW 9,17 (John Eekelaar and Thandbantu
Nhlapo eds., 1998) (noting Popenoe's views on the decline of familism as a cultural value in
Sweden, and rise on cohabitation in Nordic countries as an alternative to marriage).
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births in Nordic areas have been increasing since the mideighteenth century, while non-marital cohabitation and the number
of families with a husband who did not father the family's children
began increasing there by the end of the nineteenth century. 155 In
Italy, some evidence extrapolated from foundling data suggests that
illegitimacy rose from the mid-sixteenth to the mid-eighteenth
century, and then peaked dramatically in the mid-nineteenth
century;' 5 6 in Carinthia, more than eighty percent of the births
during the second half of the nineteenth century were illegitimate.5'
Indeed, much maligned 'modern' premarital sexual practices
were in fact permitted in many regions in many centuries, including
nocturnal visits from suitors.M Premarital cohabitation was not
only common in the Middle Ages but even legalized through an
engagement contract in some regions.'5 9 In others, premarital
cohabitation, or even a 'trial marriage,' was utilized to determine
whether the woman was fertile and thus whether the marriage
contract between the families was worth making."'6 Marriage among
the poor and servants was particularly restricted, with predictable

155. See Rogers, supra note 127, at 296. Illegitimate births varied from six to eleven
percent in Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland during the 19th Century, whereas in
Iceland, the proportion of these births ranged from fourteen to twenty percent. Id. Illegitimate
children were treated the same as legitimate children by law in Sweden, but some historians
suggested that women conceiving out of wedlock were ostracized or subject to a public
requirement of repentance. Id.
156. See Kertzer & Breitell, supra note 147, at 101-02.
157. See Andre Burguiere, The Formation of the Couple, in FAMILY HISTORY AT THE
CRossRoADs: AJoURNALOFFAMILYHISTORYREADER 47 (Tamara Haraven & Andrejs Plakans
eds., 1987). In Florence, 43% of all children born in the 1830's were abandoned. Kertzer &
Breitell, supra note 147, at 101-02. These numbers do not precisely correlate to illegitimacy,
as increasing numbers of foundlings were children born in legitimate working class families
who could not afford to support them, a practice which was similarly followed in Spain and
Portugal. Kurtzer and Breitell, supra note 147, at 101-102. However, this practice would be
considered even more aberrational in modern America, in some respects, than illegitimate
births to single mothers. FIEMAN, supra note 17, at 114 (quoting a study noting that
approximately forty percent of babies born between 1785 and 1797 were born to first-time
single mothers).
158. See Burguiere, supra note 157, at 46-47 (discussing such customs as arranged
marriages in which the promised bride was allowed to cohabitate with the future husband
well in advance of marriage).
159. See Rogers, supra note 127, at 296.
160. See Burguiere, supra note 157, at 45-46. See also Rogers, supra note 127, at 296
(noting that as many as two-thirds of brides were pregnant when they married in the 19th
century, as engaged couples were considered to be married in most people's eyes. Church
attitudes and commoners' views about premarital sex in Sweden were also quite different some communities strictly supervised young people, while others permitted "bundling,"
overnight sleeping between boyfriends and girlfriends).

20041

A PEACE PROPOSAL FOR THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE WARS

229

results16 ' and while some anti-illegitimacy campaigns had longlasting effects, others seemed to produce quite unintended results,
as in two strong Counter-Reformation areas, Bavaria and Austria,
which experienced the highest rates of62illegitimacy in Europe at the
beginning of the nineteenth century.
Moreover, even the prevalence of nonfamily household members,
such as servants, has varied over time and place, and not
necessarily in a historically linear fashion. Most educated persons
are familiar with the extended nature of medieval aristocratic
households, which could include upwards of seven hundred
servants. 6 3 Indeed, large households were so complex that they were
sometimes broken down into separate parts - the great household
("the full permanent establishment"),'
the riding or foreign
household, and a secret household that remained with the noble at
those times when he did not wish to maintain hospitality. 165 Many
aristocratic households included poor people who were fed or lodged,
or other guests who just came to supper, who could add several
dozen more to the household."c Medieval households also took in
short-term guests and long-term lodgers, many of whom would pay
17
for their room and board, just as they do in a modern day hotel.
However, servants, boarders and other nonrelatives have also
been 'members of the family' in other cultures and other times as
well, reflecting a less fractured relationship between a household's
economic activity and its private noneconomic activity than in
modem times. For example, the Greek term for household, oikos,
referred to any number of groupings including the physical space
occupied by the household unit, which might contain a shop, factory,
bank, or even a grouping of several physical dwellings, each
populated by a different wife of the master and her children; or
161. See Burguiere, supra note 157, at 47 (noting that illegitimacy was aggravated by the
restrictions on marriage for the poor).
162. Id. at 48-49.
163. See C.M. WOOLGAR, THE GREAT HOUSEHOLD iN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 9-10 (1999).
164. Id. at 15.
165. Id. at 15-16. For the Duke of Buckingham in 1507-1508, the great household (all who
depended upon the institution) averaged 157 people; the riding household, the retinue that
accompanied the nobleman when he traveled averaged 57 persons. Id. The Earl of
Northumberland in 1511-12 had a riding household of 36 persons, a secret household of 42.
Id. at 16.
166. Id. at Tbl. 1 at 12-13, 23-24 (noting that guests at the Duke of Buckingham's ranged
from 54 to 80, depending on the day, while other households seemed to have a special day of
the week for hosting the poor.)
167. Id. at 25.
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landed estates scattered over many miles.' Indeed, in Athens, like
other later European, Asian and African societies, concubines were
in certain respects an extension of the household, inasmuch as even
'free concubines' or their blood family members might make
contracts providing for their support or property during the
relationship, and their children might, by living with members of
their father's 'legitimate'
family, come to be recognized as kin of a
169
legitimate marriage.

In medieval households, servants and family members often
became intermixed by assigning younger bluebloods as household
servants to greater noblemen as a means of acculturating the
younger man to the responsibilities of his aristocratic birth for
example.7 0 Ties between servants and the household head were by
both blood and money.' 7 ' For example, it was commonplace for
medieval young people between the ages of twelve and twenty-five
to be in service for a year at a time, often to relatives, as a means for
poorer, lower-status families to forge stronger ties with relatives
from higher classes.'7 2 The practice of sending young people out to
be servants in other households persisted into the nineteenth
century in southern Europe.'73 The young servants were also joined
in the household by apprentices, who would board with their
masters from the ages of twelve on, for perhaps five to ten17 4years, for
which the masters would be paid a fee by their parents.
Nor is the household presence of servants and other nonfamily
members confined to noble families or to medieval periods. One
painstaking study of an 1820s central Finnish household estimated
that forty-two persons resided in its four rooms in the winter; and
another oral history of a 1940s family identified twenty persons
centered around three married siblings.'75 Family historians have
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See Cox, supra note 105, at 136-40.
Id. at 172-80.
See PETER FLEMING, FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 75 (2001).
Id. at 72-73.

Id.
See Kertzer and Brettell, supra note 147, at 102.
See FLEMING, supra note 170, at 72-74.

175. See Gaunt, supra note 120, at 126-29. Gaunt notes that these were not typical
households; the mean central Finnish household in the 1820's was 4.0-4.6 persons, and less
than 4% of households had more than fifteen members. Id. at 126. But these varied from area
to area, in one parish near the Soviet Border, 12% of the households had more than twentyone members; greatly extended households in this area fluctuated from 34% in 1820 to 15%
in 1830 to 17% in 1840 to 21% in 1850 (excluding stem families, and commonly married
brothers and their families residing together). Id.
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shown that nonfamily members, including servants, were prevalent
in households in both England and the United States until the end
of the 1930's, and in Japan until the 1950s.'76 Indeed, Morioko notes
that in the United States, as in other countries, nonrelatives were
present in significant numbers until the end of the nineteenth
century; and the decline in this family composition corresponds to
the parallel rise of single-person households in these countries.'7 7
One might argue that the existence of extended households is
not evidence that the nature of the legal family - the group who
understands themselves as having moral and legal obligations to
each other - has changed over time. It seems quite clear, however,
that the relationship between legal obligation and familial
obligation was much more fluid in earlier times than the modem
model, which imposes legal obligations largely on the basis of blood
and marriage. Indeed, in the medieval period, households themselves
were recognized as legal entities to which rights might be granted.'
Moreover, medieval households, for example, quite clearly understood
that household heads had legal obligations to their servants.179
Some of these obligations inhered in the fact that the servants were
blood relatives, others in the documents of indenture that spelled
out in extensive detail the perquisites that accompanied service in
the great household." 8 For example, the 1312 indenture of William,
son of Ralph DeMerk, shows that William traded a nobleman part
of William's estate for sixty acres of land, "reasonable food and drink
fitting for an esquire, together with a horse and groom," "a yearly
allowance of two sets of clothes," and identification of the table at
which he would sit for meals.'' As suggested, similar legal support
contracts were common practice from the seventeenth through the
nineteenth centuries in Scandinavian countries where sons succeeded
their parents on the land.'82
Similarly, legal obligations for support of kin have often
extended beyond the nuclear family. In the United States, until
176. See Kiyomi Morioka, A Japanese Perspective on the Life Course: Emerging and
DiminishingPatterns,in FAMILYHISTORYATTHE CROSSROADS: AJOuRNALOFFAMILYHIsTORY
READER 247 (Tamara Haraven & Andrejs Plakans eds., 1987).
177. Id.
178. See WOOLGAR, supra note 163, at 8.
179. Id. at 8-9.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 9.
182. See, e.g.,. Gaunt, supra note 120, at 136-39 (describing how sons when assuming
responsibility of their father's land were obligated to provide a living allowance of sorts, which
can include, food, clothing, firewood, and money to his father).
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3
recently, legal responsibility for aging parents was commonplace. 11
Communist China, which has been cited by some as promoting
aberrant communal family life, statutorily codified the Confucian
tradition that adult children had the legal duty to support their
aging parents if they have "lost the ability to work or have difficulty
providing for themselves," and grandchildren had the same duty
to their grandparents.'8 4 Under the law, Chinese children and
grandchildren who mistreated their aging parents or grandparents
could be punished by up to two years in prison, and those who
refused to support them by up to five years in prison.1'
In terms of critiquing the 'evolving/nuclear family' conception,
perhaps the most striking thing about family history studies is how
a community model of 'the family' can vary quite dramatically
within the same geographical area. These studies to some extent
give the lie to the argument that 'the American family' is changing
in ways unprecedented in human history, and that regional
variations - between, for example, the stereotypical 'Bible-belt'
traditional family and the San Francisco gay family - are historical
aberrations. For example, Hajnal posited a fundamental cultural
"Western European marriage pattern" which assumed that
individuals would marry late, or not marry at all due to the scarcity
of land; yet, in reality, this pattern did not obtain in many areas
because of occupation - areas where fishing, mining or textiles
were frequent trades showed 6 lower ages of marriage than
agricultural areas, for example.1

183. See, e.g., Terrance A. Mine, A RationalRole for FilialResponsibilityLaws in Modern
Society?, 26 FAM. L. Q. 195, 198-201 (1992) (noting that twenty-eight states continued to have
laws requiring the support of ageing parents in 1992, though most had not been enforced since
the 1960s).
184. See William Meredith and Douglas A. Abbott, Chinese Families in Later Life, in
FAMmIEs IN MuLTIcuLTuRAL PERSPECTIVE 216 (Bron B. Ingoldsby & Suzanna Smith eds.,
1995) (noting that the duty of grandchildren to grandparents occurred when the grandparents'
children were deceased).
185. Id. at 216-217 (citation omitted) (noting that detention or public surveillance are
alternative punishments).
186. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 127, at 294-95. In many areas, the household's economic
activity seems to have been a more critical factor in household composition than local custom
or law. In fifteenth century Tuscany, for example, the "average" family may have differed in
composition largely because of the family trade: 31% of sharecropping households (a majority
of sharecroppers) lived in households with two or more nuclear families, while only 19% of the
artisans lived in such households; see also Kertzer & Brettell, supra note 147, at 93. Similarly,
in early 20th century Bulgaria, more than 40% of all Pomak (Muslim) families, who largely
farmed, lived in extended or multiple family household, (most often including a grandparent
or a married son and daughter-in-law, as compared with about sixteen percent of the Greek
Orthodox families in the same region who sought other trades such as masonry and textiles.
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Family composition also varied dramatically even in the same
general geographical areas. Danish rural households in the
eighteenth century onward typically included parents and children
with family nearby, but about one-third of Icelandic and Norwegian
families were extended, in Norway usually by grandparents, in
Iceland by adult siblings."8 7 Even regions within a nation-state
might have very different households: Voinonmaa noted that
Southwestern Finns in the early seventeenth century were almost
all nuclear, whereas in middle Finland, from a quarter to almost a
third of all households were extended family types.'8 8 Similarly,
though many areas of Italy commonly employed a complex family
household from the ninth century into the nineteenth century, in
southern Italy, nuclear families predominated during this latter
period. 8 9 Contrary to the progressive 'evolving/nuclear family'
view, the number of Italian families living in multiple family
households actually rose from about thirty percent of all families in
the fifteenth century to seventy-six percent by the nineteenth
century, including twenty-eight percent with three or more nuclear
units within one household."o
The U.S. Census figures for 2000 mirror these historical
household complexities. Beyond the 24.1% of households that fit the
nuclear paradigm, the census reports that 28.7% of all U.S.
households are married couples without their own children, 16% are
family households without a married couple, 25% are single-person
households, and 5.7% are nonfamily households composed of
unrelated individuals. 9 ' Significant trends noted by the Census
Bureau: nonfamily households (especially singles) are increasing
while family households are declining; the median age of marriage
continues to rise while an increasing number of young adult men (as
well as women) are living with their parents; and the number of
self-identifying cohabiting couples has risen sharply to more than
three million.'9 2
Brunnbauer, supra note 153 at 331-32, 336
187. Rogers, supra note 127, at 299.
188. See Gaunt, supra note 120, at 124. Gaunt notes that in Finnish areas where farming
was "slash-and-burn," and men were commonly away from home looking for arable land, large
household numbers were required to find and prepare land, which was not considered
'property' but simply a place to be used to farm and dwell, not unlike indigenous people's

understanding about land. Id. at 124.
189. See Kertzer & Brettel, supra note 147, at 92-93.
190. Id. at 93.
191. See POPULATION REPORTs 2001, supra note 26, at 3.
192. See id. at 3, 9, 10, 12. The report notes that this number is probably unrepresentative
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Beyond these statistics one can see that a wide variety of
American household and kin organizations provide economic and
social support, especially for children but also for adults. Professor
Bengston argues that there is a new emergence of extended
intergenerational kin taking responsibility for children in their
family." More than four million minor children live with
grandparents or great grandparents, due to parents' imprisonment,
additions, young age, violence, psychiatric disorders, or for various
other reasons.'9 4 Moreover, about twenty-nine percent of singleparent families double up, with about one-third living with a
noncohabitant adult, often the mother's parent; about one-fourth
with a married couple, often kin; and about twenty-eight percent
with an unrelated male cohabitant. 9 5 Single-parent families who
live with other single parent families seem to do so out of dire
necessity, because these are the poorest of single parent families,
with incomes at fifty percent of the poverty guidelines.' Their
experiences, while not ideal, can be contrasted with single poor
mothers living alone in rural areas, who report being overwhelmed
fathers,
by their children's discipline issues, illnesses, irresponsible
197
and lack of appropriate child care when needed.
Modern American ethnographic studies show similar patterns
extended
family behavior, particularly when one looks at families
of
from non-European cultures. Researchers have noted that in the
African American community, beyond the nuclear and single-parent
family models, a very common grouping is the 'augmented family,'
in which aunts and uncles, grandparents and/or live-in non-relatives
provide significant care to minor children.' Studies on Mexican
because the census only counts the head of household and his partner, not other cohabitors
in the house, and requires respondents to identify themselves as cohabitors rather than
roommates. Id.
193. See Bengston, supra note 117, at 3-4, 6-8.
194. See Richard K Caputo, Grandmothersand Co-Resident Grandchildren,FAMILIES IN

SocY: THE J. OF CONTEMP. HUM. SERV. 121 (Mar.-Apr. 1999); Bengston, supra note 117, at 7.
195. See Anne E. Winkler, The Living Arrangements of Single Mothers with Dependent
Children: An Added Perspective, 52 AM. J. OF ECON. AND SOC. 1, 2, 4 (1993). Winkler also
notes the rise in single-mother households from eight to twenty-two percent from 1960-1990
(involving 13.9 million children in 1990). Id.

196. Id. at 13.
197. See Marion H. Wijnberg & Kathleen M. Reding, Reclaiming a Stress Focus: The
Hassles of Rural,PoorSingle Mothers, 1999 FAMILIES INSOCIETY: THE J. OF CONTEMP. HUM.
SERV. 506, 509 (1999).
198. See Barnes, supra note 43, at 451. While a number of these families, too, report
significant stress, most exhibit considerable adaptation and resilience to their circumstances,
including strong family communication. Id. at 458.
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American families also note that their extended families include
primary kin, extended kin and close friends and neighbors, and
entails "a deep sense of obligation by its members to each other for
economic assistance, encouragement and support."' This ethos
results in Mexican American 'helpers' who regularly offer a home to
distant relatives and even unrelated persons in trouble for periods
from a few months to over a year. °° One interesting study of
modern Micronesian households in both Micronesia and southern
California showed that the American Marshallese households were
even more likely than those in the Marshall Islands to include
distant relatives, including married couples with children.20 '
In sum, actual studies of different households throughout
history confirm that the 'evolving/nuclear' paradigm, is at best a
conceptual building block for understanding how real households
function. In reality, in many societies, pluriform households have
formed under a wide variety of rules for identifying legal and social
responsibility to near and distant kin as well as unrelated members
of the household. Even in modem America, the nuclear family as
the major option for structuring household responsibility is clearly
mythic. Even though it is clear that nuclear families have existed in
many modem cultures and in significant numbers, to the extent
that the proponents for the nuclear family rely on tradition or
prevalence to claim prominence in ordering legal relationships in
the United States, the evidence largely goes against this claim.
COVENANT AND GAY MARRIAGE

PARALLELS AND THE PROBLEM OF

CHOICE

The covenant marriage movement and the gay marriage
movement may not, on the surface, appear to share much, since
they are identified with wider ideological chasms in American
society. Indeed, those on the right, many of whom have applauded
199. See Patterson & Marsiglia, supra note 42, at 24.
200. Id. at 26.
201. See Michael L. Burton et al., Who Can Belong to a Micronesian Household:
Representationsof Household Composition Across Social Contexts, 14 FIELD METHODS 65, 85

(2002). Researchers posited that this may be due to the high cost of housing in Southern
California, which requires relatives to double up. Id. The homeland Marshallese studies
corroborate previously discussed findings on variety of households: researchers identified both
a matrilineal and matrilocal family structure, including twenty kinship categories in ninetytwo households, which are most often extended to include the wife's relatives, the head of
household's siblings and mother, and grandchildren or great-grandchildren of the head. Id.
at 76, 78-79.
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the covenant marriage movement, are quick to deride the idea of gay
marriage as, in Professor Duncan's terms "an oxymoron,"2 °2 arguing
that marriage is by definition between male and female because of
natural complementarity.0 3 Some of those in the gay community who
oppose the extension of the institution of marriage to gay and lesbian
couples suggest that gays and lesbians who ask for marriage are
sacrificing something essential to their identity or the core values of
the gay community, particularly tolerance for diverse lifestyle
choices. 4 To extend the analogy, for them, for a lion to ask to be a
gazelle represents a form of disloyalty to lions everywhere.
It seems fair to say that both the gay and covenant marriage
movements share certain commitments and optimism about the
human condition - one might venture to say a mix of practicality
and naive romanticism - that represent both the promise and the
limitations of the American institution of marriage. As I will
suggest, both respond to modem anxieties about the future of the
family by affirming core traditional assumptions about the value of
marriage. Yet neither, in my view, gets away from a key problematic
in a liberal culture: whether the legal family that the state should
recognize should be conformed around the concept of 'choice.' I will
suggest that this concept should be modified to include households
that are not the product of individual choice, as most commonly
construed by reference to contract notions.
Gay Marriageand Covenant Marriage:Similarities
To their credit, both the covenant marriage and the same-sex
marriage movement attempt to make a positive response to
202. See Richard F. Duncan, Homosexual Marriageand the Myth of Tolerance:Is Cardinal
O'Connora "Homophobe"?, 10 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHIcs & PUB.POLY 587, 589 (arguing that
under current state law, homosexual marriage does not exist since the legal definition
requires a man and a woman).
203. See, e.g., Teresa Stanton Collett, Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage:Asking for the
Impossible? 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1245, 1256, 1261-62 (1998Xarguing that "[tjhe expansive
nature of married love between complementary persons is most fully realized in the creation
of children," and that heterosexual unions join "intrinsically different individuals" whose
"innate desire and unique capacity for union" is "captured by the word 'complementarity);
Duncan, supra note 202, at 595-96 (noting the complementary reproductive and other
capacities of men and women).
204. See, e.g., Warner, supra note 18, at 286-88 (arguing that the marriage debate has
widened the gap among gays, and demanding that marriage advocates account for the
harmful consequences of their policy to the queer ethos). For a summary of feminists'
arguments against the extension of marriage to lesbian couples, see Robson & Valentine,
supra note 87, at 538-40.
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anxieties over percieved changes in the nuclear family by proposing
legal amendments to the existing social structure, instead of merely
expressing disgust, anger, or fear at the perceived unraveling of
the social structure of the traditional family. The covenant marriage
movement has offered a quasi-contractual legal form of marriage
that returns the 'fault' regime of divorce to center stage, providing
an additional option for people to cement their legal relationships."'
The same-sex marriage movement proposes not the elimination
of legal marriage, but extension of all of legal benefits and
responsibilities of marriage to same-sex couples, often objecting to
civil unions and other legal attempts to confer less than a full
complement of marital rights on gay and lesbian couples. 2"
While these attempts to find a way out of the marriage
battleground are progressive, both of these movements can be fairly
called conservative. Both are reactive rather than ultimately
idealist because they propose to remedy perceived excesses of
'unlimited freedom' in relationships that are held responsible for the
high rate of family breakups and serial uncommitted relationships
in American society by modest extensions of the existing marital
form.20 7 Both of these movements also attempt to assimilate their
relationships to a traditional ideal of marriage, including a
monogamous lifelong relationship between two adults, although it
is not always clear whether the covenant marriage movement
embraces the equal partnership model the gay marriage movement
aspires to emulate. 0 8
Similarly, both movements display some realization that they
are politically unlikely to achieve complete social acceptance of their
ideal, yet reason that providing some better option for those who are
willing to undertake it is at least a worthwhile goal. Many of those
who advocate gay marriage, for example, also are willing to work for
civil union or registered partnership legislation, acknowledging its
205. See Hawkins et al., supra note 13.
206. See ESKRDGE, CASE, supra note 45.
207. See, e.g., ESKEIDGE, CASE, supra note 45, at 8-10, 82-84 (noting that same-sex
marriage might "civilize" and liberate "sexually venturesome" gay males from harmful
promiscuity, stereotyping and a cult of youth worship); Testimony of John Crouch, Maryland
House of Delegates H.B. 1076-Covenant Marriage, March 16, 1999, at http'/www.
divorcereform.org.tes.html (last visited Jan. 30,2004) (noting that covenant marriage would
reduce the incentives that encourage adultery or distrust that one's partner will commit

adultery).
208. At least one study has identified support for covenant marriage with "conservative,
religiously active individuals with traditional gender ideologies." Hawkins et al., supra note
13, at 16.
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obvious limits. 209 Despite excessive posturing on both sides, neither
of these movements has proposed more significant changes, such as
extended families, purely contractual marriage, mother-child dyads
as proto-families, the abolition of marriage, or the return to a maledominated family form.2 10
To their credit, both movements insist that human relationships
must be affirmed and supported by external social institutions
(especially the law) if they are to thrive. 21 Both also affirm that an
approach toward the organizing of human intimate structures that
utilizes a 'core model' with some basic features and protections
applicable to all families is ultimately going to be more successful
at preserving human security than a model in which all of the terms
of the relationship must be defined by the two individuals entering
into it. Indeed, both movements seem to acknowledge that no
extremes - e.g., the patriarchal marriage in which the male has
unlimited freedom to control both the fact and the incidents of
marriage, or the 'easy exit' relationship in which one person may
desert the other without accountability - represent21an
acceptable
2
relationships.
intimate
of
formation
the
to
approach

209. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, CIVIL UNIONS, supra note 45, 144-46, 158 (discussing how
members of Vermont's legislative body were better able to appreciate the plight of the gay and
lesbian community after the opportunity to listen to testimony from such individuals during
hearings to determine whether to legalize same-sex marriage).
210. See, e.g., Alison Harvison Young Reconceiving the Family: Challengingthe Paradigm
of the Exclusive Family, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 505, 515-16 (1998) (arguing for an inclusive
family that would include adults to whom the child was attached); FINEMAN, supra note 17,
at 230-33 (proposing that the mother-child dyad be recognized as family); see also Weitzman,
supra note 21, at 1249-76 (proposing that marriages be privately contracted); Nastich, supra
note 21, at 114-15 (arguing that the arguments in favor of same-sex marriage justify abolition
of marriage).
211. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, CASE, supra note 45, at 710-72; Laura Sanchez et al., Is Covenant
Marriage a Policy that Preaches to the Choir? A Comparison of Covenant and Standard
MarriedNewlywed Couplesin Louisiana,Bowling Green State Univ. Working Paper Series 0206 4-5, at http://wwwbgsu.edu/organizations/cfdr/research/pdf/2002/2000_06.pdf (last visited
Jan. 17 2004) (noting lawmakers' views that covenant marriage strengthens marriage "by
restoring legal efficacy to the marital vows* and giving couples security in their marriage
investment in a way that will stabilize marriage) (internal citation omitted).
212. See ESKRIDGE, CASE, supra note 45, at 71-73, 76 (describing virtues of life-long
commitments and disagreeing that marriage is the main explanation for the subordination
of women); ESKRIDGE, CIVIL UNIONS, supra note 45, at 214-17 (arguing that same-sex
marriage will destabilize oppressive gender roles); Sanchez et al., supra note 211, at 4, 6-7
(noting the purpose of covenant marriage legislation to encourage "serious, undiluted
commitmentV to marriage and arguments that covenant marriage protects women's and
children's well-being, gives women greater protection in divorces, and lessens the chance of
spousal abuse).
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The Role of Choice in Marriage:Revisiting the Issue
One key aspect of both covenant marriage successes and samesex marriage advocacy is that they largely retain the 'choice' model
for understanding marriage. Covenant marriage advocates have
accepted, perhaps reluctantly and perhaps for pragmatic reasons,
that mandating covenant marriage is unlikely to be completely
successful, and have constructed a model in which both parties must
choose a covenant marriage, rather than having a 'fault' regime
imposed by law as an aspect of marriage itself."'3 At least some gay
marriage advocates advocate an extension of a 'choice' of models,
including contracts and civil union, to gay and lesbian couples.214
This emphasis on choice as the key aspect of the marital
relationship in these two movements is perhaps unsurprising. In
the United States, the modem law of marriage is grounded in
an image of relationship and community that is deeply rooted in
liberal individualism. The evolving/nuclear family model adopted by
these movements proposes to validate marriages based on their
ability to demonstrate three fundamental elements that mimic the
contractual form regnant at least since the twelfth century - the
couples' choice and intention to enter into marriage; the act of
establishing a relationship, and public acknowledgement of the
relationship, which are simultaneously present in the marriage
ceremony in modem culture.
The problem is that many forms of intimate relationships may
fail to exhibit one or more of these elements, at some or even all
times of their existence. This means that the validity of marriage
itself is constantly called into question by the prospect of choice. Gay
marriage advocates ultimately seem to adopt the modern contractual
solution to this problem: you may exit the agreement without moral
consequence if you are willing to pay the 'damages' either explicitly
agreed upon in an antenuptial or other contract, or the implicit
property division implied by a partnership model. 1 5 Covenant
213. See Hawkins et al., supra note 13, at 7 (noting Katherine Spaht's view that covenant
marriage would be more incremental and more politically palatable than other efforts to
reinstate fault based divorce).
214. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, CASE, supra note 45, at 78-79; CIVIL UNIONS, supra note 45, at
121-26 (describing menu of options for commitment for all couples, including domestic
partnership, cohabitation, civil unions, and covenant marriage).
215. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, CIVIL UNIONS, supra note 45, at 230 (noting the modern view that
couples should weigh costs and benefits of marriage carefully, and the postmodern view that
a menu will "empower couples to choose which institution best fits" their needs).

240

WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW

[Vol. 10:195

marriage advocates want to return to an earlier contractual model,
in which the choice to exit is morally faulty, though not legally
impossible, unless the other partner has 'defaulted' first by wrongful
behavior or some fact like impotence that6 makes the contract
21
'impossible' to perform in the first instance.
The intention of both parties to enter into marriage has been a
key legitimating factor in recent Western marriage law that is based
on Christian tradition.2 1 v In modern times, the relationship
of intention to enter into a marriage and public acknowledgment
of the marriage is inseparable because the acts leading up to
the completion of the marriage ceremony usually have no legal
significance, despite whatever social importance they may retain as
a ceremonial rite of passage." 8 Until the final vows are taken and
the marriage license is signed, modern couples have virtually no
legal rights against each other because of their prior, non married
21 9
relationship, and no cause for complaint if one of them backs out.
However, this was not always so. While Catholic theologians
stressed the importance of the couple's consent from the earliest
times, and the freedom to contract into marriage was an aspect of
the medieval canon law of marriage, John Witte's study of marriage
in medieval and early modern times suggests that the validity of the
couple's decision to marry varied from century to century as
property conflicts between parents and children rose and waned.22 °
Moreover, once merely a private agreement between the couple or
their families, marriage did not become a fully public and 'legal'
institution until the sixteenth century, as Witte and Mary Ann
Glendon have shown in their work on the history of marriage.2 2 '
216. See, e.g., Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana'sCovenantMarriage:Social Analysis and
Legal Implications, 59 LA. L. REV. 63, 81-83 (1998) (covenant marriage bill author arguing
that moral judgments should be made in dissolution cases).
217. See LYNN D. WARDLE & LAURENCE C. NOLAN, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY
LAW, 128-29 (2002).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 155 ("Licensed marriage is authorized by statute in all states, and mandated in
most of them"), 176-77 (discussing so-called "heart-balm" actions (breach of a promise to
marry) and their virtual nonexistence in most states today).
220. JOHN WITTE, FROM SACRAmENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION AND LAW IN THE
WESTERN TRADITION 25-26, 38, 59-60 (1997) (stating that pressure to control the shift in
family wealth that could occur because of marriages influenced the requirement of parental
as well as the couple's consent before the couple could marry); MARY ANN GLENDON, THE
TRANSFORIVIATION OF FAMILY LAW 28 (1989) (stating Lutheran-influenced jurists required both
parental consent and the couple's consent).
221. Church laws regulated sexual practices, forbidding such action as pedophilia, adultery,
and sodomy from the earliest times. Witte, supra note 220, at 19. The Church did not require
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First, marriage was purely in private hands: couples came to the
church door to marry each other, later with a preference for a priest,
and finally marriage took on legal form through the requirement
that the church legitimize and bless the marriage.22 2 However, it
was only after the Reformation, between the sixteenth and eighteenth
centuries that marriage was secularized, licensed, 2and
regulated by
23
the state in the ways that we understand it today.

A key theological transition that influenced this development
was the transition from common understanding of marriage as a
natural but private association to an official Church sacrament to
a finally a secular estate. From the twelfth century, a systematized
Roman Catholic tradition that dominated Western 'law' held the
view that marriage was a complex institution, "as a created, natural
association, subject to the laws of nature; (2) as a consensual contract,
subject to the general laws of contract; and (3) as a sacrament of
faith, subject to the spiritual laws of the church."22 4
As a natural association, marriage illustrated the importance
of the inclination of the couple for each other, a direction of one's
natural desire to an individual person, in a way that is not
compelled from the outside (and in that sense voluntary) but
perhaps well beyond calculation.225 Second, as a contractual form,
marriage functioned as a much more intentional decision to
mutually exchange the spouses' "bodies for perpetual use in the
procreation and nurture of children," 226 "an 'association in which
each partner obligates [] himself to the other by virtue of mutual

any marriage formalities until the Council of Trent ending in 1563, when the Church began
to require parental consent, announcement of the banns of marriage, no premarriage
cohabitation, and witnesses. Id. at 26, 28, 38.
222. Id. at 38 (stating that a properly contracted marriage would result in a priest
recording the couple's and their witnesses' name in a register).
223. See GLENDON, supra note 220, at 30-34. Glendon notes that France did not make a
civil marriage ceremony and state marriage registration mandatory until 1792. Id. at 33.
Civil marriage did not appear in England until 1836, and informal marriages not performed
under ecclesiastical auspices were valid until Lord Hardwicke's Act in 1753. Id. Luther's
view that marriage was a secular institution resulted in statutes in the later sixteenth
century requiring either a government official as a witness to marriage vows, or an
announcement in a secular building, while in some places, the church was assigned a legal
role in registering couples and celebrating the marriage. Id. at 60-61. John Calvin's Marriage
Ordinance of 1545 began to require civil registration much earlier, after the Marriage
Ordinance was adopted as a statement to be used for Geneva's common law of marriage in
1561. WrrrE, supra note 220, at 84-85.
224. WrrrE, supra note 220, at 23.
225. Id. at 24.
226. Id. at 25.
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consent.""22 In this aspect, the couple's intention in recognized
marriage did resemble the conscious, almost arm's length decision
making now associated with human autonomy and choice: as with
other contracts, force, fear, fraud or coercion by parents or others
were sufficient to nullify the legal bond.22
Third, as a sacramental institution, marriage was a symbolic
embodiment of the relationship between Christ and the Church and
the means of grace by which God sanctifies the married couple and
their children in their roles in the family.2" As such, it does not
resemble the modern model of autonomous choice. First, there are
minimally three parties to the agreement - the husband, the wife,
and God. It is only when the contract conforms to divine intention
and is given "with the consent of God," if you will, that it is a valid
contract.2 3 ° Second, the agreement has a critical, public importance
beyond itself, enacting a symbolic union between God and his
followers that makes its terms a visible manifestation of such
relationship. 231' Third, in the canonical discussions about whether
sexual intercourse would suffice to create a marriage among
consenting adults when a family was against it, decisions arose in
which the role of mutual consent of the couple won out in the church
and in secular regulation, 232 it is clear that the decision of the couple
to enter into the relationship might better be characterized as one
of conscience rather than choice. Theologians distinguished between
intercourse without the intention to marry, and intercourse that
was intended to establish a bond with theological ramifications
beyond the desire of the couple themselves. 23

227. See id. (quoting Hugh of St. Victor).
228. See id. at 26.
229. See id. at 26-27.
230. Id. at 29 ("In essence, the parties consented to bind themselves to each other and to
God and the Church and thus to accept God's sacramental grace.").
231. See id. at 26-27.
232. See GLENDON, supra note 220, at 29-30. Glendon notes that the rise of the required
public ceremony before a priest and witnesses was, as Glendon suggests, in response to the
problem of informal marriages that allowed some people to disclaim valid marriages and
others to falsely claim a secret marriage to gain an inheritance. Id. at 29. Witte notes that the
canon law distinguished three forms of consent in the process of contracting into a marriage:
The promise to marry in the future (betrothal), the promise to marry in the present which
constituted a marriage; and voluntary sexual intercourse in order to consummate the
marriage. Wrrra, supra note 220, at 32. Either a promise to marry in the present, or a
betrothal plus consensual sexual intercourse were considered sufficient to constitute
marriage. Id.
233. See WrrmE, supra note 220, at 27-28.
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While Protestants rejected the sacramental aspect of marriage,
the public aspects and social aspects of marriage were strengthened
in the Protestant traditions which resulted in state secular4
assumption of the power to confer the legal benefits of marriage. 1
Though the Lutheran conception acknowledged the natural law
assumptions of the Catholic model and stressed the intention of the
two parties to enter into the marriage, the language of'calling' that
Luther used to describe marriage even more clearly illustrates that
Lutherans perceived marriage as a duty imposed by God upon
people (though some were called to be celibate), a duty which they
had the religious and moral obligation to accept.23 As one of three
key institutional forms given by God to preserve and nurture human
community, along with the state and the church,23 marriage was no
more of a private choice than one's government. Moreover, for
Lutherans, marriage retained the symbolic if not salvific aspects of
Catholic marriage; it was to serve as a reminder of Christ's
relationship with the church, imposing upon the couple an ethical
duty to carry out their family responsibilities with love and virtue.3 7
Similarly, the dissolution of the marriage estate was not simply
dependent on the will of the parties involved, since it was assumed
that sinful and willful self-concern would not be a justification for
destroying what was a God-given social institution.2 38
Calvinist denominations that primarily followed a covenantal
understanding of the relationship among God and Christians
similarly understood human intention and consent to be a key
requirement in the creation of a valid marriage.2 39 However,
Calvinist denominations also held that the covenant of marriage
was a sacred and solemn third-party agreement entered into with
God.2 ° Since a key element of the Calvinist covenantal model is the
234. See id. at 52-56. ("[Blecause marriage is a social estate of the earthly kingdom, not a
sacrament of the heavenly kingdom, it is subject to civil law and a civil authority, not canon
law and the church.").
235. See id. at 48-51; GEORGE FoRELL, Faith Active in Love, in MARTIN LUTHER:
THEOLOGIAN OF THE CHURCH: COLLECTED EsSAYS 28-29 (William R. Russell ed., Supp. 1994)

236. Id.
237. See WrrrE, supra note 220, at 49, 52.
238. See id. at 52-53.
239. Id. at 83,94-95. The early Calvinist Marriage Ordinance was written at a period when
Calvin was generally following Luther in his understanding of the Two Kingdoms doctrine;
the covenantal theology of marriage came later. Id at 94-95. Witte notes that the consent of
parents, especially fathers, were also vital to a valid betrothal, and even community members
could register objections to the marriage. Id. at 83-85.
240. Id. at 7, 83-85. In covenantal theology, the couple's parents (instructors in marriage),
the witnesses (to the sincerity of the couple's promises and the fact of marriage), the ministers
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fidelity of the parties, Protestants who employed this model
understood marriage to be indissoluable except when the most
egregious of violations was committed by the other party.2 41 In
Witte's narrative, these forms have given way to an Enlightenment
driven, secular and contractual imagination about marriage,
where for a marriage to be effective, the full, free and rationally
considered consent of the parties is all that is required.2 4 2
Perhaps more than the contemporary law of marriage itself, the
covenant marriage and the gay marriage movements both deeply
recognize the vital importance of fidelity in intimate bonds, though
the covenant marriage movement wants to adopt the symbolic
weight of the Protestant covenantal tradition, where the gay
marriage movement has largely confined itself to endorsing a robust
'loving contract' model with some recognition of the ways in which
marriage does not fit the contract model of human relationship. As
William Eskridge, a proponent of same-sex marriage, acknowledges:
the duties and obligations of marriage directly contribute to
interpersonal commitment.2 4 [Vierbal assurances [of warmth
and love] are useful, but actions speak more loudly. Discussions
about whether to move in together or get married are an
important way partners communicate with one another about
the level of commitment they feel.
The promise and the reasonable expectation of commitment
are valuable for a variety of reasons, starting with the personal
security that comes from knowing that one can depend on
someone else for better or for worse (with an emphasis on the
latter). Conversely, commitment provides an intense focal point
for one to transcend the self and to deepen one's identity through
intimate interaction with another being . . . the status of
spousehood protects people's capacity for intimacy and thereby
fosters a stable sense of self over time.2'

who blessed the union and admonished the couple about their responsibilities, and the
magistrate who ensured the legality of the marriage, registered it, and protected the marriage
all performed their respective responsibilities as God's agents in the marriage. Id. at 95.
241. With the exception of adultery and sexual dysfunction, Calvin refused to expand the
grounds for dissolution, though he treated desertion or separation as forms of adultery in
some cases. Id. at 100-03.
242. Id. at 10-11 (To Enlightenment scholars, "The essence of marriage was the voluntary
bargain struck between two parties who wanted to come together into an intimate
association.").
243. ESKRIDGE, CASE, supra note 45, at 71.
244. Id. at 71-72.
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Covenant marriage proponents echo this focus on the intrinsic
and functional goodness of marital promises and the stability which
such promises bring to the lives of those married. They also want to
claim that covenant marriage will ensure that the covenantal bond
is treated as a sacred bond, well beyond the normal commitments
which people make to each other in daily life. Recognizing some
points of irreparability, covenant marriage still represents the
notion that most of the injuries married people cause each other are
not just reasons for forsaking their vows of faithfulness.
Perhaps ironically, the criticisms leveled at both gay marriage
and covenant marriage tend to be from liberals who romanticize the
capacity of the individual to make morally worthy choices. Critics of
covenant marriage believe the covenant marriage option traps
women in uneven and loveless marriages. 24' These critics would join
critics of marriage in general who argue that in contractual forms
of marriage, both men and women can exit on essentially the same
terms, so that women do not have to put up with the physical or
other abuse their spouses inflict.' In their view, covenant marriage
also restrains the individual spouse's opportunity for growth, by
denying relationship and work choices that would be available in a
more egalitarian system.24 7
Similarly, the same-sex marriage movement has been criticized
by some in the gay rights movement for institutionalizing the
current patriarchial, abusive system of marriage as a paradigm for
couple relationships, thereby dooming any 'liberation' lifestyles
available to that gay and lesbian couples due to the fact that they
are not legally and socially bound by marital conventions.2 One
advocate argues that lesbians should think of the process of forming
intimate relationships as "'negotiating a contract rather than
245. See, e.g., NostalgicAttempts, supranote 91, at 581-82; Lawton, supra note 93, at 2478,
2510. Some commentators have suggested that covenant marriage increases the risk of
domestic abuse. Sanchez et al., supra note 211, at 6 (citing Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon Lohr,
Marriageas Contract,Opportunistic Violence, and Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce,
1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 719 (1997)).
246. See, e.g. Robson & Valentine, supra note 87, at 525-26 (describing work of lesbian
feminists who advocate for contractual solutions, but noting problems with contract as the
response to the problem of legal marriage).
247. See, e.g., Lawton, supra note 93, at 2510-11 n.347 (quoting Ashton Applewhite, who
suggests that "advancements in women's social and political status correlate with access to
affordable divorce").
248. See, e.g., Robson & Valentine, supra note 87, at 536-39; see also Warner, supra note
18, at 269 (arguing that the politics of same-sex marriage distracts people from inequality and
reinforces privilege).
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enforcing standards or issuing ultimatums.- 24 9 and another that
"contracts can acknowledge . . . the depth and richness in a
relationship while at the same time providing guidelines for the
'what ifs' every couple faces."'
In the liberal view of gay
relationships, open-ended contractual models, based on the
autonomous and egalitarian choice of partners, are capable of
achieving desirable ends, while traditional marital models are
thoroughly problematic because of power differentials.
Moreover, even nonliberal feminists, such as Professor Martha
Fineman, who have mounted a devastating critique of the failure of
the 'sexual family' to meet both the needs of gender equality and
social dependence, ultimately embrace a largely private contractual
model for marriage.2"' Professor Fineman has made a very
persuasive case that the nuclear family has been used to label all
nonnuclear forms of the family as deviant to justify state
interference in those 'defective' forms of family and the state has
dumped all of the responsibilities for dependents within the nuclear
family upon women, all in the name of family self-sufficiency and
independence.25 2 Yet, rather than calling for more public
accountability for male-female relationships, she wants to abolish
traditional nuclear family marriage as the paradigm or model for
the family in favor of a mother-child dyad, and relegate sexual
unions to an even more private place than they currently hold.253
Thus, despite criticism of their efforts for failing to be
sufficiently liberal, both the advocates and critics of gay and
covenant marriage share strongly in the 'choice' tradition described
in the term 'informed consent.' For example, covenant marriage
arguments continue to be premised on the assumption that the
critical basis for justifying enforcement of responsibilities upon one
of the married partners is his uncoerced and fully informed choice
to make a commitment, rather than external, community or
the partner's, expectations or needs. Louisiana's covenant marriage
law uses the language of the autonomous self: "A covenant marriage

249. See Robson & Valentine, supra note 87, at 525 (quoting P. CALIFA, SAPPHISTRY: THE
BOOK OF LESBIAN SExuALrry 57 (1980)).
250. See Robson & Valentine, supra note 87, at 525 (quoting D. CLUNIS & G. GREEN,
LESBIAN COUPLES 65-66 (1998)).
251. See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 17, at 107-14.
252. See Id.
253. Id. at 228-30.
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is a marriage entered into by one male and one female
who understand and agree that the marriage between them is a
lifelong relationship."254
Indeed, participants in covenant marriage are required to seek
mandatory premarital counseling, presumably so they can make
voluntary and fully informed choices. 25 They are also mandated
to disclose, before marriage, "everything which could adversely
affect the decision to enter ...

marriage."25

Similarly, most gay

marriage proponents such as William Eskridge do not argue that
gay and lesbian couples should be expected to marry because of their
history, social expectations, or the other person's need, however,
they should be given the choice to marry if they agree it would be in
their best interests.257
As compared with the actual history of family relationships as
well as the traditions that Witte has sketched out, this conception
of intention in forming human relationships is an idealized one. The
modem imagination about marriage has divided the Western
history of marriage into two periods: a primitive or traditional
earlier period, in which parents or kinfolk arranged marriages and
the children had no right to consent or object in the choice; and the
'modern' period, in which children have had the right to choose a
spouse and the parents or kinfolk had no say in the matter, except
perhaps moral suasion."B However, that description would seem to
be another example of oversimplification in the evolving nuclear
family metanarrative.
Instead, we might substitute the notion of a 'willingness to
marry' as a more consistent and embracing theme in Western
history. In the image of marital 'choice' embedded in the American
law of marriage, each member of the couple freely, independently,
and rationally evaluates the value of marriage and decides to marry
and chooses a particular mate from a group of several other
available alternatives. 2 9 He or she also decides to make an
emotional commitment to that person and consciously steers his or
her sexual inclinations to that person, to the exclusion of other
important relationships if a conflict arises.
254. LA. REv. STAT. ANN § 9:272 (West Supp. 1998) (emphasis supplied).
255. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §9:272 (West Supp. 1998).
256. LA. REV. STAT. ANN §9:272-73 (West. Supp. 1998).
257. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, CIVIL UNIONS, supra note 45, at 210-12.
258. See Bron B. Ingoldsby, Mate Selection and Marriage,in FAMILIES IN MULTIcULTURAL
PERSPECTIVE, 143, 150 (Bron B. Ingoldaby & Suzanna Smith eds., 1995).
259. See WrEr, supra note 220, at 194-95.
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Yet, not even the modern romantic ideal about marriage
would suggest that it can be pared down to a pact between two
individuals freely and knowingly choosing to enter a lifelong marital
contract. In reality, real marriages call this legal imagination into
question in any number of ways. In many American subcultures,
individuals feel pressure to enter into marriage because of social
or moral expectations that 'normal' people get married, including
expectations of kinfolk. 2" Others may be swept away by sexual
passion or emotions they do not fully understand, such as grief at
the loss of family or friends, a desire to have children, or attraction
to some specific aspect of the mate's personality or status or
resources.2 61 These and other common experiences count against the
idea that marriage is always, or even usually, a freely and fully
considered option.
The notion of willingness, by contrast, suggests that marriage
represents the confluence of many influences, decisions, and
experiences, so that a 'valid' family is created by the history of a
common relationship and not a set-in-time decision or ceremony.
This familial relationship is created unless both partners are
strongly unwilling to enter into such a relationship. If we understand
families as being validly formed when the partners are willing,
though they do not follow the modem model of consent, the options
for understanding how families might be identified and supported
by the law open up considerably. Indeed, we might see how closely
the current model of household formation under attack by
conservative groups - the so-called cohabiting couple - in fact
relates back to the way households were created prior to the
'legalization' of marriage first by the Catholic Church and then by
the state.2 62
In its support, the concept of willingness honors the realities of
'natural association' among persons - admitting that how we
affiliate in intimate relationships is governed partly by situation,
historical accident, biological, psychological and other influences
that are only partly conscious and 'rational.' For example, we might
argue that most couples who cohabit are willing participants in the
260. See, e.g., Dorian Solot & Marshall Miller, Unmarried Bliss Living Happily Ever After
Doesn't Nessesarily Require a Marriage License, at http://www.unmarried.org/unmarriedbliss.htm1 (last visited Jan. 11, 2004) (discussing expectations of kinfolk and general societal
pressure to get married).
261. Id.
262. See generally WrrE, supra note 220, at 16-41 (discussing marriage as a sacrament in
the Roman Catholic church).
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relationship and have some moral and even legal obligations to each
other, even if they did not make the more complicated and
thoughtful series of choices that at least the ideal story of betrothal
and legal marriage would present.26
Second, the concept of willingness recognizes the real force of
external influences upon our so-called 'choices' to affiliate in an
intimate relationship, marital or otherwise. This concept has the
ability to honor the role that parents, family and friends, and even
social mores play in decisions whether to form families and with
whom, without denigrating those who are partially guided by these
influences as somehow making invalid, immature or defective
decisions.
Third, the concept of willingness embraces those religious
traditions, including Catholic and Protestant, that understand
marriage and family as a conscientious response to a 'call' or
expectation from the divine about care and sacrifice on behalf of the
beloved, rather than an autonomous decision that is free from any
moral constraints in its inception.26 4 Claims that now seem strange
to modern ears because of nuclear family stereotyping, for example,
the notion that a lesbian feels that she was led and joined to her
partner by God, or that an uncle felt conscientiously obliged to care
for his young niece who was abandoned by her parents, can be
recognized by the state without privileging or recognizing either
these views or any opposing religious or secular views about what
constitutes a family.
Fourth, the concept of willingness does not privilege the
Western concept of romantic love over alternative customs for
selecting mates and forming marriages. Even those traditions that
rely on arranged marriages can be honored, so long as care for the
child meets some minimal standards of the liberal state regarding
coercion on fundamental rights - e.g., that the child is agreeable to
the marriage and the process of mate selection. 265 This recognition
is particularly important in light of the increasing diversity of
Western communities, and the lack of evidence that marriages
originating in romance are more lasting than those created by
nontraditional arrangements. 2"
263. See Solot & Miller, supra note 260.
264. See WiTrE, supra note 220, at 16-41.
265. Id.
266. See, e.g., Meena Thiruvengadam & Brooke Adams, Arranging a Modern Marriage,
SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Aug. 13. 2003, at D1. (discussing evidence of a one percent divorce rate
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Moreover, the concept of willingness does not subtly or overtly
disparage as foolish or less worthy those who find themselves in
households that do not resemble the 'ideal nuclear family' by
suggesting that they have 'made the choice' for that 'lifestyle' and
must pay the consequences for that choice, when in fact, many such
persons find that circumstance has circumscribed their life-choices.
For example, it is far from clear that most single persons who
constitute single-person households in the U.S. have made a 'choice'
for singleness: it may be happenstance whether suitable partners
are available or not, and many people may find themselves single
because they did not find themselves in the social surroundings or
economic circumstances that would produce a mutual lifelong
commitment. That single person households should be automatically
excluded from the benefits given to family households because
singles have made the 'choice' not to marry seems false, if not unfair.
When we look beyond marriage, we see that many households
are more similar to the traditional model than the modern arms'
length contract. Some grandparents who are raising their
grandchildren, for example, have not contracted for or pursued that
particular family formation in the same way a business owner seeks
out a supplier; but when only worse alternatives such as foster care
are available, they accept the responsibility for parenting their
grandchildren. Similarly, families who double up to make rent
payments or brothers whose families cowork a farm may not have
sought out a multiple family situation because it was the most ideal
they could imagine, but because it was the best alternative under
the circumstances. Moreover, even heterosexual 'cohabiting couples,'
who are often treated in the literature as individuals who have
explicitly chosen against marriage, frequently describe themselves
as much more committed and mutually dependent on the household
than one might assume by the fact that they have not married. 67
They have not made the choice against marriage so much as they
have not yet made the choice for it. 26 Indeed, such couples often
express the idea that if there is a 'need' to marry or if the time is
'right,' which sometimes is dependent on economic self-sufficiency,
they will marry.6 9
in India, where ninety-five percent of all marriages are arranged).
267. Solot & Miller, supra note 260.
268. Id.
269. Id. (noting that most unmarried cohabitants end up marrying, and that having
children is a common reason for doing so).
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In demonstrating how much economic and social factors
influence household forms, historians have provided evidence that
the extended families of the past have been constructed more with
a 'willingness' model of marriage than a pure modem 'choice'
model.27 ° The studies of households suggest that the point of typical
marriage is very much dependent on economic and social
circumstance rather than 'informed consent.'2 7' In societies where
marriage marks the formation of a new household, young people
marry when they are able to support that new household
economically, whether that means having sufficient land or a
trade.2 72 In societies where marriage and the formation of a new
household are not so closely linked, people marry much younger, but
marriage is treated much more like the acquisition of new human
resources for the whole household 27" rather that as a private
intentionally entered contract for emotional support.
In terms of the deformation of the household, a socially and
legally expectant model which focuses on 'willingness' rather than
'choice' normatively offers less freedom to, or puts less social
pressure upon, individuals to leave relationships, marital or
otherwise, during those stretches when the relationship does not
live up to some romantic ideal of perfect equality, freedom and
responsibility. A model for family formation that suggests that
commitment is the result of a history of relationship, dependencies
and expectations formed over time and that any dissolution of a
family or household must be guided by that history rather than a
momentary decision that a relationship is not personally fulfilling
is more likely to result in stable households than a 'choice' model of
families. For example, sociologists have documented that men who
move in with women who already have children often end up
supporting those children, 27 4 demonstrating their willingness to
treat the household as an important commitment.
On the other hand, any model for the household that fails to
consider the possible detriments of a focus on the 'willingness'
270. Cornell, supra note 120, at 150-54 (describing the different ways people decide who

and when to marry).
271. Id.
272. Id. at 153.
273. See, e.g., Brunnbauer, supra note 153 at 337 (noting that in Pomok families the son
marries early in order to compensate for the loss of the daughter's labor).
274. See, e.g., Winkler, supra note 195, at 12 (noting that live-in boyfriends provide some

financial support to children that are not their own, especially when the couple has joint
children).
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understanding of family commitment is also fairly subject to
criticism. The advent of a 'choice' model of marital commitment has
redounded largely to the benefit of women, though not entirely so.
Though arranged marriage customs have hampered men in some
respects, women have suffered from traditional family formation
systems much more than men. Since the majority of cultures that
formed multigenerational households have formed them by severing
the bride's relocation from her own family to join her husband's
family,2 75 traditional marriages essentially required the bride to give
up virtually everything of value to her as the price of becoming
married and respectable.
Moreover, until the recent gains in economic independence and
equality for women in public life, the legal system has, intentionally
and through neglect, furthered the abuse of women by failing to give
them any equal bargaining power either to induce reformation
of the marital relationship with their male partners, or to leave the
relationship. Marital rules from custody presumptions prior to
the twentieth century, power over the couples' property during
marriage, double standards for marital 'fault,' and the rights of
husbands to coerce their wives into sexual performance2 7 7 have
reinforced the ability of husbands to exercise abusive control over
their wives' lives. Property division rules that have unevenly placed
family responsibilities on women while awarding income and
property to men have made exit difficult in even the worst family
situations.27 Without a 'choice' paradigm for family relationships,
one might argue, women's inadequate options to escape such
nightmarish relationships might be severely restricted.
On the other hand, we might question whether a 'choice' model
does not, in some ways, exclude the notion of public responsibility
275. See, e.g., Max E. Stanton, Patterns of Kinship and Residence, in FAMILIEs IN
MuLTIcuLTuRAL PERSPECTIVE, 102, 104 (Bron B. Ingoldsby & Suzanna Smith eds., 1995)
(noting George Peter Murdock's finding that 58% of societies employed patrilocal residence
patterns, and, in addition, 42% of societies were patrilineal); Cornell, supra note 120, at 151
(describing the differences in household formations in simple and joint household societies).
276. See, e.g., Brunnbauer, supra note 153, at 337, 339 (noting that daughters-in-law were
subject to their parent-in-law's authority, causing considerable strain); Cornell, supra note
120, at 151 (noting that the women in such a system will enter a household as an outsider and
have to prove herself to get resources of the household).
277. See, e.g., Jana B. Singer, The Privatizationof Family Law, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 1443,
1462-63; FINEMAN, supra note 17, at 77-79 (describing the move away from a presumption in
favor of the father to a presumption in favor of the mother, and movement back again to
father dominance).
278. See BARLET & HARRIS, supra note 138, at 421-22 (discussing various views about the
effect of no-fault divorce on women's economic circumstances).
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and public review for one's family behavior, and thus contribute to
the development of unequal and abusive marriages. In terms of
power imbalances within the relationship, at least in pre-modern
times, for example, a husband's abuse could be met by community
disapproval and revocation of social standing and privileges, clergy
failure to grant religious rites to the abuser, and even physical
'persuasion' by the wife's family,2 79 options which are all considered
distasteful in a 'choice' regime. Moreover, the 'choice' model can be
used to further the unequal bargaining power between spouses and
other family members by holding the threat of immediate exit over
the head of the dependent spouse or children as a means of
enforcing their compliance with the dominant member's wishes.
Despite these very real concerns, reconceptualizing the
intentionality element of the legal household would permit legal
institutions to more justly recognize legal responsibilities among
household members when their acts, as well as their words
demonstrate a willingness to form a household, even when they
have not entered into contractual or formal arrangements. Where
members of a household are all willing to be legally recognized as
such, including for tax and Social Security purposes, the state's
refusal to recognize this household as a legal entity unless they
comply with a single legally recognized form, that is, the institution
of marriage and/or the procreation of children, seems an unjustified
privileging of what Fineman terms the sexual (nuclear) family over
all others.28 ° The state's concern about proving whether the
household is indeed a 'real' or a 'fraudulent' household could be
obviated by a requirement that the members declare their
willingness to be treated as a household for purposes of that
particular law (as they do when they submit a tax return listing a
household head and dependents) coupled with any appropriately
limited forms of proof that household members indeed function as
a household (such as by the submission of proof of residence, joint
bank accounts, joint spending habits, etc.).
In those cases where members of the household disagree about
whether they should be treated as a household, this 'willingness'
model need not exclude choice as a factor in determining legal
responsibilities among household members. In the current legal
regime, even in those legal regimes that permit nonnuclear family
formations, such as domestic partnership registries or the Food
279. Wrrr, supra note 220, at 85, 91, 160.
280. See FINEmAN, supra note 17, at 145-46.
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Stamp program, the law essentially raises a presumption that a
group is not a household if there is no husband-wife-child
relationship among the parties. 1 This presumption is rebuttable as
to some laws Michelle Marvin, for example, can establish a contract
in lieu of a marriage, or a gay couple can go to court to prove that
they have functioned as a family, as in Braschi v. Stahl Associates.22
It is virtually irrebuttable in other situations, for example, a
caretaker aunt can rarely gain permanent custody over the children
of a sporadically appearing biological mother unless the mother's
rights have first been terminated.
This current presumption against nonmarital, household
relationships could easily be reversed: the law could presume that
individuals who hold themselves out and behave in a way that
suggests that they are households would indeed be presumed to be
households. This presumption could be rebutted by demonstrating
that the individuals involved were not economically interdependent,
or the individuals could register their intention not to be treated as
a household or even by signing antenuptial-type agreements with
other household members that would obviate the legal presumption
that they should be treated as a unit. The householder would then
have the option of preventing the accrual of official household
responsibility by limiting his responsibility for his guest, terminating
the relationship after a period of time, or filing his intention not to
be responsible.
Preservingthe Economic and Social Functions of the Family How the Legal Household Might Fare
In the modern model of the 'evolving/nuclear family,' the couple
carries the weight of five secular vital functions that independent
households serve in the human community: sexual communion,
reproduction, childhood socialization, economic interdependence,
and a complex of social support needs often termed 'emotional
support.' 2 3
The great weight of the cultural debates about the future of
marriage and the nature of the family is focused on whether
marriage is a necessary institution to bear those functions, or
281. Id. at 146-47, 155-57.
282. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
283. See Ingoldsby, supra note 104, at 85-87 (describing functions as sexual, reproductive,
childhood socialization, economic, and companionship/emotional support functions).
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whether private contracts between adults are a better way to handle
these critical social functions.2 Moreover, there is frequent debate
over the question whether the family unit is 'breaking down,' by
which critics mean that it is failing in its obligations to fulfill these
functions, and over what should be done to strengthen it. Less
frequently, critics of the nuclear family ask whether marriage is a
sufficient institution to bear the weight of all of these needs.
When the nuclear family recedes in importance as the sole
community about which we are asking these questions, the emerging
social pattern is that these functions are appearing in different
combinations within different relationships and institutional forms.
Some relationships, marital and nonmarital, combine sexual
expression, economic interdependence, and emotional support, but
do not perform childhood socialization or reproductive functions.2 s
Certain relationships, including some involving unwed fathers and
mothers, utilize sexual intercourse and reproduction, possibly with
some childhood socialization undertaken by the parties, but do
not perform the other functions.28 6 Many households of friends,
adult siblings, parents and adult children, group homes for the
disabled, and so forth provide only economic and social support;
some households combine child socialization with economic and
social support, but not sexual relations or reproduction. 2 7 Some
relationships, both marital and nonmarital, attempt to perform all
of these functions.'
A review of the history of the household suggests that this state
of affairs is not unusual, though the number of single-person
households and families not organized around at least one marriage
certainly is on the rise." Shifting the focus of legal institutions
from marriage to the household makes it possible not only to
respond to these patterns more effectively, but it also supports those
who are performing such functions in a socially effective manner by
284. See, e.g., Weitzman, supra note 21, at 1249-50, Singer, supra note 277, at 1533-40
(discussing pros of contractual ordering of marital relationships); Developments in the Law-The Law of Marriageand Family, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1997, 2075, 2098 (2003) (arguing that
judges should combine contractual and partnership approaches to marriage by undertaking

a substantive fairness review of antenuptial agreements).
285. See Weitzman, supra note 21, at 1214-15 (discussing how procreation may not be the
goal of certain relationships).
286. See id. at 1254-55 (describing different relationships and how they contracted to
achieve their desired results).
287. Solot & Miller, supra note 260 (discussing examples of real relationships).
288. Id.
289. POPULATION REPORTS 2001, supra note 26, at 3-6.
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eliminating legal barriers and aiming public benefits toward their
support. Fineman argued effectively that the current pattern of
legal response to the family unfairly rewards sexually-based families
that demonstrate apparent self-sufficiency, while punishing other
families, including those headed by single parents, or who need help
in performing these functions.2 9° Refocusing legal attention on the
household entity will better aim legal resources toward dealing with
problems that may arise, while providing all households with an
appropriate shield against noninterference on those matters in
which law and government are usually inept.
THE LEGAL HOUSEHOLD AS A MODEL FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

In recent times, the nuclear family has been the model for
provision of economic support and social interdependence.2 9 ' As the
history of the household suggests, perhaps the paramount factor in
explaining the shape of households throughout time has been
economic: the need to find an optimal household organization that
will permit household members to sustain themselves economically
has driven the size and composition of households. Where economic
concerns, such as the availability of land, human labor requirements,
and dependencies, have dictated, households have been both
sizeable and have included related and unrelated members.2 92 In
fact, where economics permit, the nuclear family is not the simplest
form of household organization: even single person households will
occur in great numbers.293 On the other hand, the presence of
smaller-size households does not necessarily mean that all such
households have found an optimal configuration for purposes of
social and economic support or for raising children. For example,
except for the social code that tells adult children they should leave
their families of origin when they finish school, more family
households with parents and adult children, or adult siblings living
together with or without their children, might well be found. 294 As
290. See FINEMAN, supra note 17, at 101-03, 124-25, 145-48.
291. See id. at 15, 150-55.
292. See POPULATION REPORTS 2001, supra note 26, at 2 (explaining that household
composition depends on values, laws, the economy, fertility, and other factors).
293. Id. at 7 (noting that "several demographic factors" are responsible for the "shift from
two-parent to one-parent families," including the presence of economic resources).
294. Carol Sanger & Eleanor Willemsen, Minor Changes: Emancipating Children in
Modern Times, 25 U. Mich. J.L. REFORM 239, 311-12 (1992) (contending that cultural
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it is, despite this code, economics have dictated that the number of
households containing adult children is significantly rising over
previous contemporary periods.295
Moreover, some small households, such as single parent
families and single persons, must come to rely on the state more
because the traditional social code based on nuclear household
concepts discourages them from forming long-term or permanent
relationships with other such families with whom they might
achieve relative economic self-sufficiency. 29 Among the stigmas
embedded in this code is the assumption that single adults living in
297
the same household for a period of time must be a 'sexual family.'
If longtime householders are of the same gender, there is often
community speculation about whether they are gay or lesbian
persons engaged in a sexual relationship, and if they are of different
genders, they are assumed to be, as the euphemism goes, unmarried
cohabitants.298 When acknowledging the possibility of latent
homophobia in a society where status and privileges are linked with
a few forms of socially approved sexuality, it should not be a
surprise (nor necessarily homophobic) that unmarried individuals
would feel as if they were being judged for their presumed sexual
activities with housemates if they lived as a household for a long
period of time.
A second part of this code is that everyone aspires to and will
have the opportunity to join a nuclear family someday. 2 9
Consequently, no household-like social or economic interdependencies
should be viewed as permanent because they will be superseded by
a marriage or a marriage-like relationship that prevents the
formation of households that make either short-term or long-term
economic sense. This common sense is reflected in several ways.
For example, architects do not design living spaces that easily and
comfortably permit single mothers and their children to live with
expectations regarding leaving one's parent's home is prevalent in America and that moving
out is associated with "responsibility, self-sufficiency, and independence").
295. See POPULATION REPORTS 2001, supranote 26, at 10-11 (mentioning that young adults
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four were likely to live with their parents or cohabit
with a roomate).
296. See Id. at 7-8 (explaining that one-parent families were more likely to have family
incomes below the poverty line).
297. See FINEMAN, supra note 17, at 46.
298. See, e.g., FamilyRule PenalizesVirginiansofAll Walks, THE VIRGINIAN PILOT, Jul. 22,
2003, at B10 (Virginia law requiring benefits to pass only to married and related cohabitants
discriminates against many adults cohabitating in nonsexual relationships).
299. See FINEMAN, supra note 17, at 146-47.
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each other, or encourage single noncohabitants to create a common
household."' ° Single-family residences are built for nuclear families,
very rarely with even a 'mother-in-law' apartment, and apartment
houses are largely organized around the same model, with few
spaces for common, interdependent economic and social activities
such as joint purchase of food and other necessities, cooking,
socializing, group child care, or engaging in other family activities.30 1
Even if architects and builders were creative enough to start
building residences that encouraged extended households, zoning
laws continue to highly favor single-family dwellings in residential
areas and disfavor group home construction."0 2
Where they are not hounded out of town by zoning laws and
citizens' groups, group homes are created for those who least
resemble the social ideal of the nuclear family - mentally,
physically and chemically disabled persons, troubled kids and
orphans.0 3 The likely social assumption is that those who are
temporarily dependent or disabled will eventually move out of such
homes into a nuclear family model.
Of all of the functions associated with the family, stable
economic and related social relationships are those most effectively
influenced by the government. Moreover, such economic and social
relationships are one of the foundations for a third function that
families have traditionally performed, providing economic security
and socialization for children, even though they are not the only
necessities for that task.304 It is hardly necessary to look far beyond
census figures that attest to numerical decline in traditional nuclear

300. Lucie McCauley, A Woman's Place (Dec. 1989), availableat http/www.newint.org/
issue2021place.htm (acknowledging that the needs of single-parent families, single people, the
elderly and employed people are ignored by designers and builders).
301. Id. (arguing that cooperative households are better suited for single-parent households
because they have "shared kitchen and dining areas").
302. See David P. Lazarus & Susan DiMaria, Housing Discriminationand the Disabled,
170 N.J. LAW. 20, 22-23 (1995) (describing use of zoning to exclude group homes for the
disabled); Jeffrey M. Lehmann, Reversing Judicial Deference Toward Exclusionary Zoning:
A Suggested Approach, 12 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & CoMM. DEv. L. 229, 230-32 (2003)
(describing methods and reasons for exclusion of multifamily dwellings).
303. Katherine A. Hort, Note, Is Twenty-Two Months Beyond the Best Interestof the Child?
ASFA's Guidelines for the Termination of Parental Rights, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1879,
1906 (2001) (recognizing that group homes often are created for orphans and children with
special needs).
304. Robert E. Oliphant & Susan E. Oliphant, Domestic Relations and the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 645, 670 (1990) (noting that a family provides
economic security for its members).
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families to realize that the evolving nuclear family fails to provide
economic security to all of society's children.
While children lucky enough to live in two-parent or even full
extended families receive the economic blessing of the government
in many ways, children in single parent households, grandparentgrandchildren families, and parent-boy(girl)friend-children homes
are virtually invisible to legal institutions other than those who
deal with children in crisis. 0 5 Indeed, some programs like TANF
and its predecessor AFDC have historically discouraged single
mothers with children from forming a meaningful multiadult, longterm household that could provide adequate nurturing for the
children, effectively encouraging them to find someone to marry
or to carry the burden of their families alone. 3" The legal household
model holds out the possibility of giving more children the
opportunity to grow up in multiadult households, perhaps by
providing an incentive for adults to create complex economic and
social relationships that continue through time.
At the same time, the focus on the nuclear family as the key
unit oflegal organization rather than the household guarantees that
cohouseholders (whether cohabitant or not) have neither the
responsibility nor the incentive to make a long-term commitment to
the upbringing of children in their household. In his brief for samesex marriage, Professor Eskridge notes that a full citizen carries
legal responsibilities as well as rights.0 7 This situation does not
occur with nonblood-related householders and the children they
raise in the current regime. Although a few cases have begun to
recognize the rights and responsibilities of so-called 'de facto' fathers
305. See generally Amy E. Hirsch, Income Deeming in the AFDC Program: Using Dual
Track Family Law to Make Poor Women Poorer,16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 713 (1988)
(discussing the effects deeming of incoming have on low-income women).
306. Between the 1960s and the Reagan-era 'reforms,' government programs encouraged
teenaged single mothers to live alone by "man in the house" and immorality rules that would
punish welfare mothers for cohabiting. Income deeming also discouraged others from residing
with these mothers. As of 1981, stepparents' income began to be deemed available to children,
and later, siblings' child support was similarly considered available to meet the needs of
welfare children. Finally, the TANF program, finally awakening to the fact that single
teenaged parent/child households left something to be desired, began to pressure teen moms

to stay at home by threatening to deny all welfare benefits; still, income imputation of
grandparents and siblings continued. See id. at 714-720; Jodie Levin-Epstein, Parent
Provisions in the PersonalResponsibility and Work Opportunity ReconciliationAct of 1996,
4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 323, 326, 327 (1997) (noting that minor parents are required
to live with an adult unless they are exempted, and grandparents' income is generally deemed
available under TANF to the grandchild being supported by TANF).
307. See, e.g., EsxmDGE, CIVIL UNIONS, supra note 45, at 185-187.
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and 'parents by estoppel,'3 " for the most part, the law places no
obligation on that cohouseholder to provide for the children, even
when they have come to rely on the support of the cohouseholder
over a period of years.3"
Also, the law does not provide much in the way of incentives to
that unrelated adult to provide economic and social support within
a household setting. For example, married couples can file taxes
jointly, allowing both parties to take advantage of credits and
deductions that account for joint support of their children.3 10 By
contrast as between, two unrelated women who provide maternal
support and care to their group of children, only one will be able to
achieve similar savings by claiming the status of household head.311
Similarly, some public assistance programs like AFDC have
refused to provide support to grandparents or other family members
raising children unless they legally exclude the mother from custody
and care of the child,312 thereby weakening the system of family
support for the child. While these programs have been significantly
reformed in the past two decades to avoid encouraging unemployed
fathers from moving out of the house, the same is not true for
unrelated adults who may be helping to care for the children, their
needs as contributing members of the household are completely
invisible to most of these social programs.313
308. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supranote 284, at 2052,2063-64. Under the recent
ALI Principles statement, parenthood by estoppel includes individuals with an obligation to
pay child support, a man who lives with a child for two years under the bona fide belief that
he is the biological father, a person who has lived with a child since birth and accepted his full
responsibility as a parent, or someone who has lived with the child for two years under a
written agreement assuming parental responsibilities. De facto parents are those who have
taken care of a child for at least two years with consent of the legal parent. However, these
classifications are proposed guidelines for the law that are to some extent, ahead of most
courts. Id. at 2060-62.
309. Id.
310. Lewis A. Silverman, Suffer the Little Children:JustifyingSame-Sex Marriagefrom the
Perspective of the Child of the Union, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 411, 437 (1999) (explaining that
married couples are entitled to file taxes jointly by combining their "income, gains, losses,
deductions, and credits").
311. Bay Area Homeless Alliance, What's My Filing Status?, available at
http-J/www.baha.org (acknowledging that "only one person per household can file as head of
[the] household in a given tax year") (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
312. See MaryC. Rudasill, GrandparentsRaising
Grandchildren Problems andPolicyfrom
an Illinois Perspective, 3 ELDER L.J. 215, 270 (1995) (noting that many states have refused
AFDC benefits to grandparents, while others require them to obtain legal custody, and still
others provide benefits unequal to those provided to foster parents).
313. See Martha Fineman, Masking Dependancy: The PoliticalRole of Family Rhetoric, 81
VA. L. REv. 2181 (1995); Silverman, supra note 310, at 413 ("two individuals may perform all
tasks and equal...all the functions of a parent and child. Yet if they are not related by blood
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Indeed, the social disapproval leveled at low-income cohabiting
couples combined with evidence that children are better off with
14
single mothers alone than with them and their boyfriends,
broadens the concept of family to include households of unrelated
persons. This evidence might well offer single mothers a socially
acceptable alternative to a romantic relationship that meets more
of their family's needs. The replacement of the family with the
household as the key legal concept for allocating economic rights
and duties has the potential to ameliorate the harmful effects of the
exclusionary family model.
Problems in Defining the Legal Household
Perhaps the first objection one might encounter toward the
replacement of the nuclear family with the household concept is the
clarity and stability of its legal definition, which is a key
consideration in replacing a long-used legal category. Initially, this
concern may be overcome by the evidence that the household is
already used as the legal concept for a number of programs,
including the United States census.1 5
However, opponents might argue that the nuclear family
generally provides a more bright-line test for identification of legal
relationship, which could be viewed as a more significant
relationship than the census' interest in who happens to live with
whom at any one time. Members of the nuclear family are already
preidentified by the law." 6 Married couples have obtained licenses
from the state and their children are identified through birth
certificates or adoption decrees; conversely, legal proceedings,

(or at least adoption) they will not be considered...in the eyes of the law.") (internal citations
omitted).

314. See, e.g., Gregory Acs & Sandi Nelson, The Urban Institute, Series B, No. B-48,
The Kids are Alright? Children'sWell-Being and the Rise of Cohabitation,NEW FEDERALISM NAT'L SURVEY OF AMERIA'S FAMILIES (2002), at http-/www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310544
_B48 .pdf(last visited Mar. 7, 2004) (noting that low-income children with single mothers who
cohabit with nonfathers are more likely to be poor, insecure in terms of being able to meet basic
needs such as food, and exhibit behavioral problems than those who live with single mothers).
315. See POPULATION REPORTS 2001, supra note 26, at 1 (using the term 'household' as a
legal concept).
316. Joan C. Bohl, Hawk v. Hawk: An Important Step in the Reform of Grandparent
VisitationLaw, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 55, 63 (1995) (noting that common law recognizes
and protects the nuclear family).
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producing relatively trustworthy legal records, are required to
terminate either the relationship of spouses or of parent
and child. 1 7
This argument is circular: if processes were available for others
besides spouses and children to register and deregister their
households, as there currently are in those countries, states and
localities that offer domestic partner registries or civil unions,3
similar bright-line evidence of household status would be available
for these groupings. The same legal incentives that spur couples to
seek the legal status of divorce would encourage these non
traditional households to deregister if registration would be made
widely available. Since registration and deregistration procedures
currently are simpler than divorce and termination of parental
rights proceedings,3 19 nontraditional households may be more likely
to utilize these procedures.
Moreover, the use of marriage licenses and birth certificates is
over-inclusive as a test for identifying stable functioning households:
many nuclear families split apart and organize separately
functioning economic and social units without bothering with the
process of 'deregistering' their families through divorce or
termination of parental rights.3" To the extent that the state wants
to reward and regulate nuclear families actually functioning as
such, the use of marriage/divorce papers and birth certification/
termination of parental rights proceedings as the identifying marks
are not very helpful.
A third argument against substituting the concept of the legal
household for the traditional nuclear family might be simply
empirical: studies may well indicate that nonnuclear households are
much more likely to dissolve as compared to nuclear families,321
317. HOSPITALITY GROUP NETWORK, MARRIAGE LAWS (2002), available at http/www.us
marriagelaws.com/search/UnitedLstates/getting-marriedhndexhtnl (explaining that marriage
requirements typically involves obtaining a marriage license and participating in a civil or
religious ceremony); see also Ilse Nehring, 'Throwaway Rights"': Empowering a Forgetten
Minority, 18 WHiTrIERL. REv. 767,800 (1997) (recognizing that married couples may separate
by mutual or written agreement without going to court).
318. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, CIVIL UNIONS, supra note 45, at 12-14, 121-22.
319. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, DOMESTic PARTNERS REGISTRY,
http//www.ss.ca.gov/dpregistry (visited August 1, 2003) [hereinafter DOMESTIc PARTNERS
REGISTRY] (permitting people to download and complete registry and deregistration forms.)
320. Aaron Larson, Expert Law: Legal Seperation, at httpJ/www.expertlaw.comAibrary/
pubarticles/FamilyLaw/legal-separation.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2004) (recognizing that
married couples may separate by mutual or written agreement without going to court).
321. See, e.g., DAVID POPENOE & BARBARA D. WHITEHEAD, SHOULD WE LIVE TOGETHER?
WHAT YOUNG ADULTS NEED TO KNow ABOUT COHABITATION BEFORE MARRIAGE 2, at
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leading to uncertainty about whether an individual is part of a
household over a long period of time, a possible destabilizing
influence for the law. Yet, this argument may well exemplify the
problem with using the nuclear family as the legal paradigm: if
there are no legal incentives and support for a nonnuclear
household to stay together, it stands to reason that they are more
likely to dissolve.3 22
The Functions of the Legal Household
For purposes of considering how we might constitute a legal
household and determine what rights and duties should flow from
one's membership in it, we might consider four broad categories
of legal relationship where the nuclear family has functioned as
the key legal concept: (1) cases where the state is regulating the
household economic system for general public purposes, such as
income taxation; (2) cases where the state is supporting the
household economic system over and above the services it provides
to all households (e.g., welfare benefits rather than sanitation, roads
and public safety); (3) cases where the state is regulating
relationships between household members and other private
entities, (e.g. legal requirements that employers provide maternity
leave or family leave to care for ill members, as in the Family
Medical Leave Act);323 and (4) cases where members of the
household themselves are in dispute about their circumstances.
Government regulation of the household
Cases where the federal government is regulating or taxing the
economic unit would seem to be the easiest cases for using the
household model, since the federal government has already shown
httpJ/www.smartmarriages.com/cohabit.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2004) (noting that
cohabiting parents break up at a substantially higher rate than married parents, with
longlasting and "devastating*effects). However, as Eskridge points out, this is not necessarily
true. ESKRIDGE, CIVIL UNIONS, supra note 45, at 175. While there is a substantial incidence
of nonmarital separation among gay and lesbian couples, it is not remarkably different from
the separation between heterosexual couples. Id. Moreover, in Denmark where gay and
lesbian couples are permitted to enter into 'civil unions' or other forms of legal commitment,
the separation rate is actually lower than the divorce rate, and even the divorce rate has
fallen. Id.
322. ESKRUDGE, CIVIL UNIONS, supra note 45, at 203 (stating that marriage recognition
would reinforce the interpersonal commitment homosexual couples share).
323. 26 U.S.C. § 2601 (2003).
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that the household can be used in place of the nuclear family as the
organizing concept. 2 4 Currently, the Internal Revenue Service
defines those who are entitled to be counted in the household for
purposes of tax exemptions much more broadly than the nuclear
family paradigm. 325 Household heads may claim as their dependents
their descendants, without any limitation as to generation,
stepchildren (even if they are not legally obligated to support them),
siblings and stepsiblings, parents and other ancestors, stepparents,
nieces and nephews, sons/daughters/mothers/fathers/brothers/ sister
-in-law or even more broadly, any "individual . . . who, for the
taxable year of the taxpayer, has as his principal place of abode the
home of the taxpayer and is a member of the taxpayer's
household." 2 6 For these cases, the United States government
apparently believes that mere attestation of household relationship
and support is sufficient without requiring any actual proof, subject
to the possibility that a head of household might be audited.
Of course, even tax regulations are not devised only for strictly
economic purposes: they reflect public aspirations for social
organization by supporting favored institutions and behaviors with
tax deductions/credits and exacting financial penalties for
disfavored ones. Suggesting that the household concept could
replace the nuclear family concept in every case in which
governmental regulation is involved only returns us to the main
question, which is whether there is value in recognizing, supporting,
and fairly treating those households that are not nuclear families.
Government Provisionof Economic Support
The second set of cases, so-called 'public benefits' legal regimes,
should not be any different, for they also involve government
regulation and involvement in the economic situation of the
household. Moreover, the same mix of economic and noneconomic
social purposes is theoretically involved as in government regulation,
although public benefits cases purport to elevate noneconomic social
purposes such as family stability over economic ones.127To that
extent, the particular purpose behind a social program needs to be
examined to determine whether there is some essential reason to
324.
325.
326.
327.

See 26 U.S.C. § 152(a)(9) (2003).
See id.
Id.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9908(bX12) (2003).
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employ the nuclear family model as the legal unit of relevance.
Moreover, these programs are popularly imagined as 'giving' hardearned community dollars to struggling individuals rather than
'taking' their income. 28
Yet, even if one accepts prevalent social biases about 'sponging'
and'cheating' in public benefits programs32 9 and thus would demand
more than mere attestation of household status, it is clear that
replacing the nuclear family with the household as the key legal
concept is not difficult. Since there is a social presumption that
people who need government help will cheat the government more
often than people who are paying taxes,3 public benefits programs
currently have much more rigorous and invasive standards for
proving eligibility and household relationships than the IRS utilizes
in the income tax system.33 '
Yet, the federal government's success in using the household as
a legal model is proof of its viability. Both the federal Food Stamp
and energy assistance programs, keyed toward protection of the
economic stability of low-income households, have adopted the
household as their eligibility unit.3 2 Each of these programs
recognizes that many so-called 'nontraditional families' actually do
function as an economic unit, pooling their food and money toward
shared expenses such as food and utilities. 3 Indeed, the use of the
household as the legal paradigm expresses a normative preference
in favor of cost-sharing by not only permitting but encouraging
unrelated groups of people to pool economic resources and seek
assistance together, a move that should reduce both their individual
needs and their combined needs as presented to the government.
As an example of how simple the definition of household can be
in public benefits programs, consider the federal energy assistance
program, designed to meet the needs of low-income 'households,'
where the term "'household' means any individual or group of
individuals who are living together as one economic unit for whom
residential energy is customarily purchased in common or who

328. See, e.g., Larry Cata Backer, By Hook or By Crook: Conformity, Assimilation and
Liberaland Conservative PoorRelief Theory, 7 HASTiNGS WOMEN'S L. J. 391, 400-01 (1996).
329. Id. at 399-402.
330. Id.
331. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1437n (2003) (describing eligibility for assisted housing) with 26
U.S.C. § 152(a)(9) (2003) (defining taxpayer's household).
332. 7 U.S.C. § 2014 (2003) (describing eligible households).
333. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(iX1) (2003) (defining household).
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make undesignated payments for energy in the form of rent."3 4 In
the Food Stamp program, which uses a similar definition, those who
wish to be counted as a household, if they are not spouses or parentchild groups, must show that they purchase and cook meals
together."s That program has devised relatively simple and clear
proof regulations for establishing the relationship of members to the
household.3 36 Some other programs, such as those assisting mentally
disabled persons, actually encourage joint households." 7
Opponents of the extension of the household concept to other
public benefits programs might argue that the real problem is not
fraud per se, but the fact that household information used to make
eligibility determinations may rapidly become outdated because of
their relatively short lifespan and membership fluidity. However,
virtually all of today's public benefits programs have rigorous
reporting requirements, mandating that recipients to report
promptly, and in great detail, any changes in income, household
status, and other matters relevant to their eligibility for
programs.33 8 Thus, a shift in favor of the household concept is not

334. See 42 U.S.C. § 8621 (defining eligibility); 42 U.S.C. § 8622 (5) (defining household).
335. See 7 U.S.C. § 2014 (defining eligibility of households); 7 U.S.C. § 2012(iXdefining
households, in part, as follows:
(1) 'Household' means (1) an individual who lives alone or who, while living with others, customarily
purchases food and prepares meals for home consumption separate and apart
from the others; or
(2) a group of individuals who live together and customarily purchase food and
prepare meals together for home consumption.
Id.
336. See 7 C.F.R. § 273.2 (f)(Xx)(2003) (requiring State agencies to"verify factors affecting
the composition of a household, if questionable. Individuals who claim to be a separate
household from those with whom they reside shall be responsible for proving that they are a
separate household to the satisfaction of the State agency."). As another example, the federal
statute providing funds for rural housing for the elderly and handicapped care defines an
eligible person to include:
two or more elderly (sixty-two years of age or over) or handicapped persons
living together, one or more such persons living with another person who is
determined.., to be essential to the care or well-being of such persons, and the
surviving member or members of any family described in the first sentence of
this paragraph who were living in a unit assisted under this subchapter, with
the deceased member of the family.
42 U.S.C. § 1471(b)(3).
337. See, e.g., 42 U.S. C. § 8013 (encouraging group homes for persons with disabilities).
338. See, e.g., Maria Fazzolari, Comment, The Brown v. Giuliani Injunction: Combating
BureaucraticDisentitlement, 23 FORDHAm URB. L.J. 413, 422 nn.63, 65 (1996) (describing
welfare procedural requirements and their production of error rates disentitling eligible
persons from benefits).
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likely to create any more difficulties in determining eligibility
accurately than those that currently occur.
Indeed, those programs that have adopted the household as the
legal paradigm for the granting of benefits demonstrate what might
happen if public benefits programs would affirm rather than punish
the decisions of distantly related or unrelated adults to share their
lives and pool their resources. As just one example, the utilization
of the household as the key legal concept in the Food Stamp
program can provide the economic stability necessary for group
homes aimed at adult disabled persons to provide a 'family setting,'
including long-term private relationships between disabled adults
who can become as close as blood families.
As suggested, government subsidy programs can also be used
to encourage a whole range of behaviors that help to form viable
social and economic households. The range of government subsidies
and tax incentives to produce certain kinds of housing, from home
mortgage deductions to tax incentives to construct lower-income
3 9 could be structured
housing to publicly-owned housing itself,"
to
encourage both extended family and nonrelated groups of people to
live together and become socially and economically interdependent.
One can imagine, for example, tax credits for builders who produce
apartment houses with both private and shared living spaces so that
families can achieve the economies of scale that come with joint
food purchase and meal preparation, shared utilities and repair
costs, even the opportunity for easily exchanged babysitting for
single parents.
There is a potential downside to the move from a nuclear family
definition to the use of the household as the legal concept benefit
eligibility: the state may use the concept only to exclude and punish,
but not to assist and support. The story of federal welfare programs
since the Reagan era is the story of ever increasing implicit use of
the 'household' to terminate benefits to families by imposing
requirements on people who live with them but are not legally
obligated to support them. For example, the AFDC/TANF programs
have used the household concept to reduce aid to households where
there is a nonlegally obligated stepparent in the home, or to punish
other members of the household when some members do not meet
work requirements. 4 ° Obviously, limited use of the household
339. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2003) (providing tax credit for new or rehabilitated lowincome housing construction).
340. See, e.g., Joel F. Handler, "Ending Welfare As We Know It:"The Win, Win Spin or the
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concept only to exclude families from support or to punish them for
not conforming to social norms will accomplish none of the goals
that legal marriage is intended to achieve.
Regulation of Private Third Party Interactionswith
the Household
The third set of economic decisions implicated in such a
paradigm shift concerns the regulation of private third parties'
obligations toward the household, most significantly employers'
provision of benefits to employees and their household members. Of
course, any number of objections could be raised against extension
of employers' legal duties to provide economic benefits to more
families, but few of them necessarily relate to the distinction
between 'nuclear families' and other forms of household.
Even without legal regulation, the expansion of employer
benefits to nontraditional families has grown, as shown by the
exponential growth in domestic partner benefits over the past ten
years. 3 1 Since state-mandated legal requirements for such benefits
have not kept pace with voluntary provision by employers,
conservative commentators who always opine that 'the market will
take care of such problems may not be so far from the truth. Yet, it
is hard to imagine that such significant changes would not have
occurred for domestic partners, without the pressure of other social
and legal changes pushing toward recognizing them as a legitimate
form of 'family.'
Two somewhat separate theories have inspired legal regulation
of employer relationships with employees. Perhaps the most visible
justification for legal regulation of private party conduct is the equal
protection/civil rights-type argument that differential treatment of
families constitutes discrimination on the basis of status. Whether
Stench of Victory, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 131, 132-33, 161 (2001) (noting denial of family
TANF aid for mothers who do not cooperate in establishing paternity or procedural
requirements in the work program, and deeming of grandparent income to families headed
by teen mothers); Margorie Engel, Pockets of Poverty: The Second Wives' Club-Examining
the Financial[Inlsecurityof Women in Remarriages, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 309, 320
n.68 (1999) (noting AFDC deeming of stepparent income to AFDC-eligible children).
341. See, e.g., National Lesbian & Gay Journalists Assoc., Domestic Partner Benefits
Overview, DIRECTORY OF NEWS MEDIA COMPANIES/UNIONS WITH DoMESTIC PARTNER
BENEFrS, at http//www.nlgia.org/pubs/DP/IDpovrvw.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2004)
[hereinafter, DOMESTIC PARTNER BENEFITSI (reporting growth from ten media companies who
offered domestic partner benefits in 1994 to seventy-seven companies and unions, including
sixty of the top 100 newspapers, by October 2001).
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an employer's refusal to change from a nuclear family concept to a
household concept in the provision of private benefits should be
assimilated to the discrimination model probably awaits much more
thorough research. Legislators should know whether the social
harms flowing from 'household discrimination' are as grave as social
harms from discrimination on the basis of other statuses such as
gender, race, and sexual orientation. It is difficult, however, to
argue with the claim that nuclear families are legally privileged
over other household forms.3 42
The second type of justification for government regulation of
private employer decisions has been that such decisions can cause
wider social harm if they are not properly regulated. 3" Labor
regulation is guided by the presumption that government's failure
to regulate how employers treat organized labor would throw parts
of the economic system into chaos, affecting the entire community.34 4
In OSHA, wage and hour, and worker's compensation regulations,
one key argument is that oppressive or harmful working conditions
will shift the costs borne by the employee to the general public and
injured workers will eventually have to be supported by the state,
when the private employer is actually responsible for their
circumstances.4
Intuitively, it seems logical to argue that third parties should
support households in the same circumstances that the government
requires them to support nuclear families. For example, for
purposes of extending benefits such as family leave, if employers are
not bound to recognize employees' efforts to find the most viable or even a minimally viable - economic arrangement that permits
them maximum economic self-sufficiency, the public at large might
end up taking up the slack. There is no logical economic reason that
an employer should be legally required to support a nuclear family
and not provide benefits to other households.
Just one example of how a shift to the household as the model
unit for regulating of employer responsibilities will illustrate this
point. Currently, working parents and their children are one of the
fastest-growing segments of the population in homeless shelters in

342. Id.
343. See, e.g., Brotherhood ofR. R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & R. I. Co, 353 U.S. 30,40 (1957).

344. Id.
345. See 29 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1998) (describing burdens on interstate commerce from
workplace injuries, including disability compensation and medical payments).
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cities across the country.3 Studies have shown that as many of
seventy percent of individuals living within the low-income bracket
confront the difficulty of being unable to afford food, housing, and
health insurance at the same time.347 Were employer benefit plans
required to include any household members and not just nuclear
family members, these household members might be able to afford
housing by creating a joint economic unit with another adult or
family, a unit that could theoretically share both a home and their
health insurance costs.
Of course, as with all previous forms of government regulation
designed to shift public burdens to the private sector, including
federal mandatory extension of parental leave and the raising of the
minimum wage, public discussion will likely center upon the size of
the cost to be borne by employers if they must extend such programs
to include nonnuclear family members. However, knee-jerk fiscal
reactions should not suffice to negate this idea out of hand. For
example, studies on the extension of both public and private
employer benefits to gay and straight domestic partners report a
negligible public fiscal impact ranging up to two percent more to
systems that have adopted them.3
IntrahouseholdLegal Disputes
In the fourth area, the use of the household as the legal rubric
for organizing intrahousehold disputes may present more
complicated problems, particularly in terms of the proof necessary
to show that one 'belongs to' a certain household so that legal
obligations accrue in an equitable manner. Indeed, this is the area
most resistant to change: legislatures and courts have demonstrated
reluctance to replace the nuclear family model when it comes to

346. See Stanley Herr, ChildrenWithout Homes:Rights to Educationand FamilyStability,
45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 337, 341 (1991) (noting that as of that date, one-third of the homeless
population consisted of families with children).
347. See Sharon K. Long, The Urban Institute, Series B, No. B-54, ChoosingAmong Food,
Housing and Health Insurance,NEW FEDERALISM - NATL SURVEY OF AMERICA'S FAMILIES, at
http:/twww.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310775_B-54.pdf (last visited Jan. 23,2003) (noting also
that a fair number of moderate and higher-income adults have had either a food, a housing,
or a health care hardship, including lack of insurance, in the previous year).
348. See, e.g., Domestic Partner Benefits Overview, supra note 341(noting that health
insurance benefits for gay and straight domestic partners rarely covers more than two percent
of an employer's total health care costs at most).
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such matters as child custody, property division, inheritance,
income support obligations, and the right to make health care
decisions for another.3 4 9
One major objection to using the household as a rubric for
establishing such legal relationships is that public investigation of
the relationships of household members is antithetical to the timehonored place that family privacy holds in U.S. social life. 5 ° (A
considerable and often overlooked exception involves families
dependent upon poverty programs, where public intrusion into the
351
most intimate details of a person's life is the order of the day.)
Indeed, even in divorce, where intrusive judicial investigation of the
couple's behavior and financial circumstances was once the norm,
no-fault divorce and the increasing move toward equal property
division regardless of circumstances have only strengthened the
'zone of family privacy' presumption. 5 2
In recent years, however, the rise of domestic partner laws have
shown that the privacy objection can be eliminated simply by
duplicating the registration and deregistration scheme that marriage
and divorce law provide, which already provides a couple a way to
control just how invasive government inspections into the household
might be.35 3 Just as the formal marriage license and ceremony, with
its witnessed declarations of intent to marry, create legal obligations
among nuclear family members, so civil union and domestic
partnership laws have provided registries, some with very marriagelike ceremonies with mutual pledges of commitment and fidelity, for
those who wish to register their intent to become households. s4
Similarly, such couples may deregister rather than face scrutiny
about actual interdependence if they change their relationships.
Of course, most such legal forms currently pertain only to
couples resembling the husband-wife dyad. Moreover, few of them
confer anywhere near the panoply of economic responsibilities
between the parties that marriage does. 355 For example, domestic
349. See Singer, supra note 277.
350. Id.

351. Id.
352. See id. (discussing the 'privatization'of many areas of family life).
353. See, e.g., VERMONT SECRETARY OF STATE, THE VERMONT GUIDE TO CIVIL UNIONS, at

http'/www.sec.state.vt.us/otherprg/civilunions/civilunions.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2004)
[hereinafter, VERMONT GUIDE TO CIVIL UNIONS]; CALIFORNIA REGISTRY, supra note 319.
354. Id.
355. See, e.g., Lamda Legal, Why MarriageEqualityMatters, at httpJ/www.lambdaegal.
org/binary-data/LAMBDAPDF/127.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2004).
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partnership laws rarely bestow a right on one party to demand
economic support from the other, the right to mutual property
division upon break up of the relationship, the right to inheritance
absent a will, or the right to obtain benefits or damages from
a government or private third party when the partner is injured
or killed." 6 These limitations seem to stem largely from the fear
that civil registration will decenter the nuclear family as the ideal
rather than from any intrinsic procedural or proof problems
with using the domestic registry as a substitute for proving a
committed relationship.
Yet, requiring a formal attestation process may be both too
much and too little to establish legal rights and duties among
economically interdependent persons in a household. It has become
clear that many persons who organize households do not follow
attestation processes because they are legally prevented from doing
so (as in the case of gay or lesbian couples), but rather because they
either choose not to follow them or neglect to do so. 57 In addition to
the numerous dual-gender cohabitants who fail to get married
though they are free to do so, studies have shown that the number
of gay and lesbian partners who have bothered to create legal
relationships either through private agreements and wills, or through
domestic partner or civil union registries, is underwhelming. s
If attestation procedures for the legal recognition of households
are relatively inexpensive and available, courts will still have to
grapple with whether legal households can be recognized for
purposes of economic issues like income support and property
division even when the members of the household fail to follow
attestation procedures. Conversely, legislators will have to decide
whether such attestation procedures will confer the entire panoply
of economic rights now available to spouses and children, as current
domestic partner registries do.35 9 Moreover, they will have to
determine whether an 'easy exit' deregistration procedure should
resolve retroactively what property and other rights the parties
356. Id.
357. See, e.g., Partners Task Force for Gay & Lesbian Couples, Attitudes Toward Legal
Marriage: Results from Partners' Survey of U.S. Lesbian & Gay Couples, at httpJwww.
buddybuddy.com /toc.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2004) (noting that only fifty-three percent of
self-selected gay and lesbian respondents reported having not prepared legal documents to
protect their partners).
358. Id.
359. See THE VERMONT GUIDE TO CIVIL UNIONS, supra note 353; CALIFORNIA REGISTRY,
supra note 319.
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have against each other, a standard objection to existing domestic
partner registries.3 °
Of course, attestation, like the formal marriage ceremony, may
provide the best evidence that all parties in the household intend to
be bound to a set of legal rights and duties towards each other.
Attestation may not, however, provide the only viable evidence. A
key problem in deciding whether attestation procedures should be
an absolute prerequisite to a finding of a legal household is in
determining what to make of the fact that many existing
cohouseholders have not chosen to follow even those formalities
currently available to them.36 ' Apart from the symbolic reasons that
unmarried couples give for not getting married - for example.,
partners don't believe in the ideal or traditional patriarchal form of
marriage - several possibilities present themselves.36 The first,
that such formalities are too time consuming and expensive, 3 can
be easily alleviated by making such processes cheap, well-publicized
and easy to use.
A second possible reason for failure to enter into such
relationships is the presence of uneven bargaining power amongst
the parties in the relationship. Although, recent research suggests
that 'ordinary cohabitation' generally occurs at a higher rate among
low-income couples. 36 ' To the extent such relationships might be the
result of a power imbalance in cases such as Marvin v. Marvin,3 6 it

seems more just to treat informal families as exactly that, rather
than to allow the Lee Marvins of the world to coerce and control
relationships with loving but economically vulnerable partners.
Yet, the law has traditionally respected an individuals'

360. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, CIVIL UNIONS, supra note 45, at 25, 123 (noting that reciprocal
beneficiaries and domestic partners can, for the most part, eliminate any obligations to their
partners simply by deregistering).
361. See, e.g., Popenoe & Whitehead, supra note 321, at 2 (noting rise from 500,000 to 4
million unmarried couples from 1960-1977, and the estimate that about twenty-five percent
of unmarried women between 25 and 39 are living with a partner, and about fifty percent
have done some at some time in the past, while over 50% of marriages are preceded by
cohabitation).
362. See Ann L. Estin, OrdinaryCohabitation,76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381, 1386-87 (2001) (providing a broad-based and comprehensive survey of current population patterns of
cohabitation).
363. Id. at 1387-88.
364. See id. at 1388.
365. Id. at 1381-82 (noting that in the end of her lawsuit to recover from a cohabitating
partner, Michelle Triola Mitchell received nothing from the actor Lee Marvin, and ended up
in a similar relationship with actor Dick Van Dyke).
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fundamental right not to marry,3 6 and a scheme that would impose
the duties of marriage against the express wishes of one of the
parties seems to contradict that value. Given this countervailing
value, the question is whether the law should protect the right of a
more powerful partner to say "no" to a legally binding relationship,
thereby benefiting from an intimate relationship while essentially
remaining free from any of the duties. More directly, has the
traditional law been just in imposing such a duty upon only the less
vulnerable and perhaps less business-savvy partner to bargain for
legal protection at the inception of an intimate relationship? Such
a requirement effectively forces all intimate relationships into an
'arms-length,' 'buyer-beware' dynamic that may not reflect the social
ideals we have for committed relationships. The 'palimony' cases
essentially resolve this problem by adopting the contract model for
resolving nonmarried partner disputes. 36 7 This model virtually
concedes that the more powerful partner is entitled to get all of the
benefits with none of the duties if he can use his bargaining
strength to achieve these results, while remaining open to reading
an ambiguous situation as a contract.3
A third likely reason that people do not follow attestation
procedures, including marriage, is that they are afraid of
the implications of a long-term commitment. For them, a
commitment to a small change in the status quo is likely easier to
handle than a promise to surrender their autonomy in perpetuity
to a predetermined legal list of some serious responsibilities. To
expect that household members will flock to follow attestation
procedures that entail long-term legal interdependence among
cohouseholders may be especially unrealistic given the social cues
that individuals should wait for the perfect partner before
constituting a nuclear household.
Where one person has enough bargaining power to achieve the
benefits of intimate relations without giving up anything and
where people are afraid of the long-term implications of their
commitments, the current system of elevating personal choice as the
exclusive value that defines the legal household seems both unfair
and unwise. Most human relationships are an amalgam of
366. See BARTLETT & HARRIS, supra note 138, at 670.
367. Estin, supra note 362, at 1391-95 (noting that while some states provide more
equitable division of property under partnership or common law marriage theories, provide
very limited contract-like remedies).

368. Id.
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dependence and independence; they have a history that is entitled
to be honored down the road when one cohouseholder decides to
dissolve any household, even if that history becomes only one factor
in legal decisions about dividing up the household.3 69 Moreover, as
I have previously suggested, the problem of establishing and
disestablishing a legal household is not an evidentiary problem: it
is possible through a number of coordinating means to establish
that a legal household was intended without completely scrapping
intention as a necessary factor in creating a legally binding
household relationship."'
To the objection that Good Samaritans who take people
into their homes might be unfairly 'stuck' with legal obligations
under a de facto rule, it is possible to easily protect those who
clearly do not wish to be bound to those living with them. Just as
attestation procedures, such as domestic partnerships, can establish
cohouseholders' intention to form a household, a legal 'reverse
attestation' procedure can be made available for those who want to
preclude such a possibility.3 7 ' That is, individuals can preserve their
freedom and avoid the acquisition of legal duties by filing
attestations stating that they do not wish to be considered members
of a household with others with whom they live. These reverse
attestations could also be subject to the same notice and service of
process requirements that civil and criminal complaints are subject
to. A simple email to the appropriate state agency, for example,
would suffice if properly noticed and served to the other members of
the household. In cases where both parties indeed would consider
themselves just 'roommates,' such an attestation should cause no
burdensome household difficulties.
However, if the parties have very different views about their
responsibilities to each other, the benefits of a reverse attestation
procedure would be multiple. First, they will force intimate partners
who may be blinded by romantic considerations into realistically
taking stock of their need to protect themselves legally. For
example, if Lee Marvin had been required to file an attestation that
he was not obligated to support and share his property with
Michelle Triola Mitchell before he could escape liability for any de
facto household relationship he had created by his conduct or oral
369. See generally Woodhouse,supra note 21 (urging that an expanded definition of kinship
be used to identify legal rights and responsibilities).
370. See ESKRIDGE, CIVIL UNIONS, supra note 45.
371. See id. at 25, 123.
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representations, Michelle would have had clear notice that he did
not intend to undertake any obligations to her.3 2 Even those in a
romantic fog about their partners would find it difficult to ignore
such a clear indication of present noncommitment, and would likely
be spurred to negotiate a mutually consensual arrangement or find
a more committed partner. Moreover, the courts would not be faced
with the inevitable task of determining whether an oral express or
implied contract of support was made, as in the Marvin case.373
Indeed, there is an element of fairness in requiring the party
who wishes to get the upper hand in a loving relationship to declare
his intention to do so. Any domestic partner tempted to exploit the
trust and love of his housemate by an oral or implicit commitment
would bear the burden of either confessing his real designs or being
saddled with the responsibilities that accompany the benefits of
trust relationships. Similarly, those who currently fail to marry or
file domestic partnerships because they fear what future obligations
they would have to undertake would be forced to articulate to
themselves (and explain to other household members) the reasons
they did not want to make such a commitment.
However, some households will fail to file either an attestation
that they wish to be recognized as households, or one that they do
not. To protect the rights of household members not to become
legally bound as 'family' to their cohouseholders, the requirements
for establishing a de facto household where neither formality has
been observed can be made stringent enough so that only those
households would be legally recognized where there was no
significant doubt that the intention to form a relatively permanent
household existed.
3. 4 established factors for determining
Braschiv. StahlAssociates
when a gay couple was the equivalent of a family, and common law
marriage cases provide examples of how a legal regime can
investigate many factors to ensure that members intended a
household commitment, and can justly be legally bound to each
other.3 75 Braschi, for example, looked at "the exclusivity and
longevity of the relationship, the level of emotional and financial
commitment, the manner in which the parties have conducted their
372. See Estin, supra note 362, at 1381-82 (discussing Marvin v. Marvin).
373. Id. at 1395-96 (noting difficulties plaintiffs are encountered in proving such contracts.)
374. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
375. See Stuart J. Stein, Common Law Marriage:Its History and Certain Contemporary
Problems, 9 J. FAM. L. 271 (1969).
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everyday lives and held themselves out to society, and the reliance
placed upon one another for daily family services."37 6 The Braschi
court also laundry-listed the numerous practical ways in which
financial and similar interdependence can be established. 7 7
Similarly, common law marriage statutes and cases have been both
rigorous and flexible in finding a common law marriage. For
example, Texas' common law statute, even though grudgingly
applied in particular cases, has essentially required only proof of
public representation that the parties are married and cohabitating,
which allows an inference of an agreement to marry, the third
requirement of the law."7 '
Permitting a course of conduct to establish household members'
intent to be economically dependent should be a more equitable
means of determining their actual choices than asking them at
either the inception or the dissolution of a relationship. Ideas about
commitment at the beginning of a marriage are likely to be
unrealistic and relatively shallow, because it is impossible to
imagine the actual depth and dependency that grows in the course
of an ongoing relationship. This is true not only where romantic or
sexual relationships are involved - long-term friendships similarly
take on depth and dependence that is almost imperceptible until
they are disrupted or challenged.
Similarly, at the moment of a relational break-up, both partners'
retrospective views of their historically intended commitments to
each other are likely to be grossly distorted by anger and selfjustification. Typically, each party will try to take as much as he
possibly can out of the relationship, once the commitment to the
other's welfare has been so brutally cut off. For the law to recognize
either the moment a relationship starts or the moment it ends as an
accurate reflection of a couple's intentions would be a false reflection
on the nature of the commitment over time, indeed at the time when
376. Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 55.
377. Id. (noting multiple forms of proof that the surviving partner was able to produce
about his coresidency, including driver's license, passport, and mail address; knowledge of the
relationship by building staff, and statements made to family and friends. Moreover, the
survivor was able to show significant financial interdependence: a joint household budget,
joint safe-deposit boxes, joint checking and savings accounts, and joint credit cards. He could
also produce a power of attorney for the decedent's financial, medical and personal matters,
for him during his illness and evidence that he was the chief beneficiary of the decedent's life
insurance policy, as well as the primary legatee and executor of his estate).
378. See Kathryn S. Vaughn, Comment, The Recent Changes to the Texas Informal
MarriageStatute:Limitationor Abolition of Common Law Marriage?,28 Hous. L. REV. 1131,
1151 (1991).
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most of the resources were actually being accumulated, which would
seem to be more relevant intentions. Yet, that is what current
palimony law, antenuptial agreements and to a lesser extent,
divorce laws essentially do.
Moreover, as Braschi suggests, a key criterion that legislators
or common law courts can employ to draw the line between people
living together and legal households is the longevity of the
arrangements.3 79 Both common law marriage regimes and emerging
cases allocating property and support obligations between
nonmarital partners have found it useful to employ the presumption
that longevity is key to establishing the intent to make deep
economic and social commitments of a kind similar to marriage. s0
While there are certainly counterfactuals, cases in which longterm households do not in fact function interdependently and yet
remain in the same living quarters, the same can be said for some
marriages, in which the parties lead separate financial and social
lives for most of the existence of the marriage. Indeed, in order to
spare the confusion of case-by-case judicial determinations, there is
no reason why a minimum longevity requirement could not be
required by public regulation or benefits programs for legal
households, or that courts could not employ a longevity presumption
in adjudicating rights between sparring cohouseholders.
Even in the case of the least urgent resource division matters,
such as inheritance rights, moving to a household concept may be
a better means of truly effectuating the intent of the property owner
over time. Professor Foster has documented the ways in which the
legal presumption in favor of blood relatives in inheritance disputes
not only unjustly enriches those blood relatives with tenuous links
to the deceased, but also deprives those truly important to the
deceased of both necessary support and rewards for the
contributions that they have made to the deceased's life. 3s ' The
classic case of human indecision in legal matters, which proves the
rule that formal attestation alone is insufficient to guarantee legal
autonomy, is the widespread failure of individuals to make wills.38 2
379. Braschi, 543 N.E.2d, at 211.
380. See, e.g., id. at 55. Typically, common law marriages were established when a couple
had lived together and held themselves out as married for a period of years, even though that
was not a formal requirement of common law marriage. See Bowman, supra note 21, at 713,
758-59.
381. See Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigmof InheritanceLaw, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199,
203-210, 270 (2001).
382. See Bruce H. Mann, Essay: Formalitiesand Formalismin the Uniform ProbateCode,
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It is doubtful that people do not make wills because they do not care
about exercising their autonomy over what happens to their
property after their death. Rather, it is more likely they do not
make wills because human choice making is more complex than the
legal model presupposes, and, in the case of inheritance, includes
much psychological denial of the death that precipitates an
inheritance dispute.383 Yet, inheritance law continues to deny the
reality of denial, by indulging in the presumption that blood
relatives must have been the natural objects of the deceased's
bounty, even where a testator's history would clearly suggest that
nonrelatives householders or even friends are more 'like family' to
him than his own family.3
Finally, some persons who have made harmonious private,
nonwritten arrangements and not public, formal agreements simply
do not anticipate the need for legal protection until it is too late until the relationships have reached such a stage that one or both
parties are unlikely to assent to the assumption of duties because
of discord. Again, however, to the extent that support and property
division disputes relate to the period between inception and demise
of a household, what occurs between those two points, as people live
and interact in a household, is far more likely to be an accurate
reflection of their intentions for the great bulk of the relationship
than what they are feeling at its beginning or end. At this point, the
accumulation of extrinsic evidence should be telling: for example,
two individuals who really are just roommates are unlikely to be
pooling income, purchasing property jointly on a regular basis,
supporting each other's children, signing each other up for employee
benefits, and so forth; while individuals who plan a more long-term
and perhaps permanent, commitment likely will do these things if
they are provided some legal security for their willingness to become
interdependent.
Children'sSecurity and Social Nurturance
As suggested, one key agreed-upon emphasis in the discussions
over covenant and gay marriage has been the role of the legal family
in raising children. Both advocates and detractors argue that absent
a loving, stable family life, preferably with more than one adult who
142 U. PA. L. REv. 1033, 1052-53, n.72 (1994).
383. Id.
384. See Foster, supra note 381, at 257-59.
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takes responsibility for the family's children, children are at risk for
any number of destructive behaviors both as adolescents and later
in life. 3" Advocates of gay marriage argue that this is precisely one
of the reasons that the legal institution of marriage should be
extended to lesbian and gay couples, while opponents argue that
such couples represent poor prospects for the healthy development
of children. 3"
Similarly, advocates of covenant marriage argue that children
are much more likely to grow up to be secure and competent adults
if their parents must make extraordinary efforts to obtain a
divorce.38 7 Covenant marriage opponents argue that the covenant
marriage form simply holds unstable and destructive families
together, when a single-parent household would in fact be less
chaotic and destructive for the family's children."s
However, the same-sex marriage debate has produced
considerable evidence on at least one point: that preservation of the
emotional security and the socialization of children can also be
served by other household arrangements, including domestic
partners, extended families, intergenerational families, and even
unrelated adults taking responsibility for children.38 9 While there
may be legitimate debate on the relative value of biological parents
rather than adoptive or unrelated adults caring for their children,
it seems increasingly clear that no matter what pressures the law
imposes on individuals to stay married and care for their own
children, many will not be willing or able to do so."g Indeed,
noncustodial fathers risk jail time every day to avoid support orders,
which are one of the least onerous forms of taking responsibility for
the upbringing and socialization of children.3 9 1
If some children will not have a married father and mother or
a committed same-sex couple raise them despite the many social
and economic pressures on parents to stay married, what purpose
385. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, CASE, supra note 45, at 112-113; Wald, supranote 45, at 300, 321-22.
386. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, CASE, supra note 45, at 112-113.
387. See Sanchez et al., supra note 211, at 6.
388. See id.
389. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 43, at 455 (discussing augmented families); Bengston,
supra note 117, at 9-10 (discussing intergenerational families); Erera & Fredriksen, supra
note 44, at 263 (discussing lesbian families).
390. See, e.g., NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, 43% OF FIRST MARRIAGES BREAK

UP WITHIN 15 YEARS, at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/releases/Olnewsffirstmarr.htm (last visited
Jan. 25, 2004).
391. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, Chronic Child Support Defaulters
Arrested in Nationwide Sweep, at www.hhs.gov/news/press/2002pres/20020731b.html.
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would government serve by denying those adults willing to form
a household to raise such children legal protections on the same
terms as it provides to married parents? To the extent that the
government wishes to encourage families to stay together, it would
seem to be operating based on a logical fallacy. If marriage is the
most solid foundation on which to build stability and security for
children, then providing additional support to that foundation while
denying it to other, more fragile household forms raising children
seems at least counterintuitive.
Similarly, if children know that they can count on the adults
who have raised them to continue to care for them, and that the law
will intervene to ensure that those adults keep such commitments
to them, they are more likely to pass on the stability and security
they have experienced to a new generation. If nonmarried adults
in a household know that the law will hold them jointly responsible
for the care of children, each person is more likely to embrace
the responsibility to meet the child's real needs. For example, the
legal recognition of the household as engendering duties to all of its
members is more likely to enable one adult to forego earning income
in order to protect against a future cohouseholder's exit, which
would provide more time to spend caring for the children in
the household.
Moreover, as with marriage, legal recognition of rights and
duties among household members can forge trust and lower the
anxiety accompanying relationships where expectations are less
clear, resulting in more attention to the children's long-term needs
rather than the adults' immediate emotional concerns. If indeed
more adults in the household creates a better childhood, then
a household concept of determining rights and duties owed to
children is more likely to result in a network of adults, biologically
related or not, caring for and continuing to have contact with
children over time.
Such a move does not necessarily require abandonment of a
presumption in favor of a biological or adoptive parent when
disputes arise. In the case where children are not being raised by
their original parents, the use of the legal household as the
operating legal concept simply provides more protection for adult
household members' responsibilities and rights to raise such
children against the outside world, without demanding that such
persons fight for their rights by creating guardianships and other
legal forms.
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By contrast, where a biological or adoptive parent is one of the
disputing parties, and the existence of an economic and socially
interdependent household has been established, family courts may
simply make a somewhat less absolute presumption in favor of total
control by the biological or adoptive parent. Whereas the nuclear
family model has, until recently, excluded nonparents (even
grandparents and stepparents) from any rights to the custody of the
child in the case of a dispute unless the biological or legal parent
makes serious parenting errors, 392 a household model may require
the legal parent, for example, to justify her refusal to allow
nonparent cohouseholder visitation or consultation on important
matters involving the child.
Substituted Autonomy
The current legal nuclear family also provides for decisions
on behalf of children and the mentally incompetent, and in some
cases, physically disabled adults. Yet, the nuclear family model
excludes many household members, including intimate partners,
from serving as substitutes to exercise decision-making authority
on behalf of an adult who cannot exercise her own authority
for a host of decisions such as medical care and the right to
receive visitors in the hospital. 3 3 Absent any preregistered wish
by the incompetent person through a medical power of attorney
or living will, generally members of the incompetent person's
nuclear family are designated first to make the medical decisions for
him, with a pecking order established in the case of serious conflicts
that may arise, such as withdrawing life support. 394 The same holds

392. See, e.g., Young, supra note 210, at 519-20 (noting the exclusion of unwed fathers and
stepparents in the case of disputes). But see John DeWitt Gregory, Defining the Family in the
Millennium: The Troxel Follies, 32 U. MEM. L. REv. 687, 718-24 (2002) (noting the uncertain
status of statutes permitting grandparent or third-party visitation statutes after Trozel v.

Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), which invalidated a grandparent visitation statute as violative
of a parent's fundamental rights to make decisions regarding their children).
393. See, e.g., T. P. Gallais, Aging and the NontraditionalFamily, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 607,
621-22 (2002) (noting that the Uniform Health Care Decisions Act of 1993 provides for nonfamily members to make such decisions, but only if none of the designated family members
are "reasonably available.")
394. Id.
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true for substituted judgment on behalf of children, although in
these cases, the legal model is sometimes 'best interests 'rather than
'substituted judgment.'395
In decisions for the incompetent adult, the abundance of
medical ethics reports on familial medical decision conflicts suggests
that simply substituting the judgement of identified family decision
makers such as spouses, children or parents does not obviate
familial conflict or make the decision any easier."9 In these cases,
experience has proven that the nuclear family paradigm is, once
again, both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. By providing for
automatic default to a spouse, parent or child if the patient is
incompetent and cannot convey his wishes on these matters, the law
often places key decisions in the hands of persons whose own needs
often overwhelm their ability to identify what choices the
incompetent person would make. Children's guilt or anger at dying
parents may cause them to needlessly prolong biological life or end
it early even in cases where it is questionable that their parent
would have made the same choice.397 Spouses faced with the
overwhelming burden to care for an incompetent person or the sense
that the patient's loss of life is their own may be less able to
objectively identify the patient's wishes than a friend or other family
member, even if the spouse knows the patient better. 98 Moreover,
as cases such as Sharon Kowalski's attest, those who live in a
household with the deceased may know his or her current wishes on
these matters better than a blood relative such as a parent who is
depending on a (perhaps distorted) historical memory of the child to
make medical decisions.
An ideal legal regime would put force individuals to express
their wishes through living wills or formal documents conveying
medical power of attorney. However, it would also call for a more
flexible legal inquiry about with whom the proper locus of decisionmaking authority rests if the patient defaults on his responsibility
395. Ardath A. Harmann, Family Surrogate Laws: A Necessary Supplement to Living
Wills and DurablePowers of Attorney, 38 VILL. L. REV. 103, 117 (1993) (discussing the best
interest test).

396. Id. at 151-52 (noting conflicts within families and between families and health care
providers).
397. Id. at 150.
398. Id. at 164-65.
399. See, e.g., David Link, The Tie That Binds: Recognizing Privacy and the Family
Commitments of Same-Sex Couples, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1055, 1134-39 (1990) (discussing the
Kowalski case and the problem of determining her wishes)

284

WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW

[Vol. 10:195

to name a decision maker, including consulting and perhaps even
designating a cohouseholder of long standing who may know the
patient's desires and needs more intimately than those who do not
live with the patient. Such a regime stands at least an equal chance
of preserving a patient's autonomy and minimizing conflict between
affected parties as a strict regime that identifies decision makers
only by blood or marriage.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

It is incumbent upon anyone proposing such a significant legal
change to enumerate its possible drawbacks, some of which I have
previously outlined and attempted to refute. However, it is also
important to acknowledge what tradition tells us, insofar as it is a
significant factor in determining whether such a legal change is
viable. Despite the fact that the household has functioned as a key
organizing social principle in many cultures, it is only honest to
acknowledge that the key legal relationships in most traditional
households were those based on marriage and blood ties, that is, the
'so called' extended family.4°° As discussed, the relationships within
the blood family were not the only ones that counted, but surely,
these relationships counted most significantly in the legal
organization of private life.
However, it is important to place this fact in some context.
Until the modem age, the key legal relationship of interest was the
real property relationship. Classical contract law, understood as
recognizing the intentions of the parties, did not become a significant
aspect of legal ordering of relationships until the nineteenth
century,"' and the legal regulation of commerce beyond contract is
a development of the twentieth century. 2 Contractual ordering of
family law is a fairly recent development.
It is perhaps not surprising that family law and property law
were effectively the same body of law prior to the nineteenth
century, given two distinct differences between the modern
construction of the family and it's pre-modem construction. First,
400. See supra Part II.
401. See Jay M. Feinman, CriticalApproaches to ContractLaw, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 829,
831-33 (1983) (noting that before that time, "contractual obligation arose not solely or even
principally from agreement, but from implied community standards of behavior").
402. See, e.g., id. at 829 n.1, 836-37 (noting that modem contract law emerged from the
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in 1960).
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pre-modern societies understood that social life was maintained by
linear historical continuity, that is, by ensuring stability in social
forms from one biologically-linked generation to another. 403 The
bloodline model of social construction was the easiest way to
accomplish the transfer of a stable social structure from one
generation to the next, since it was arguably simpler in an earlier
age to identify who was in one's blood family. Second, the key legal
need in pre-modern societies was to protect transfers of real
property, because all economic production was tied to land.
Generally, the key value that property law served was to ensure
that real property holdings remained intact in sufficiently large
'chunks' to make agricultural life economically viable.4 4
In modern societies, neither of these factors are present; indeed,
they are virtually beyond the imagination of ordinary persons.
Almost no modern Western societies are organized around the
principle that continuity of social organization from one generation
linked by blood to the next is vital to the maintenance of social
stability.' °5 Indeed, we might say that the twentieth century
disrupted any notion that Western families would carry on the
traditions of forebear generations, in favor of the expectation that
each succeeding generation would live radically different lives and
would have dramatically different occupations than the family
generation preceding it.
Moreover, real property has arguably receded as the central
organizing principle for the creation and transmission of wealth. In
the Western world, relatively fewer people participate in long-term
real property economies. For example, in the United States, only
about two percent of those working are employed in the agricultural
sector.' An adult who succeeds even one previous generation on
the farm is even becoming unusual; it is uncommon to find a farmer
who can trace his family's holdings back more than two
generations. °7 In urban areas, this disruption of the relation
403. See, e.g., Barbara R. Hauser, Born a Eunuch? Harmful Inheritance Practices and
Human Rights, 21 L. & INEQ. 1, 12-14 (2003) (discussing the importance of the law of
primogeniture in preserving the family line).
404. Id. at 13-14.
405. Id. at 14 ("Primogeniture was abolished early in the history of the United States...").
406. See U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, States Farm and Farm-RelatedEmployment, 1997, at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FarmandRelatedEmployment/ViewData.asp?GeoAreaPick
=STAUSunited%20states&YearPick= 1997 (last visited Jan. 25, 2004).
407. See, e.g., Val Farmer, Saskatchewan Soil Conservation Association, Stewardshipof the
Farmand Family, at http:/www.ss-ca.ca/1999proceedings/Fariner.html (last visited Jan. 25,
2004) (describing why children do not choose to succeed their farmer parents and proposing
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between real property and family continuity is even more
pronounced, for example, it is a rarity to find anyone who admits to
living in his great grandparents' house.
Thus, the chief reasons for aligning legal rights with bloodline
families have largely dissipated, while the need for more diverse
forms of household support and resource-sharing has increased.
Indeed, we might identify a reverse correlation between the need for
a large household and the wealth of the chief householder. Whereas
in ancient and medieval times, the smaller nuclear family was more
often located among the poorer classes because they did not have
the resources to support an extended household,"°s in a postmodern
technological market-based era, in which work and money are
separated from one's 'personal life,' single persons are more likely
to successfully maintain economically viable units than larger
groups of people, especially those with only one adult capable of
holding down a traditional full-time job.' Thus, the need for a
concept of the household as the key organizing principle in the
private sphere of the oeconomia is more severe lower down the
socioeconomic ladder.
Second, the most immediate objection to changing from the
nuclear family to the legal household as the primary building block
for legal rights is that it violates the basic legal preference for
incremental over revolutionary change."O This concern recognizes
not only the economic costs of rebuilding statutory and common law
around a new model, but the social costs entailed when dominant
groups lose privileged status to nondominant or visible groups in
society. As evidenced in the Civil Rights movement, the social costs
of granting even symbolic parity between subordinate and dominant
groups are severe. In addition to the widespread emotional sense of
impending social chaos, change of paradigms forces individual
some solutions).
408. See David I. Kertzer & Caroline Brettel, Advances in Italianand Iberian Family
History, in FAmiLYHISTORYATTHECROSSROADS: AJOUENALOF FAMILYHISTORYREADER 91,92

(Tamara Haraven & Andrejs Plakans eds., 1987).
409. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Table No. 660: Money Income of Families-Distributionby
FamilyCharacteristicsandIncome Level: 2000, STATISTICALABSTRACTOF THE UNITED STATES,

437 (2002).
410. Hon. Russell M. Nigro, Emerging Issues in State ConstitutionalLaw, Forward: The
Importance of Interpretive Theory in State ConstitutionalLaw, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 905, 908

(2000) ("Courts 'are cautious and reflective, if not by nature, then by nurture; legal education
is respectful of precedent and favors incremental changes' over revolutionary modifications
in the law.") (citing Boris I. Bittker, Interpretingthe Constitution:Is the Intent of the Framers
Controlling?If Not, What Is?, 19 HARv. J.L. & POL'Y 9, 51 (1995)).
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renegotiation of human relationships at all levels of social life. As
both the African American and gay rights movements have painfully
illustrated, these costs are measured in many ways: violence against
the subordinated group; backlash movements against social equality
that attempt to reinstate norms and social relationships that
predate present arrangements; interpersonal and intergroup
suspicions and stereotyping; and more incidents of personal
discrimination as individuals from dominant groups sense threat
from their neighbors' new status.41 '
The change from the family concept to the household concept
presents all of these potential threats. It is quite possible that
threatened dominant groups will attempt to reach back into a
historical past to restore norms and relationships that existed in an
imagined time of social stability and perfection. Yet the move from
the nuclear family concept to the household concept is not without
precedent nor is it a revolutionary concept in Western history or
even American life. As suggested, many federal statutes are
recognizing the new realities and moving incrementally to the
household as their key legal organizational concept. 1 2
One must also respond to the argument that such a change is
unnecessary, since virtually all household legal arrangements may
be created by contract if people want to deviate from the nuclear
family model. Same-sex marriage advocates have constructed a fair
piece of their argument on equality principles: excluding gay and
lesbian couples from marriage is unfair because of the vast number
of legal relationships dependent upon spousal relationship. 413 In
rebuttal, however, critics of same-sex marriage such as Prof. Collett
have argued that these claims are overstated, implying that many
of the rights and responsibilities that heterosexual married couples
enjoy can be duplicated by other legal arrangements.4 1 4
In my view, as with those who argue for the extension of
marriage to gay and lesbian couples,"'5 this argument understates
411. See Elizabeth Martinez, Beyond Black/ White: the Racisms of Our Time, 20 Soc. JUST.
22 (1993) (arguing that backlash against the 1960s civil rights movement increased racism
and increased tensions among racial and ethnic groups).
412. See supra Part III.
413. Mary N. Carnell, Note, Extending Family Benefits to Gay Men and Lesbian Women,
68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 447, 447 (1992) ("Providing opportunities to obtain family status to

person who live outside of traditional families is both equitable and worthwhile in advancing
the goals traditionalists promote.").

414. See Teresa S. Collett, Benefits, Nonmarital Status, and the Homosexual Agenda, 11
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 379, 390-91 (2000); see also Collett, supra note 203, at 1265-69.
415. See, e.g., ESKPIDGE, CASE, supra note 45, at 66-70.
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the relevant differences between statutory presumptions and
contractual arrangements. In some cases, such as duties of financial
support and limited rights to make decisions for others, including
children, the chief value of marriage is that it becomes the
automatic test for determining these rights and responsibilities. If
one enters into a legally valid marriage, one need not do anything
else to create the legal rights and responsibilities entailed by the
institution.
Others, to achieve a comparable legal status, must carefully
follow specific procedures for each right or responsibility they wish
to create - for example, absent a civil union or domestic partnership
law, lesbian and gay individuals who want to provide for
comparable intestate protections for their partners must follow
statutory will requirements to the letter in order to take advantage
of this protection, whereas straight spouses are protected at least in
part by intestate succession and taking against the will even if they
do nothing. Similarly, if homosexuals want to create a right to make
health care decisions for their partners, they must follow a quite
different set of procedures.
The dual track for creating rights and responsibilities has little
to say for it. It may have the advantage of ensuring that those who
live in the same household for convenience do not inadvertently bind
themselves to their house mates in significant ways. However, in a
society that complains that individuals do not make commitments
to others, it would seem more fitting to adopt a presumption of
commitment rebuttable by those who do not intend one. Because
this system should encourage reliance, it is preferable to the current
presumption of noncommitment that must be rebutted by the partner
who has relied.
Moreover, even in committed relationships, the requirement
that each right be formally legalized in a separate proceeding
discourages nonmarital partners from taking advantage of all the
rights and protections potentially available to them, even if they
intend to create a comprehensive legal relationship. Apart from the
time and expense involved in identifying and legalizing each
separate right and responsibility, the process of negotiation itself
can undercut the relationship. Any person who has been involved in
creating a prenuptial agreement can so attest.
When all questions of the relationship are contested,
opportunities for intentional and even unintentional exertion of
power over its terms in personally abusive and destructive ways are
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enhanced, while the anxiety over the partner's true commitment to
the relationship increases. This is particularly true in a contract
setting, where vulnerabilities and emotions rather than dollars and
cents are the main consideration and where there is more likelihood
of lopsided bargaining positions, as in cases where one partner loves
or needs the other more. As palimony cases, along with well known
divorce and prenuptial lawsuits attest, quasi-contractual agreements
among intimate partners exacerbate power differentials between
the parties.4 1
By contrast, the creation of a status relationship such as
marriage that comes with a presumed 'package' of rights and
responsibilities permits society some involvement in equalizing the
relative power of the parties and spelling out expectations for a fair
and just relationship. Yet, while status relationships, such as
spouse-spouse, parent-child, and guardian-ward impose a long list
of rights and responsibilities, they still give the parties considerable
freedom to negotiate other terms of their relationship that arise out
of its unique aspects, either formally or as they go along. Marriage
may impose the right to support, but it does not impose duties for
earning income or caring for the household or prescribe any level of
sexual intimacy, things that are presumed to be better decided by
the individual couple.
In other cases, the law makes it impossible for nonmarital
partners to create comparable rights and responsibilities.4 17 Most
federal benefits inure to the nuclear family - spouse/spouse,
parent/child. Even grandparents, aunts and uncles, or adult
brothers and sisters, to survey one degree of relational separation,
cannot take advantage of many federal benefits such as Social
Security survivor's benefits restricted to the nuclear family. Once
the very constrained way in which these federal programs limited
benefits might have been justified by administrative convenience,
because the dual spouse nuclear family described how most families
were organized, but in an age in which less than a quarter of all
households are organized in this manner,4 18 the presumption seems
ineffective as a means for protecting most social values.

416. Thomas J. Oldham & David S. Caudill, A Reconnaissanceof PublicPolicyRestric-tions
upon Enforcement of Contracts between Cohabitants, 18 FAM. L. Q. 93, 115-17 (1984)
(discussion of courts' response to unequal bargaining power among cohabitants).
417. Collett, supra note 203, at 379.
418. See POPULATION REPORTS 2001, supra note 26, at 3.
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However, advocates of the traditional concept of marriage
continue to argue for a legally preferential status for the marriedcouple nuclear family for normative reasons. First, they make the
argument that marriage is intrinsically good, so that treating
marriage as a qualitatively different from other relationships
supports and affirms the continuity of that tradition and choice of
those who enter into it.419 Second, they make consequential
arguments: just as good social policy encourages the rewarding of
'green' companies to push them to protect the environment, it
represents good social policy to encourage and support nuclear
families so that they stay together and accomplish the stabilizing
functions that they accomplish, particularly in a society that is
otherwise so fragmented and unstable.
Traditional marriage advocates make a point that bears serious
consideration: evidence that a social practice has been continued
throughout centuries and across cultures is a good indicator that it
meets some basic human needs and results in some fundamental
social goods, even if this is not a dispositive argument. We should
take seriously, as gay marriage advocates do, that the practice of
marriage should not be abolished simply because in some of its
manifestations, or at times in its history, it has been oppressive or
dysfunctional. This argument similarly supports gay advocates'
claim that, absent compelling evidence that the values of marriage
cannot be extended to their relationship, there is no reason to limit
the practice of marriage to those traditionally enabled to participate
in it.
While the nuclear family has been a core legal relation from
time immemorial, it has not been the only legal relation that confers
rights and responsibilities by law. The law can continue to support
the marital relationship even while expanding the kinds of
relationships that provide benefits meeting similar or additional
public policy objectives. Indeed, the government should do so unless
American public policy preferences favor increasing individualism
and personal freedom; that would seem unusual considering the
vast amount of literature and efforts that have gone into redefining
communal space and responsibilities in the past thirty years. In fact
one might argue that the past two centuries in which virtually all
legal rights and responsibilities of private life are vested in the
spousal-parent triad is the historical aberration, and the legal
419. See, e.g., Session Two: Legal, Equitable and Political Issues, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH.
RouNDTABLE 33, 46-47 (2000) (noting remarks of George Dent).
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household concept is the normal practice in human community.
Thus, for tradition's sake, we should be predisposed to utilize the
household as the legal unit, even if the household is defined differently from age to age and culture to culture.
Moreover, there are fundamental political considerations that
might militate against recognition of the nuclear family concept as
the socially preferred or most valued unit of legal responsibility in
the United States. In Establishment Clause cases such as Lynch v.
Donnelly, Justice O'Connor effectively argues that government
intervention that symbolically privileges groups with certain
religious beliefs automatically splits the political community into
'insiders' and 'outsiders.'420 Not only are outsiders symbolically
excluded from the polity, but they are discouraged from
participating in its core life. Conversely, insiders come to understand
themselves as a superior class entitled to special rights and
privileges. Despite the equality that single people and other
nonnuclear families enjoy in nonprivate areas such as work and
politics, many if not most of them can describe with anguish the
ways in which they are socially excluded, treated as invisible, and
even looked down upon in the sphere of family life because they do
not resemble nuclear families.
It is difficult to imagine what would justify the creation of two
classes of citizens, nuclear families and all others, through law,
unless nuclear marital families provide distinctive social benefits
that other forms of family cannot mimic, even in a shadow form.
The overriding need of societies to reproduce and raise children
seems in no danger in an era in which over-population poses one
of the greatest threats to the well-being of the world's inhabitants,
and in which new technologies make reproduction possible in
many ways.
Even if one concedes that the marital model may be the most
humane form for performing the sexuality function of the family,
the American family is called upon to meet many other human
needs in which sexual intimacy is not a necessary component and
which could be met as well, or even better, in the household concept
than in the nuclear family concept. That is not to say that because
the gulf between maleness and femaleness persists, there is no
value in preserving and encouraging intimate relationships between
males and females; for ethical reasons we cannot explore here, it
420. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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may be a critical aspect of preserving our humanity. Simply put,
these are not the only relationships that the law should encourage.
One more social point can be made in favor of the use of
household as the key legal organizing principle. Both feminists and
conservatives have decried the obsession that American culture has
displayed in past decades over sexuality in the narrow sense of the
word. Yet, a legal regime that focuses on sexuality, marital and
otherwise, to define and lift up relationships as socially important
contributes to that atmosphere. Restriction of marriage or civil
unions as the legally defining relationship to only those areas of
human life where sexual intimacy is truly important, while utilizing
the household as the key legal organizing concept for all others,
need not reinforce social understandings that sexual relations are
largely private matters. It may rather empower individuals to enter
any number of close companionate relationships without feeling
pushed into creating sexual relationships to support them, or
worrying about the perception that any close relationships they do
have are sexual. Unburdening companionate relationships from
these expectations is a critical social good in a society where human
community is often said to be sorely missing.
There does, however, remain one significant advantage to
marriage if the household becomes the main organizing concept for
legal rights and responsibilities. Perhaps it is true that modem
society has inverted the value to be served by the family, raising
companionate, self-expressive and nurturing roles above the
economic and intergenerational continuity roles it once served. If
that is so, then taking much of the economic and social burden off
marriage holds out the possibility that society can redefine the
institution of marriage to reflect these non-material goods and hold
individuals who determine to enter the institution of marriage to a
more circumscribed set of expectations with respect to their status
as married people, apart from their status as householders.
To the extent that bad marriages are driven by economic and
social expectations, the pressure on people to marry for the wrong
reasons will subside to some extent, as those expectations are
moved into the legal paradigm of the household. Such a movement
will permit both religious and secular communities to focus their
attention on the ways that sexual, procreative, and
intergenerational relationships preserve the human community,
and provide appropriate encouragement and support for
relationships that serve both individuals' interests in dignity and
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growth, and social interests in preserving the marital family as a
key unit for social flourishing.
Professor Woodhouse makes perhaps the most significant
argument for adopting a legal form such as the household in place
of marriage, in stories about people who have formed 'kinship'
groupings not based on blood or legal ties. Reminding us of what
Robert Frost so poignantly taught, she urges:
"home" is the place where there are people whose lives are
"somehow" bound up with yours, where they "have to take you
in" not because of what you can give or deserve, but because of
who you "are" - your unique place in an interlocking network
of individuals, families and communities linked by bonds of
socially constructed kinship.421
So, the bonds of the household concept are the interwoven
threads of freedom and responsibility, where people can be chosen
by the need of the others in the household to do the work of family
as well as choosing their families, where each relationship of care is
valued and none demeaned. This is a tradition that can birth a
future from the past.

421. Woodhouse, supra note 21, at 576.

